Signs of Unease in the Palace

THE South Vietnamese last week launched their first serious counteroffensive since Communist troops rolled into northern Quang Tri province three months ago. Some 5,000 marines and airborne troops--preceded by the heaviest naval and air bombardment of the war--were dispatched to Quang Tri province; some, in fact, were helilifted to within four miles of Quang Tri city. The operation's immediate aim was to secure two districts as bases for future thrusts into the rest of the Communist-held territory.

For the time being, at least, the South Vietnamese--or more precisely, U.S. saturation bombing--seemed finally to have contained the Communist offensive. Embattled An Loc was still under siege, but in the north, the long-predicted push on Hue had not materialized. American intelligence analysts are now convinced that the attack was scheduled for June 9 but was canceled after the North Vietnamese commander reviewed the condition of his four divisions in the area. The analysts believe that the U.S. bombing around Hue hurt the Communists so badly that it may take them a long while to recover.

Despite the evidence that the military threat was subsiding, there were some decided signs of unease emanating from the Presidential Palace in Saigon. They were primarily visible in President Nguyen Van Thieu's increasing use of --and demand for--arbitrary power. During the past 2 1/2 months, his government has ordered the arrest of thousands of "suspected Viet Cong sympathizers," including virtually the entire student body of Hue University; arrests are continuing at the rate of 14,000 per month, though U.S. and Vietnamese officials maintain that most of those detained are quickly released. Thirty-two opposition groups issued a statement denouncing the campaign, but no Saigon newspaper printed the story for fear of government censure.

Special Powers. Last week Thieu also assumed new dictatorial powers for six months in all matters relating to the country's national defense, internal security, financial and economic affairs --though he had considerable trouble getting his request for "special powers" approved by the South Vietnamese Senate. He had asked for the authority primarily to be able to deal by decree with South Viet Nam's worsening economic situation, most probably by levying new taxes and borrowing piastres from the National Bank. As the final Senate vote approached, Thieu's forces put pressure on Senators; some of them said that they had been offered as much as $12,200 and a round-the-world air ticket for a yes vote. In the end, though the Senate had previously defeated a similar bill, the opposition could muster only 24 out of 60 votes. With passage certain, they tried to delay the vote, then simply boycotted a meeting called by pro-Thieu Senators, who waited until after the 10 p.m. curfew and finally voted 26-0 to give Thieu what he wanted.

Even as Thieu is expanding his powers, many South Vietnamese politicians are beginning to wonder aloud whether he will be able to hold onto them for much more than six months. The speculation arises because the North Vietnamese are apparently unwilling to accept American terms for a ceasefire. They assert that a political settlement must come first--specifically, the provision that Thieu must be removed from office. The South Vietnamese are well aware that while the U.S. wants an independent non-Communist South Viet Nam, Washington has nevertheless gradually acceded to more and more of Hanoi's demands. The North Vietnamese have never budged from their position that both the Thieu government and U.S. forces must go before there can be peace in Viet Nam. Now more and more Vietnamese are wondering if, in an American election year, the Nixon Administration may not be willing to make some sort of concession that would lead to the departure of Thieu.

At present Thieu's enemies do not represent a cohesive threat to his political survival. And Thieu's new muscle will make it even riskier for his opponents to speak out in favor of proposals such as a coalition government or a ceasefire. When General Duong Van ("Big") Minh circulated a petition calling for Thieu's resignation, he managed to get only 50 signatures --all from National Assembly members, who enjoy legislative immunity.

One new potential threat to Thieu, however, is the re-emergence of the Catholic church as a force in South Vietnamese politics. The Catholics have remained largely apolitical since the fall of Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963. But a number of Catholics quietly opposed Thieu's efforts to eliminate his opposition in the presidential elections last October, and many currently support a Catholic political coalition with the Buddhists.

To keep the opposition contained, Thieu is under considerable pressure to produce victories on the battlefield--or at least a credible counteroffensive. That would also help keep in check South Vietnamese doubts about his place in the Nixon Administration's scheme of things. If the South Vietnamese army can reclaim some of the territory lost in the Easter offensive and restore order to the stricken parts of his country, Thieu may be able to forestall the cease-fire that he seems to fear--or at least improve his bargaining position should a cease-fire occur.

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