Is Thieu Necessary?

"Everyone knows that the most arduous problem now existing between the two sides is the problem of power in South Viet Nam," said Le Due Tho, the chief North Vietnamese negotiator at the Paris peace talks during a recent press conference. What he meant by that diplomatic euphemism is the possible replacement of President Nguyen Van Thieu's government by a broader-based regime. Thieu, with the long war in Indochina winding slowly toward some sort of resolution, has become the sticking point in any serious peace discussions.

The U.S. Government still strongly backs Thieu. For one thing, in the midst of the current North Vietnamese offensive, he seems to represent the only viable focus of political stability in South Viet Nam. For another, his ouster--or his resignation--would be a considerable embarrassment to the Nixon Administration. Nonetheless, Nixon's most recent "two-point proposal" to Hanoi --to end all military activity in Indochina within four months if North Viet Nam accepts a cease-fire and releases the American prisoners of war--did not include a declaration of support for the present South Vietnamese government. As part of his "eight-point proposal" in January, Nixon got the South Vietnamese President to agree to resign in advance of any internationally supervised election. Apart from that, Thieu might be forced to resign in humiliation if the former imperial capital of Hue were to fall or if the NVA were to sweep through the Mekong Delta.

The essential question, though, is what kind of government might replace the Thieu regime, and under what circumstances. The North Vietnamese have long made it clear that they want Thieu, the hard-line anti-Communist whose principal base of support is the military, out of office even before a ceasefire. Time and again they have insisted that the settlement of a postwar government in the South is a precondition to peace.

At the Paris talks, Hanoi has urged the U.S. to join in organizing a tripartite "government of national concord," consisting of members of the Saigon administration who have "changed their policy," representatives of other political and social forces in South Viet Nam (including South Vietnamese leaders living in exile in France) and the National Liberation Front. Not very convincingly, Le Due Tho has stated that "we do not want a Communist regime in the South." In private talks with U.S. officials, Hanoi has insisted on the power to decide who qualifies for all three factions, which would make a Communist takeover inevitable.

That kind of imposed coalition is patently unacceptable to the U.S. What Washington could tolerate--if Thieu fell, or were pushed, from office--is a multifaceted nationalist government strong enough to resist domination by the Communists, at least for a respectable period, but flexible enough to negotiate with the NLF and Hanoi. Such an interim government would have to include members of the army, anti-Thieu factions in the present South Vietnamese Assembly, and representatives of the major religious groups: the Buddhists, the Catholics, and the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sects.

Many potential leaders of such a government have been discussed in Saigon. Among them:

NGUYEN VAN HUYEN, 58, president of the South Viet Nam Senate. A Catholic, an intellectual and a Southerner, Huyen has been able to get along with Thieu without sacrificing his independence, and he is widely regarded as the Vatican's spokesman in Saigon. Under the constitution he would automatically become chief executive in the event of the resignation or death of the President and Vice President.

GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH, 56, a former chief of state. Despite his reputation as a poor administrator, "Big Minn," a Buddhist, is widely admired for his integrity. Although he withdrew from last year's presidential election charging that the U.S. had allowed it to be rigged in Thieu's favor, Minh may now be more willing to challenge Thieu's rule. Recently, he has been circulating a petition demanding that the President resign because of the failure of his leadership.

IRAN THIEN KHIEM, 46, South Viet

Nam's prime minister. A four-star ARVN general who is currently on extended leave from his army duties to satisfy the constitutional requirement that a civilian hold the largely powerless political post, Khiem commands considerable loyalty in the armed forces. Khiem also has been able to maintain his independence from Thieu and is consequently respected outside army circles.

IRAN VAN TUYEN, 58, a lawyer and member of the South Vietnamese Assembly. A leader of the anti-Thieu coalition in the lower house, Tuyen has a reputation for having frequently represented defendants in political trials in Saigon.

A non-Communist interim government, no matter who headed it, would almost certainly lead a perilous existence. To survive, it would require massive U.S. financial and political support. There is no assurance that a government of disparate groups could achieve a settlement with the well-organized National Liberation Front and avoid domination by the Communists.

For that matter, such a government might not even last long enough to negotiate. In any post-Thieu situation, the army would remain the most powerful non-Communist force in South Viet Nam. If a caretaker government seemed likely to give way to a Communist-dominated government that would seek reunification with the North, the army might well try to seize power and resume fighting.

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