A Break in the Deadlock

"I am not here to be hopeful," declared Lord Goodman, Britain's portly envoy to the breakaway colony of Rhodesia, as he flew into Salisbury for the third time this year. But after two days of talks with Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith and his Cabinet, Lord Goodman was optimistic. Nearly six years after Smith made a unilateral declaration of independence from Britain, the Rhodesians and the British seemed to have made progress toward a compromise that might restore Rhodesia to colonial status--if only temporarily. The chance of a settlement, according to London diplomatic sources, stood at perhaps 50-50.

Even those odds looked good after five years of deadlock. As recently as last July, British Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home advised his Cabinet colleagues that a settlement would be something close to a miracle. Originally, the Rhodesians broke away over Britain's insistence that they prepare a timetable for Black African enfranchisement, and thus for African majority rule. The terms of the new proposal would comply with that principle, but emphasize a more gradual approach.

New Formula. Though the details remained secret, these terms were based on five key points: 1) Rhodesia's 5,000,000 Africans will be permitted to make "unimpeded progress" toward majority rule over a period of at least 30 years, 2) the Rhodesian legislature will pass no new laws of segregation or suppression, 3) the political status of Africans--who outnumber whites by more than 20 to 1--will be raised by degrees, with the help of British grants of $12 million a year for African education and economic development, 4) the Rhodesians will work toward eliminating racial discrimination, 5) the British government must be satisfied that the formula for eventual independence is acceptable to Rhodesia's African population.

In previous discussions, African commonwealth members insisted on a formula for Rhodesia that came to be known as NIBMAR--no independence before majority African rule. The current version might more aptly be called NIBMARIG--no independence before such rule is guaranteed.

Major Concession. The agreement was still incomplete last week. Lord Goodman admitted that one point--he did not say which--was not settled. What had happened to bring the two sides even that close after five years of deadlock? For one thing, British Prime Minister Edward Heath has shown himself, by such gestures as selling military helicopters to South Africa last February, to be less concerned about Black African feelings than was his predecessor, Harold Wilson, and more willing to make a compromise settlement.

The major concession, however, seems to have come from the Rhodesians--as a direct result of the economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations five years ago. The U.N. at that time called on all members not to trade with Rhodesia so long as it remained independent. The sanctions were evaded by most of the world's leading powers, notably including Japan, the Soviet Union and China (but Britain and the U.S. complied).

Hapana Basa. For years the blockade seemed to have little effect on Rhodesia, but the cumulative impact was severe, particularly on Rhodesia's tobacco industry, which wound up with China as almost the sole customer for its ever-increasing stockpiles of tobacco leaves. The U.N. measures forced Rhodesia "to sell at a discount and buy at a premium," as Smith recently put it.

Moreover, Rhodesia is desperately short of spare parts for industrial equipment and aircraft. Unemployment is high, especially among unskilled Africans; almost every factory and store bears a sign that reads, in the Matabele language, HAPANA BASA--no work. Foreign-exchange holdings are at their lowest in five years, and Rhodesia has been particularly hard hit by the recent revaluation of the Japanese yen, which made Japanese automobiles and other manufactured goods costlier than ever.

Smith may back out of any agreement with Britain, as he did in 1966 and again in 1968. He is vulnerable to criticism from ultraconservatives in his Rhodesian Front party; a dozen of them have already threatened to resign if he compromises the power of Rhodesia's 250,000 whites over 5 million Africans. It also remains to be seen whether the U.S. Senate vote last week to lift the embargo on Rhodesian chrome might strengthen the hand of Rhodesia's hardliners.

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