Monday, Dec. 06, 1971

Middle East: War Jitters

THE Middle East may be problem No. 5 to you," Egyptian President Anwar Sadat recently told a visiting diplomat, "but it's crisis No. 1 to me." Last week Sadat was doing his best to make it crisis No. 1 for the rest of the world as well. Wearing a khaki uniform, he viewed sandbagged positions along the Suez Canal and delivered bellicose pep talks to the troops. "I have come to tell you," Sadat said, "that the time to fight has come, that there is no more hope. Our next meeting will be in Sinai."

Sadat's statements set off the Middle East's worst war jitters since a ceasefire began along the canal 16 months ago. Floodlights and neon signs were doused in Cairo, blue dimout paint was smeared onto auto headlights and plate-glass windows. Civil-defense equipment was pointedly inspected, including electronic amplifiers that would supposedly magnify groans from victims trapped under debris. At the same time, the top military commanders of a dozen Arab nations met in Cairo and, according to Egypt's hawkish Chief of Staff Major General Saad Shazly, "voiced full desire to participate in the battle against Israel."

The Israelis responded with scare headlines: EGYPT ASSEMBLES LARGEST

ASSAULT FORCE SINCE D-DAY,*and SYRIA LIKELY TO JOIN FRAY. The first nationwide test of air-raid sirens since the Six-Day War of 1967, added to the scare. Premier Golda Meir, addressing Labor Party leaders in Tel Aviv, warned: "We cannot permit ourselves to carry on with the attitude of business-as-usual with Sadat saying to his people not that he will win, but that he will take them into battle."

Five Failures. Despite such alarms, war did not appear imminent--at least not until after a United Nations debate on the Middle East, scheduled to open this week at Arab insistence. The Arabs were apparently trying to generate pressure, principally on the U.S., to end the stalemate that has existed since the cease-fire began. Dissatisfied with U.S. peace efforts, the Egyptians hope to sway opinion in the U.N. General Assembly, where there is a built-in anti-Israel majority. Ideally, the Egyptians would like to achieve a U.N. vote for economic sanctions against Israel, and an arms embargo that would embarrass the U.S., Israel's largest supplier.

If Sadat was trying in a none too subtle manner to put pressure on Washington, so was Mrs. Meir. Israel is anxious to obtain at least 50 more U.S.-built Phantom jets, particularly in view of continuing Soviet military aid to Egypt. The U.S., however, insists that Middle East arms are still in balance and refuses to provide additional planes. Last week Israel played up the news that eight to ten more Soviet TU-16 "Badger" bombers had arrived in Cairo and that they were capable of carrying air-to-ground Kennel missiles with a range of 50 miles. Washington maintained that in spite of these Badgers the Middle East arms balance had still not been upset. The Israelis thereupon complained that U.S. intelligence has erred on at least five prior occasions, including a failure to detect the initial Soviet missile movements into the Canal Zone when the ceasefire began last year.

Ample Leverage. Mrs. Meir arrives this week for a face-to-face confrontation with President Nixon. Her friends in the U.S. gave her ample leverage last week. The Senate voted 81 to 14 for $500 million in military credits for Israel, half of it specifically earmarked for Phantoms. Eight Senators representing both parties meanwhile paid a private call on Secretary of State William Rogers to urge him to change his stand on Phantoms for Israel. Rogers not only stood fast but told the group that Israel's intransigence on peace terms was isolating it in world opinion. The U.S., he said, was Jerusalem's only true friend.

Rogers is likely to say as much to Mrs. Meir; in addition, U.S. officials will contend that even if they did approve Israel's purchase of more Phantoms, the planes would be a long time coming off production lines. The fact is that if Washington wanted to, it could provide the planes almost immediately. Two years ago, a fleet of 50 Phantoms for Israel was put together out of allotments ticketed for the U.S. Air Force; the planes were hurriedly swabbed with the white and blue insignia of Israel and rushed across the Atlantic. Plainly the Administration is sidetracking the present request so as to pressure Israel into peace concessions. But with U.S. elections upcoming, Nixon may be hard put to continue saying no.

Super Dilemma. The domestic ramifications of the situation are not lost on the Arabs. In an interview with TIME Correspondent Gavin Scott in Cairo last week, Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad, a shrewd and seasoned diplomat, professed to be confused. "It is something we cannot understand--how a superpower wild certain responsibilities about peace in the world can be affected by some votes in an election. We don't understand how it is commonly accepted that the Jews are a community completely separate from other Americans, as if their loyalty is to Israel rather than to their own country."

Riad also wondered why a superpower like the U.S. should have any difficulty at all telling Israel precisely how to behave. "I recall what Dean Rusk said to me in 1968," Riad told Scott, "when I asked him about the U.S. position on withdrawal by Israel. He said, 'There is no doubt that we don't want any country to annex territory of another country. This is our policy, so the Israelis should no doubt withdraw from your land.' I replied, 'Why, then, don't you make a public statement? That's all we want.' Mr. Rusk said, 'We are a superpower. We are not Upper Volta or Gabon, and if we say that Israel should withdraw, then they must withdraw.' "

Continued Riad: "Mr. Rogers has said Israel should withdraw. He has said that the U.S. would use all its influence to see U.N. Resolution 242 implemented and the U.S.'s own plan implemented. When you hear these words from a big power--that it will use its influence--well, it's something that has big meaning. That is why we agreed to the U.S.'s playing a role. But if it turns out that the role is no more than that of a small power like Nicaragua or Costa Rica or Malawi, what's the point in receiving any American representative?"

One Small Incident. Riad assured Scott that in spite of Sadat's fiery statements, Egypt is not intent on war. He said, "When you hear from us that there will be no more discussion at the United Nations and that we refuse Resolution 242 [calling on Israel to withdraw from occupied territories in exchange for secure and agreed borders]. then you can say that Egypt is ready to fight."

The trouble is, however, that warlike words ring louder than peaceful protestations. Sadat, by having repeatedly proclaimed 1971 as Egypt's "year of decision" against Israel, and now by telling the army that the time to fight has come, is painting himself into a corner. Using another image, an old U.N. hand last week put it thus: "Sadat, like Nasser before him, has developed a habit of hanging himself on a hook and then pleading with the major powers to get him off."

Before they do, though, one small incident could occur that might get out of hand. Significantly, Israel has already dropped warning hints that if Egypt attempts to resume even limited warfare in the Suez Canal Zone, its troops will retaliate in full force. There will not be another war of attrition, the Israelis insist, but an all-out conflict. And then problem No. 5 would again become everybody's crisis No. 1.

*Egypt has an estimated 70,000 men stationed along the canal, in addition to 10,000 commandos training for hit-and-run raids. It also has an estimated 1,000 pieces of artillery in the area, including 203-mm. cannon with a 30-mile range, as well as nearly 1,000 tanks and an undetermined number of Frog ground-to-ground missiles. Israel's opposing force is smaller but well equipped, better trained and is dug in along the formidable, 100-mile Bar-Lev Line. Moreover, it is supported by a superior air force.

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