Reaching for Supremacy at Sea

SINCE early in 1970, U.S. intelligence experts have been particularly interested in satellite photos of a ship with an exceptionally long keel being constructed at the big Soviet naval shipyard in the Black Sea port of Nikolayev. In recent months, as the hull began to take shape, the photos disclosed a number of significant details--large shafts for elevators, huge fuel tanks, a flattop deck. Last week some Defense Department experts were finally willing to make a striking prediction: the Soviet navy, which for years scorned U.S. attack carriers as "floating coffins" and "sitting ducks," is now building one of its own.

The Pentagon's leak about the mysterious ship at Nikolayev was obviously timed to coincide with President Nixon's request for more defense funds. It is possible that the vessel, which is about half complete, may turn out to be a tanker or a big cargo freighter. But some Allied naval experts are already willing to bet that the Pentagon is right, and that the ship really is Russia's first attack carrier (it already has two cruiser-sized helicopter carriers). If so, the decision to build an attack carrier represents a dramatic and fundamental shift in Moscow's naval strategy, with profound consequences for the rest of the world. "It changes the whole ball game," says retired U.S. Commander Robert Waring Herrick, a onetime naval attache in Moscow who wrote the authoritative book, Soviet Naval Strategy. "It could be an event of historical significance that would change the entire mission of the Soviet navy."

Throughout its rapid buildup during the past decade, that navy has remained basically a defensive force. Its chief military mission has been to deny the U.S. unrestricted freedom of the seas, especially in waters within Polaris-missile range of the Soviet Union, and to limit U.S. options for intervention in areas where the Soviets also have an interest. A decision to build attack carriers, however, would shift the capabilities of the navy from defense to offense. It would show that the Kremlin is determined to extend its own global reach by equipping its navy with seagoing airpower that could contest the U.S.'s dominance at sea. That could open a potentially sharper and more perilous era of competition between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

Alarming Rate. Even without a carrier force, the psychological and political impact of the Soviet navy is far greater than its actual power and potential would warrant. In terms of firepower and megatonnage, the other Russian services are more awesome. Moscow's arsenal of 1,510 nuclear-tipped ICBMs, which outnumber the U.S.'s Minutemen by 3 to 2, remains the major Russian strategic threat. Its superbly equipped army (2,000,000) is still the biggest worry to the U.S. and its NATO allies in Europe. Russian airpower, which is continually probing the air defenses of Western Europe and the U.S. (Britain alone made 300 intercepts of Red bombers last year), is developing at a rapid and alarming rate.

On the world scene, though, the Red fleet is the most dramatic and assertive manifestation of Russian will and determination to make its presence felt. Russian men-of-war are far more visible symbols of national power than the barely visible contrails of a high-flying jet bomber or the remote exploits of a spaceflight. Though the U.S. Navy still holds a sizable edge over the Soviets in firepower, technological prowess and mobility, the Russians have cleverly managed to project an image of rapidly shifting balance of naval power that has had a sizable impact on much of the world. Brigadier Kenneth Hunt, the deputy director of London's International Institute for Strategic Studies, jokingly taunts American friends by saying, "Remember, you still have the second most powerful navy in the world."

Moscow's naval buildup began in 1961 as a response to the U.S. decision to deploy its Polaris subs within missile range of major Russian targets. It gained considerable momentum after the Cuban missile crisis; the performance of the U.S. Navy convinced the Russians of the political and diplomatic value of seapower. Under the brilliant leadership of Admiral Sergei Gorshkov (TIME Cover, Feb. 23, 1968), the Soviet navy has been able to apply pressure on points that would cause the U.S. the most political discomfort. In less than a decade, for instance, it has started a sweeping pincers maneuver to outflank NATO on both its southern and northern sectors. With Russian warships in the North Atlantic outnumbering those of NATO by a 6 to 1 margin, Denmark and Norway are understandably anxious about continued membership in an alliance that in times of war could hardly be expected to effectively protect them. In the Mediterranean, Moscow's armada now outnumbers the powerful U.S. Sixth Fleet, 61 ships to 40. Not only are Turkey, Greece and Italy uneasy, but Yugoslavia is worried that in the event of a new outbreak of fighting in the Middle East, the Russians might try to seize one of its ports on the Adriatic as a base. The strategic value of Yugoslavia as a naval outlet.fqr the Mediterranean heightens the temptation for the Russians to intervene in that country's affairs in the uncertain situation that may well follow Tito's resignation or death.

Russian warships are frequently at anchor in Egyptian and Syrian ports, in part to inhibit Israel from making air attacks. The Russians are building huge new naval facilities on the Egyptian coast midway between Alexandria and the Libyan border. In the event of a new Middle East war, the Soviet fleet might try to blockade Israel, cutting it off from possible help from the West--even though such an act could mean a confrontation with the Sixth Fleet. Moscow justifies its looming presence in the eastern Mediterranean as a sign of its determination to protect the developing nations from imperialist machinations. Admiral Gorshkov has declared that "the protection of the fraternal and peace-loving peoples of the Arab world is a sacred mission of the Soviet navy."

At the Doorstep. In Washington's eyes, a recent ominous development in the Kremlin's naval strategy has been the increase in the number of its ships in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Defense and State Department officials believe that sooner or later India, in return for support during the Indo-Pakistani war, will allow the Russians to construct port facilities on its territory, as Egypt has done. (The Indians, who are intensely proud of their own muscular little navy, have persistently denied any such deal.) As a response to the expanding Soviet presence, the U.S. announced that units of the Pacific-based Seventh Fleet would make more frequent patrols of the Indian Ocean. That decision worries the Japanese, who fear that the Seventh Fleet may eventually be lured away from its role as part of Japan's defense. In addition, the Japanese fear that the growth of Soviet naval presence near the Chinese mainland will spur Peking into building up its own navy, and thus trap Japan between two naval powers hostile to each other.

The most audacious challenge is taking place almost literally on America's own doorstep. Five new Russian subs are now stationed off the U.S.'s East and West Coasts, their nuclear missiles aimed at American targets. During the past two years, Soviet task forces, in conjunction with Cuban naval units, have conducted antisubmarine exercises in the Gulf of Mexico, cruising at times to within 30 miles of the U.S. coastline.

The Nixon Administration insists that this naval presence in Cuba is not permanent. But U.S. Navy commanders in the Caribbean believe that the fleet will stay. The Russians have built a modern logistics base at Cienfuegos on Cuba's south coast that includes three large docks, a deepwater anchorage, repair facilities and, interestingly, a radio tower for communicating with subs. Russian fishing ships, merchantmen and oceanic research vessels operate from other Cuban ports. "In the 1970s," predicts Robert A. Kilmarx of Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies, "we may expect to see a Soviet naval presence in the Caribbean comparable to that which the Soviet Union now deploys in the Mediterranean."

Fast and Young. In its style and purposefulness, Soviet naval expansion might almost have been inspired by the prophetic writings of the American naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914), who contended that seapower is essential to a nation's economic well-being and political prestige. Russia's new approach to the sea, moreover, is not limited to building warships. Its merchant fleet is now even with the U.S. in tonnage. Its fishing fleet, which is three times as large as second-place Japan's, provides one-fifth of the country's protein supply.

The Soviets have also built up an oceanic research fleet of 200 ships--larger than the combined research fleets of all other maritime powers. In nearly every major body of water, their sea scientists are plumbing the depths for data on currents, water temperature and the sea bed that are vital to fishermen and submariners alike. Although responsible to different chains of command, the commercial and armed navies often work in tandem. A visit to a neutral port by a Russian freighter, for instance, may be followed by a request for docking privileges by a trawler fleet--then by the flag-showing appearance of a rakish, gray-hulled missile cruiser.

Russia's navy is divided into four geographically grouped fleets--the Baltic, the Northern, the Black Sea and the Pacific--of 270 to 350 vessels each. It is second in overall size only to that of the U.S., and in some categories of ships, it is far ahead (see chart). In general the Russian ships--which range in size from swift 83.7-ft. Komar missile boats to the 19,200-ton Sverdlov cruisers, no longer in production--are faster and younger than the U.S.'s (an average of about eight years, v. about 18 for American ships).

Fleet for the '80s. The Soviets are developing great momentum. At present, they are outbuilding the U.S. in naval vessels by the impressive ratio of 8 to 1. In addition, major Polish and East German builders are producing merchant ships for Russia, and the Soviets have ordered others from foreign yards from Japan to The Netherlands. In the frontline, high-sea naval squadrons, some classes of ship are being replaced by more advanced designs after only eight years of operational duty. The Kresta II cruisers (see picture box, next page), whose design is much admired by U.S. naval architects, will apparently be replaced in the near future by the smaller, cheaper but more heavily armed Krivac destroyers. "The Soviets," says British Military Expert John Erickson, "are building a fleet for the '80s."

That fleet will certainly include a powerful armada of nuclear-powered, missile-carrying submarines. Currently the Russians' most potent undersea weapon is the Y-class sub, called Yankee in American navy parlance, which is comparable in size and speed to the U.S. Polaris. As Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird will probably disclose in testimony to Congress this week, the Soviets now have in commission or under construction 42 Yankees. They are adding new ones at a present annual rate of twelve a year while the U.S. years ago leveled off its Polaris fleet at 41. The Russians are developing a new 3,000-mile undersea missile that would require the construction of an even larger sub. In response to the Soviet buildup, President Nixon last week requested funds from Congress for the start of development of a 5,000-mi. undersea missile called ULMS (for Undersea Long-Range Missile System). Russia's desire to strengthen its position in underwater missile-delivery systems is a major reason for the lack of progress at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. Meanwhile, the Soviets are engaged in a buildup of hunter-killer submarines, which the Russians regard as the best weapon against the Polaris subs.

The emergence of Russia as an ocean superpower has touched off a gigantic global war game on the seas. Sometimes the game is played with a dash of old-style chivalry and locker-room humor. As the rival ships maneuver, often coming within only meters of one another, the commanders exchange congratulatory signals on smart seamanship and derogatory remarks on poor shows. "Gorshkov wouldn't be impressed with that performance," one Sixth Fleet captain recently signaled to his counterpart after a particularly awkward maneuver. Sometimes close is too close, and the warning goes out: "You are interfering with my right of freedom of the seas."

Crucial Factor. Russian ships often cut across the bows of U.S. carriers as they launch and retrieve aircraft, mostly to annoy and distract. But they also come close to learn. As a possible preparation for starting up carrier operations of their own, the Soviets have filmed hours upon hours of U.S. and British carriers in action. Last summer, a Soviet destroyer in the Eastern Mediterranean was rammed and badly damaged by the British carrier that it was watching conduct nighttime landings and takeoffs.

In time of peace (or at least of non-war), the most important aspect of the high seas game is surveillance, which could be the crucial factor in victory or defeat if a real war broke out. While the Russians deploy a larger surveillance fleet of trawlers jampacked with electronic gear, U.S. technology is vastly far ahead of its rival's in the highly sophisticated field of submarine detection. Russian subs are what U.S. Navy men call "clankers"; their "signature"--the distinct and definable rumble of their engines, propeller shafts and other machinery--is noisier than that of U.S. submarines. To the great irritation of the Russians, whose sonar-laden "fishing trawlers" periodically tear up international cables in an effort to find America's undersea listening devices, the U.S. has crisscrossed parts of the ocean depths with lines of supersensitive acoustic receivers that pick up sub sounds (as well as whale songs, grouper grunts, and shrimp crackles) and flash them to a land-based central computer that can instantly identify the vessel's particular signature.

In addition to the cable systems, which are known as Sosus and Caesar, the U.S. also tracks submarines with sonar buoys dropped by aircraft and floating robot platforms that maneuver around the ocean surface. Currently under construction, at an initial cost of $1 billion, is an even more sophisticated system called SAS (for Suspended Array System). It consists of a towering triangular frame, its three legs situated ten miles apart, which will rest somewhere in the Atlantic on the abyssal plain, about 16,000 ft. below the surface. SAS will take advantage of the oceanic phenomenon that sound travels vast distances horizontally through the ocean's chilled lower layers. With ultra-acute hydrophones, which will be strung along its structure, SAS will be able to detect submarine noises in the deeper reaches throughout the entire Atlantic. A similar listening system is planned for the Pacific.

Bird Farms. In the unlikely event of an outbreak of war, which navy would win? Many U.S. Navy men are no longer so cockily confident of America's overwhelming superiority. Says one ranking naval officer: "Take the Mediterranean. If we lost those two bird farms (attack carriers), we would be in big trouble. It would be the 5-in. gun [the U.S. destroyer's basic weapon] against the 300-mile cruise missile. Sure we might beat them. But it is not certain, particularly if we lose the bird farms right off."

Vice Admiral Gerald E. Miller, commander of the Sixth Fleet, is considerably more optimistic. "I'm not running for Gibraltar yet," he says. A "brown shoe" admiral who still wears his pilot's wings, Miller believes that America's air superiority gives his fleet a decisive advantage over the larger Russian flotilla. The Sixth Fleet 'has about 160 A-6 Intruder and Phantom jets stacked aboard its two attack carriers, the John F. Kennedy and the Independence. Miner's Russian counterpart has only the limited aerial support of fighters and medium bombers at airfields in Egypt.

Test of Will. In the event of war, the Soviet navy would be a prisoner of its geography. Ships that were not already at sea might never get there. With the exception of the Northern Fleet's base at Severomorsk near Murmansk, the principal bases of the other three fleets are located in tactically difficult positions. A few hundred well-placed mines in the Kattegat and the Dardanelles would serve to bottle up both the Baltic and Black Sea fleets. In addition to having shallow and often ice-clogged approaches, the Pacific Fleet headquarters at Vladivostok is located on the Sea of Japan, which has only four narrow straits opening to the Pacific and is relatively easy to keep under surveillance.

The Soviet navy also has some severe shortcomings as an offensive force. In view of its growing global role, Britain's Erickson regards it as "overstretched." It badly needs air cover at sea and more permanent and developed bases near its new areas of operation. Though it might be able to deliver a powerful first blow, the Russian navy still is basically a one-shot outfit that would be virtually defenseless after it had emptied its quivers of missiles and torpedoes.

Admiral Gorshkov, who has run the navy for 16 years--considerably longer than the other service chiefs--is trying to remedy these shortcomings. Exactly how far the Soviet Union is prepared to go in its quest for dominance of the oceans will become more evident after the mystery ship in Nikolayev is completed. If it is indeed an attack carrier, naval experts would then feel that four to eight more must be in the planning stage if each of the major fleets is to enjoy the protection of seaborne aviation.

Even so, the carriers could not be truly operational until the end of the decade. It would probably take even longer to acquire proficiency in the complex business of running the floating airfields. If the carriers are anything like the ship at Nikolayev, they are only in the 30,000-ton range. They would be no match for the nuclear-powered 75,700-ton Enterprise and the other big U.S. carriers.

Still, the creation of a carrier fleet would be a test of Russia's intentions in decades ahead. The cost of building even one is so enormous and the requirements are so taxing for the already strained Soviet technological capacity that this decision must have ranked in the minds of the Soviet leaders as a crucial and historic choice. Moscow's political strategy holds that the outcome of the struggle between capitalism and Communism will be decided not by a clash between the U.S. and the Soviet Union but by the ability of the respective superpowers to create dissent among their opponent's allies and to exert influence upon the uncommitted nations. Russian policy toward Western Europe and Moscow's treaties with Egypt and India seem to bear out that theory. For the U.S. it would be a stunning irony of the nuclear age if such traditionally old-fashioned objects as naval ships should serve as the force that helped to tip the balance of power away from the world's most technologically advanced nation.

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