A Western Explorer Heads for Moscow

IT is probably one of the most difficult jobs in modern diplomatic history. "It makes the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks look like a kindergarten scene," says a top official of the U.S. State Department. The job is to lay the groundwork for a proposed conference between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact nations to bring about the reduction of armed forces in Europe. Earlier this year, Soviet Party Leader Leonid Brezhnev surprised the West by suddenly endorsing its longstanding proposal for such troop cutbacks. NATO, suggested Brezhnev, should try tasting "the wine" of Moscow's intentions. Last week, at a Deputy Foreign Ministers' meeting in Brussels, NATO chose a man to do just that: Manlio Brosio, 74, the meticulous Italian diplomat who retired as NATO's Secretary-General last month after serving for seven years in the post.

Only the Beginning. A self-effacing, unemotional and uncommonly aloof man, Brosio is expected to leave for Moscow before mid-November to "explore" the situation, accompanied by a lean staff of no more than four or five technical experts. His mandate, as one NATO official put it, is "to taste the wine, but not to drink it"--to ask questions about Soviet intentions but not to negotiate. Though the Kremlin considers Brosio a hard-lining cold warrior because of his long service to NATO, he has stressed the importance of detente. "The Soviet Union views detente as a permanent struggle short of war," he said earlier this year. "The allies must press for their own kind of detente--modus vivendi in Berlin and Germany, the reduction of armed confrontation in Central Europe, economic cooperation, and the freer movement of people and ideas."

The central problem that Brosio must deal with is the present balance of power in Europe. In the East, the Warsaw Pact countries have 2,300,000 troops, 1,700,000 of them Russian; the NATO powers have 2,100,000 troops, only 300,000 of them American. The huge imbalance in numbers between Soviet and U.S. troops is only one factor. Another important element is the geographic gap; while Russian troops can withdraw from Central Europe by pulling back only 300 or so miles, the Americans must cross the 3,000-mile Atlantic to do so. Since the "negotiable" U.S. troops in Europe are fewer and have farther to withdraw than the Russians, the U.S. insists on an "asymmetrical reduction" rather than a one-to-one cutback.

This is only the beginning of Brosio's problem. NATO members in the Baltic and Mediterranean regions are afraid that any troop reduction in Central Europe would simply release a flood of Russian troops to put pressure on NATO's northern and southern flanks (see box opposite). Then there is the matter of the 329,000-man French army, which is outside Brosio's domain. France was the only one of the 15 NATO powers that did not endorse Brosio's mission, making it clear that the Italian explorer is in no way empowered to speak on its behalf.

Western Doubts. The Soviets are rather reluctant to deal with an explorer rather than a negotiator and one who, moreover, represents 14 diverse clients. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko emphasized to U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers two weeks ago that "it would be better all around" if Washington and Moscow negotiated force reductions bilaterally. But Rogers, acutely aware that Washington's allies are already nervous about the bilateral SALT talks, insisted that the troop cutbacks be worked out by all of the NATO countries.

The whole question of East-West negotiations is complicated by doubts about the Soviet Union's sincerity in pursuing detente. On the one hand, there have been several indications that Moscow is genuinely interested in untying some of the knottier East-West problems--SALT, the recent preliminary Berlin agreement and perhaps eventually negotiations on limiting Soviet and U.S. military assistance to other nations. Yet at the same time, the Soviets are mounting a long-range military buildup that could, in the next several years, drastically alter the prevailing balance of power. Pentagon sources point out that the Russians have quietly been modernizing and building up their air force and ground units as well as their navy and missile arsenal, which have gotten most of the attention. The State Department believes that the Soviets are in an expansionist mood. What worries U.S. policymakers is that despite Moscow's mood, Congress will continue pressing for a partial but unilateral American troop withdrawal from Europe.

Vague Threat. The Russians are aware of Washington's problems and can thus be expected to stall on convening a conference. Meanwhile, Moscow is pressing for another conference, this one on European security, probably to be held some time next year. Such a conference would serve Soviet ends by formalizing the status quo in Eastern Europe and the separation of the two Germanys, encouraging an atmosphere of relaxation in Western Europe and increasing pressure within the U.S. to bring the boys home. The U.S. sees a security conference as a Soviet-inspired propaganda measure, but Washington has indicated that once the Berlin question is resolved, it would have no objection to the conference--provided, of course, that the U.S. and Canada are invited.

But is the Berlin question resolved?

Observers have been predicting that a final Big Four agreement could be ready by early next year. Two weeks ago, however, Gromyko hinted that Moscow would not sign a Berlin agreement until West Germany ratified the nonaggression treaties that Chancellor Willy Brandt signed last year with the Soviet Union and Poland. Brandt has made it clear that he will not press for ratification of the two pacts until a final Berlin settlement has been reached. In all likelihood, Gromyko's vague threat was merely an oblique reminder to the West Germans that Moscow would like to see the treaties ratified as soon as possible.

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