How the President Sees His Options

THE U.S. was rapidly assembling one of history's most powerful naval armadas in the Gulf of Tonkin. It was shipping M48 tanks into Danang, landing tank-destroying, guided-missile helicopters from West Germany, reopening a bomber base in Thailand. Fresh fighter-bombers winged into the theater, bringing to 1,000 the number of U.S. planes poised to strike North Viet Nam. The gathering force had been ordered into place by a U.S. President who seemed determined either to blunt the Communist offensive that threatened to overpower such key South Vietnamese cities as Hue and Kontum, or to punish the North Vietnamese for succeeding.

Even as the buildup proceeded apace, a relative lull descended on the fighting, and there was muted optimism that the Communists might not after all succeed in taking Hue. But that would probably only mean a strike elsewhere. The prospect remained for more bloodshed in a war in which more deaths seemed pointless--and it cried out for negotiation. Yet, as so often in this agonizing conflict, there would obviously be no bargaining until the latest phase of escalation was felt on the battlefield. A tantalizing hope of a diplomatic breakthrough that might have avoided the showdown had flamed briefly, then flickered out.

The brief moment of optimism arose when Moscow, through Presidential Aide Henry Kissinger, had encouraged the U.S. to reopen the suspended Paris peace talks. President Nixon had expressed "the firm expectation that productive talks leading to rapid progress will follow." Arriving in Paris, Hanoi's top negotiator, Le Duc Tho, announced encouragingly that "we do not, in any way, want to impose a Communist regime in South Viet Nam." He met with Kissinger, who had once more slipped secretly into Paris. But after a few meetings, public and private, the U.S. and South Viet Nam again broke off the negotiations, claiming "a lack of progress in every available channel."

Washington was deeply disappointed. Said a State Department spokesman: "We are exceptionally frustrated." There was a feeling that Soviet Party Boss Leonid Brezhnev had misled Kissinger by exaggerating Hanoi's willingness to negotiate. "It was deception," snapped a senior U.S. official. Brezhnev's motive may have been to embarrass the U.S. before Nixon's visit to Moscow by making it look as though the new Communist offensive had pressured Nixon into suing for peace. Washington, on the other hand, had thought that the North's military gains had given Hanoi a new incentive to bargain.

Actually, any likelihood of Communist concessions was dimmed by the very success of the massive new attacks and the resulting panic among some South Vietnamese units (see THE WORLD). Hanoi doubtless was stalling until it could perceive the outcome at Hue and Kontum, where Communist victories could demoralize the South's military and civil authority and perhaps achieve the goal of toppling the Saigon government of President Nguyen Van Thieu. Thus Hanoi stuck to its past bargaining positions in Paris. The U.S., while proclaiming flexibility on its negotiating points, remained firmly behind Thieu. Said Kissinger: "The only thing we have refused to do is to end the war by imposing a Communist government on South Viet Nam."

Impasse. The diplomatic impasse still centered upon the Communist insistence that Thieu's government must be replaced by a broader, but undetailed "government of national concord," while the U.S. continues to equate Thieu with the principle of elective government in South Viet Nam. So far Hanoi has shown no interest in the one concession on the Thieu government --Thieu's offer to resign one month before the holding of an election in which the National Liberation Front could help supervise the electoral machinery and also campaign for office. The Communists demand that creation of a broad-based government, including representatives of the N.L.F., precede any election.

The U.S. has also offered a military-only package: a fixed and early date for withdrawal of all U.S. ground forces in exchange for a cease-fire and the return of all prisoners. The political settlement would then be left either to further negotiations or to whatever the Vietnamese factions can work out among themselves. Hanoi has spurned that, presumably on the theory that Nixon is committed to getting all U.S. troops out anyway and that Hanoi can achieve its goals only through continued military pressure on the South.

The grim mood in Washington thus centered upon the military options open to the President. For a leader bent on pulling out his forces, Nixon was still talking pugnaciously. At a political outing on Treasury Secretary John Connally's Texas ranch (see page 15), Nixon warned: "The North Vietnamese are taking a very great risk if they continue their offensive in the South." There seemed little doubt that the offensive would continue and that the military choices up to Nixon are limited--and dangerous. Among them:

> Resuming massive bombing of North Viet Nam, including military installations and supplies near Hanoi and Haiphong. The permissible targets could conceivably be expanded to almost any kind of large building and anything that moves. Less likely targets would be railroad lines carrying supplies out of China.

> Blockading the ports of Haiphong and other entry points for seaborne munitions and supplies. This could be done by massing U.S. ships as well as by mining the waters. It would risk direct conflict with Soviet and Chinese vessels.

> Supplying the landing ships for a diversionary hit-and-run strike into North Viet Nam by South Vietnamese troops. This would have to be at a coastal target like Dong Hoi, just north of the Demilitarized Zone. It could bolster ARVN morale and draw some NVA troops back North. But it would require some 10,000 troops and the South cannot readily spare that number. A similar raid could be conducted by ARVN paratroopers, but they hold key defensive positions in the South.

> Encouraging the South Vietnamese to counterattack near Hue, hoping to encircle the NVA forces threatening that capital. But this would require a swift turnabout by South Vietnamese troops in the area and before that could happen, the Communists seem likely to strike--or melt away.

Nixon has ruled out most of the other military possibilities, including the re-entry into combat of U.S. troops and the use of nuclear weapons.

As Kissinger and Nixon weighed the situation on the presidential yacht Sequoia on the Potomac, and the Kissinger-chaired Washington Special Action Group met repeatedly to organize options, the President once again seemed cornered, angry--and unpredictable. His Vietnamization policy, his desire for a Moscow summit meeting, even his reelection, all seemed threatened by the Communist military drive. The U.S. emphasized its willingness to return to the negotiating table at any time. But the odds seemed to be that nothing much would happen there until the present phase of the North Vietnamese invasion had run its course--and both sides stood back from the ruins to reassess their positions in view of the outcome.

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