Trying to Make Up with Japan

WHEN the Japanese pay somebody a visit, they often take a gift. If the person happens to be wealthier, they expect to return home with a nicer gift than the one they brought. That is more or less what happened last week when Japanese Premier Eisaku Sato met with President Nixon in San Clemente--the last in a series of presidential conferences with heads of state before Nixon goes to the bigger summits in Peking and Moscow. After two days of talks, Sato could go home with the satisfaction of seeming to have got a little more than he gave.

If so, it was only deserved. Of all the nations in the world, Japan, a faithful U.S. ally, was hardest hit by the dramatic American policy reversals regarding China and international finance. Relations between the U.S. and Japan had deteriorated to such an extent that the State Department made frantic preparations for the meeting. Up to the last minute, experts were scrutinizing embassy reports from Tokyo, preparing papers and debating issues. Telephone lines between Washington and San Clemente hummed constantly.

No More Shocks. When the two-day round of talks ended, U.S.-Japanese relations had recovered at least some of their old cordiality. Standing with Sato under a towering pine in the garden of Casa Pacifica, the President said that they had just finished the "most comprehensive discussion which has ever taken place between the Prime Minister of Japan and the President of the U.S." Sato concurred. The talks, he declared, "contributed to strengthening the unshakable relationship of mutual trust and inter dependence between the people of the U.S. and Japan." Less enthusiastic, a Sato subordinate remarked: "I guess we will never be completely satisfied."

The main topics of conversation were China and Taiwan. Completely surprised by the President's about-face on Peking, Sato wanted to make sure that he was not caught off guard again. Nixon assured him that no more shokkus would be coming. When he goes to Peking, he will make no agreement that affects Japan. He did not reveal details of his agenda, but he told Sato that he expects to make only modest progress in China: some steps to expand trade, tourism and diplomatic contacts. Sato was especially fretful about Taiwan. Japan had been pressured by the U.S. into signing a peace treaty with Chiang Kai-shek in 1952, and it has complicated relations with the mainland. If the U.S. made a deal with China at the expense of Taiwan, Japan would be the largest nation retaining strong ties to Chiang. The U.S. position is that ultimate disposition of the island should be directly negotiated by China and Taiwan. Sato was still uneasy and hinted that Japan might have to take a more independent approach toward Taiwan.

Better communications between the U.S. and Japan were discussed by Secretary of State William Rogers and Japanese Foreign Minister Takeo Fukuda, who is considered the leading candidate to succeed Sato. Rogers rather lamely explained that the U.S. did not forewarn Japan of the presidential visit to Peking because it was afraid there would be a leak that would jeopardize the trip. When Rogers finally did call Sato to inform him, 20 minutes were lost in a search for a translator. To make certain of quick contact from now on, the U.S. agreed to install a hot line between Washington and Tokyo.

Sato won another concession that should help him at home. The U.S. had wanted to return Okinawa no sooner than July 1. Under Japanese pressure, Nixon agreed to move up the date to May 15. Sato badly needs some accomplishment to let him end his career in honor. Nixon also made explicit an earlier U.S. guarantee to remove all U.S. nuclear weapons from Okinawa. He would not agree to reduce the 88 U.S. military facilities on Okinawa allowed under the treaty, but he promised to review their status periodically.

The two heads of state wanted to keep the talks on a general political level and not give the appearance of doing too much haggling over details. Still, there was little question that the U.S. expected something in return for its concessions on Okinawa. When asked if political issues would be linked with trade matters, Secretary of the Treasury John Connally replied: "Well, if I were President of the U.S. or Premier of Japan, they would sure be linked." Faced with close to a $3 billion-a-year trade imbalance with Japan, the U.S. is anxious to sell the Japanese some products that are now kept out by quotas--feeder cattle and oranges, for example. But the Japanese contend that they have already done the U.S. a favor by putting a voluntary limit on textile exports to America. No firm commitments were made during the meetings between Connally and the Japanese negotiators; trade talks will resume later this month.

Ambiguous Stance. One basic problem remains: Japan's place in the world. While advancing economically at a stunning rate, Japan has shied away from assuming increased military responsibility. Though not wanting Japan to become a nuclear power, the U.S. would like it to spend much more on conventional armaments and exert more political influence in Asia. But Sato and Fukuda emphasized that they prefer to stay comfortably under the U.S. security umbrella for the time being.

It is an ambiguous stance. As much as the Japanese need the U.S., they resent their dependence. At a final press conference, Sato was asked if he would invite Nixon to visit Japan. Out of the question, said the Premier. He recalled that when his brother, former Premier Nobusuke Kishi, asked President Eisenhower to come to Japan, such a storm of protest broke out that the visit had to be canceled. "This incident is stuck in my memory," said Sato. Today the same anti-American elements could still cause trouble, "and that would be a case where two brothers would be committing the same sort of error."

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