Heretic's Homecoming

For years he was reviled as an archtraitor of Communism, the heretic who destroyed the unity of the Marxist faith. But last week, in a dramatic culmination of a historic reversal of Soviet policy, Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito was treated to a hero's welcome in Moscow. At a state dinner in Tito's honor, Soviet Party Leader Leonid Brezhnev did not even allude to the earlier disagreements that led to the 1948 break between Stalin and Tito. Instead, Brezhnev praised Tito for "your friendly attitude toward our country." In perhaps the most ironic turnabout of all, Tito, who reached 80 last month, was awarded the Order of Lenin, the highest Soviet decoration, which is reserved for the Communist faithful. It was more or less as if Pope Leo X had conferred Rome's blessings upon Martin Luther.

Twice before, the Soviets have made major efforts to win back Yugoslavia, but each time those overtures collapsed because of troubles within the East bloc. This time the Soviets seem more determined than ever, at least in part because Yugoslavia's independent brand of Marxism exerts an unsettling influence upon the rest of Eastern Europe.

Moscow is also motivated by a desire to consolidate its position in Europe as a preparatory step to the Conference on European Security. Owing to the growth of Soviet seapower, Yugoslavia is strategically far more important than ever to Moscow, which wants a naval base on the Adriatic for its warships in the Mediterranean. The Soviets also seek to reassert their former "elder brother" status in Yugoslavia so that they will have a direct influence in the maneuvering that is bound to follow Tito's death or retirement.

The Yugoslavs are fully aware of the Russian motives. Nonetheless, they believe that the timing is promising for improving relations with Moscow without sacrificing their own unique political and economic system. The Yugoslavs would like to sell more goods to Russia in return for technical equipment and raw materials. Now, they feel, the Soviets could not put undue pressure on them for political concessions without jeopardizing Moscow's policy of detente with the West.

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so reader's discretion is required.