No Decent Exit from Viet Nam for the U.S

ONE of the highest priorities of the Nixon Administration has always been the search for what one of its officials calls "a decent exit" from Viet Nam. Washington had hoped that next month's presidential election in that country would have provided such an avenue. A hard-fought campaign and honest balloting could have signified a long step toward open and competitive democracy, vindicating Nixon's policy of Vietnamization and justifying a stepped-up U.S. withdrawal. But last week President Nguyen Van Thieu killed any lingering hopes for such a success. By ordering opponent Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky's name off the ballot, he turned the election into an all but meaningless referendum on his own performance in office (see THE WORLD). In Washington, Administration leaders were utterly dejected. "To say that we're disappointed gets nowhere near the depth of it," said one. "It's a goddam mess and we can't see our way out."

The election became a farce largely because Thieu would brook no opposition. Also the principals, with the possible exception of General Duong Van Minh, who withdrew earlier, maneuvered coldly in pursuit of their private ambitions. Although self-seeking might well be considered a universal disease of politicians, the candidates' actions, judged by Washington logic, made little sense. "It was in their interest, even more than in ours, to have this election go off well," complained a frustrated U.S. diplomat. "We needed it, of course, to help justify our policies. But it is their country. They needed it even more." That sentiment was echoed by a South Vietnamese official: "By using force, President Thieu can run alone. He will win, of course. But it will not solve the problems of our country. It will only make them worse."

Coup Attempt. The U.S. had hoped that it would be obvious to the South Vietnamese that a fair and vigorously contested election would knock down Hanoi's persistent charge that the Saigon government is a puppet of Washington. A willingness to allow diverse elements to compete for governmental power might also have convinced Hanoi that the time had come to negotiate seriously for a peace settlement. But as Thieu reaches for greater power by grasping all available governmental levers, dissidence grows, the possibility of a military coup becomes more real, and Hanoi may be tempted to continue to stall. Saigon could even return to the chaotic days of revolving governments that followed the overthrow and assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963. And that would almost certainly shred any remnants of U.S. sympathy with the Viet Nam involvement.

What will Washington say or do now in the face of the election farce? At San Clemente, Nixon had no comment on the Thieu power play, but it was clearly a setback. "The situation has soured," conceded a State Department spokesman. "But you will see no drastic action by the Administration." There is no intention to punish Thieu by any cutbacks in U.S. aid. Thieu's intransigence was a personal as well as professional blow to an aging but able U.S. diplomat, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker (see box, next page). Still, Bunker assured Thieu of continued U.S. support and U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers reiterated the promise. The U.S. will go on applying verbal pressure to persuade Thieu that his tightening of government reins is a tactical mistake-but this holds less and less promise of success.

Washington apparently will now try to ignore the presidential election as much as possible. Officials are already trying to cite last week's elections for the South Vietnamese Lower House as a show of healthy opposition to Thieu. But the case is not impressive. More attention is being focused on Nixon's scheduled mid-October speech on further troop withdrawals. He is determined to proceed with his disengagement plans regardless of the political problems in Saigon. In fact, there is some speculation in Washington that he is getting ready to announce, or at least indirectly project, a date for final withdrawal of combat troops.

What most concerns the Nixon Administration is whether the President will be given the time to work out the Viet Nam departure on his own schedule. Congress reconvenes this week, and the Saigon shenanigans surely have it in an angry mood. "There'll be hell to pay," predicts a Nixon aide. Some Congressmen and Senators will undoubtedly demand reductions in assistance to South Viet Nam; sentiment for almost immediate withdrawal of troops will be stronger. "Let's not minimize it," said one worried Administration spokesman. "The chances are better than ever before that Congress might force a withdrawal date on us."

Frustrated and bitter about dealing 'with egocentric South Vietnamese politicians, and pressured by Congress at home, the men around Nixon are expected to turn tougher and more determined as they grope for that elusive decent exit. In the end it simply may not be attainable, and the U.S. may decide to let Thieu grapple with his governmental problems on his own as U.S. disengagement continues. Thus the selfishness of Thieu and Ky-as well as their Oriental indifference to the procedures of Occidental-style democracy-may lead to a faster withdrawal than either Saigon or Washington wants. No one knows just how that would affect the fate of South Viet Nam, but it would not necessarily harm Nixon's prospects for reelection. Peace, to be sure, would be a political plus, but if a congressionally mandated withdrawal led to disaster in Viet Nam, the Democrats would share the blame.

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