Two Voices in a One-Man Race

AS befits a one-man race, the pace of the official month-long campaigning that began last week for South Viet Nam's presidency was positively glacial. Until a TV appearance at week's end in which he suggested that a no-confidence vote would be a vote against democracy, President Nguyen Van Thieu had not made a single campaign speech. His total campaign effort, it appears, will consist of three TV and three radio broadcasts. Previously planned visits to the countryside were scrubbed for security reasons, but were unnecessary anyway in the absence of any opposition. Saigon, meanwhile, hummed with exotic speculation about the shape of things to come. One opposition daily even wryly suggested that Mme. Thieu had threatened suicide if her husband did not resign. The newspaper was promptly seized.

Saigon's political mood could best be described as tense but basically subdued, despite Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky's efforts to inject some life into it. General Duong Van Minh had dropped out. Ky was barred from the presidential race by South Viet Nam's Supreme Court, then given the go-ahead, but he dropped out anyway, protesting that the contest was rigged. Last week he again publicly called for Thieu's resignation. In place of the Oct. 3 balloting he suggested that he, as Vice President, take charge of South Viet Nam and organize new elections within 90 days. He pledged that he would not run. To nobody's surprise Thieu ignored the suggestion.

Between the public ploys and private power plays, the campaign at times seemed a Mad Hatter's version of due constitutional process. Seeking a closer understanding of the attitudes and intentions of the two figures most deeply involved in the race, TIME requested and was granted lengthy interviews last week with both the President and Vice President. Excerpts from their exchanges with Chief of Correspondents Murray Gart and a group of TIME reporters appear in the following stories.

THIEU: A QUESTION OF CONFIDENCE

In his plushly carpeted office in Saigon's Presidential Palace, Thieu was very much at ease. Seated on a red chair, he spoke in a strong voice and laughed often at his own jokes. Yet there was something slightly defensive about his answers.

Q. Mr. President, could you tell us your view of the current political situation?

A. It is very clear. As President I cannot do otherwise but abide by the Constitution and the law. And I have mentioned very clearly that unfortunately the ticket which remains is mine. (Laughter.) Now Vice President Ky suggests that I resign. Why? I have no reason for that. I cannot abandon the country. I would be accused by the people and the historians. To the army I also said very clearly, if the whole army comes here to say "You betray your country, you go against the people," you can have a very peaceful coup d'etat. (Laughter.) If [however] the National Assembly wants to postpone the election, then it must amend the Constitution. To do that it needs a two-thirds majority. If it does that I will not abide as President. Now as to the election, I say clearly, because it has a very particular character, it's an election of confidence or noconfidence. The way for people to express their will, if they do not like me, is to make the ticket illegal and irregular.

I take this opportunity to make an appeal for many observers to watch us when we count the ballots, so one can see Thieu, Thieu. Thieu. Thieu. mutilated. Thieu. Thieu. Thieu, blank, Thieu, Thieu, until we end the vote. The information center will provide them with helicopters, planes, cars, boats, anywhere, anytime.

Q. What would happen if you failed to get 50% of the vote?

A. Any candidate who respects himself cannot accept less than 50%. He would have to wash his face and go home. I can say that below 50% I'm ready to go. It's a matter of personal prestige.

Q. With the Americans withdrawing, what sort of continuing U.S. involvement do you want?

A. We have 1,100,000 men [under arms]. What we need is not more men but more equipment to cope with what we met in Laos--heavy artillery and tanks. I mention tactical air support, B-52s, helicopters. We do not expect any participation of U.S. infantry troops by the end of 1972. What we need is technicians, advisers, maintenance people [for tasks] that we cannot do.

Q. What if President Nixon were to announce in November that the U.S. was withdrawing entirely by, say, next May?

A. It's not logical, because we cannot fight alone without the minimum of U.S. support. We need the U.S. Air Force, the fire power, the flexibility. This is the real situation of the Vietnamese forces. You know it's quite clear that the Communists will not leave us quiet. They are waiting for the last test with our forces after the American withdrawal. I'm ready for that. So I say maybe a peace settlement may come in 1973.

Q. Are you satisfied that people around the country recognize you as having brought improvement to their lives?

A. Of that I'm very sure. Everyone in the countryside asked by me or others, "What is different about President Thieu?", answers, "Security, prosperity, these two things." They don't care about politics, the Senate, Congress. [They care about] security, freedom of movement, miracle rice, law, land reform, tractors, fertilizers.

Q. Will Minh and Ky be free to organize opposition to you?

A. During the campaign, everyone can speak out against me in every way. When General Minh was in exile, he told me he would like to come back to grow orchids and to be with his sons and grandsons. But I told him he could come, he could organize a political party, he could do anything. Now when he says if Thieu were reelected, maybe he would have to leave the country, I think he is a very narrow-minded man.

Q. Is there any difficulty in your working in the same administration as Mr. Ky?

A. The last time we shook hands was on Armed Forces Day [June 19]. Can you conceive, he began to insult me one year ago? As a politician it's possible, but as a man, it's very different.

KY: A HINT OF FORCE

Vice President Ky spoke to TIME in the small study of his fortified mansion inside Saigon's Tan Son Nhut airbase. On a small end table was an autographed photo of Spiro Agnew. Only when the interview was over and he was showing his visitors out did Ky make his most disturbing statement: "In South Viet Nam, you know, the use of force is constitutional." He was pointing out that President Thieu had resorted to force in 1963 as part of the conspiracy that overthrew Ngo Dinh Diem. A repeat of this episode, Ky suggested, would not be impossible if Thieu continued to run for election unopposed.

Q. Do you foresee an upheaval in the country if President Thieu is re-elected in the election that is planned?

A. In the present situation, I think so. But if he is elected in a fair and honest election, then even with a minority of 30% or 35% we would accept him.

Q. Do you believe that you could not have conducted a fair campaign as things were organized?

A, You know exactly what happened when they put me on the ballot a second time. Mr. Thieu had used all kinds of maneuvers to eliminate me from the race, hoping first that Minh would stay in the campaign. You know, one general told me recently that he was upset by the Thieu maneuvers. So he came down to Saigon and asked Mr. Thieu why he was doing this. And the President told the general he was afraid he would be a loser in a three-way race. That's what Thieu told his closest friend.

Q. Two weeks ago you reportedly said you would make an effort to get Mr. Thieu out of office. Was this a misinterpretation?

A. I recognize that a coup is possible. Until now I have always been against a coup. My statement was in answer to a correspondent's asking what I would do if Thieu tried to arrest me. If he did, I would have no choice.

Q. Do you get along with the President on a personal basis?

A. As you know, there are differences in our two personalities. I want to go very fast, but he wants to go very slow. The problem with him is he doesn't want competition. He is a kind of blind man who sees nothing after four years of power.

Q. Did Ambassador Bunker offer you a great deal of American money to stay in the presidential race?

A. I consider that those conversations I had with Ambassador Bunker are confidential. Many things about Viet Nam are unknown. Some day someone will tell the whole truth.

Q. Are you satisfied with Vietnamization to date and that ARVN has the ability to fight alone?

A. In some ways, yes, but we have to wait until the final confrontation with the Communists to see what the results will be. There is no doubt that we will have this when the Americans are gone. The Communists are waiting for that now.

Q. In mid-November President Nixon will announce the next phase of withdrawal. How would you like to see it accomplished?

A. I would prefer to have a fixed date of the American withdrawal. If the Vietnamese are lazy and indifferent it is because for years now--even though they are angry and afraid of the Communists--they have relied on American money and American sacrifices to protect them. A withdrawal date would provide a new motivation for our nationalists to unite and take action on their own. I said last year that I would like to see American withdrawal by the end of 1971. I still think that is the best time, but a few months' further delay would be acceptable to me.

Q. Would you like to see continued American air support?

A. Yes, unless the U.S. Government accepts my proposal that they Vietnamize completely the Vietnamese Air Force. You must give us more modern weapons such as F-4 Phantoms and C-130 transports, because all that we have now are old, obsolete ones like A-37s--which are not good enough to fight the air force in the North. Really, they have more modern weapons than we have.

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