Hazards Along the Road to Peking

CAREFULLY damping its obvious elation, the Nixon Administration moved last week to check the early euphoria as well as to calm the fears generated by the revelation that the President will travel to Peking. Nixon briefed congressional leaders and his Cabinet. Secretary of State William Rogers counseled ambassadors of the most nervous nations, including Taiwan, Japan and the Soviet Union. Out of all the talk came one firm insistence: no agreements--except to talk--have been reached by the long-estranged U.S. and China.

A White House directive even ordered Washington officials not to discuss the arrangements, agenda or policy implications of the summit conference with newsmen. Not only does Peking insist upon secrecy, it was explained, but the Communist world usually takes as officially inspired any speculation in the U.S. press, so a misstatement could torpedo the sensitive talks. Actually, the Administration's clampdown may well have an effect opposite to the one desired. Speculation about the meaning of a major move announced by the President with considerable drama is both proper and inevitable in an open democracy. The unusual blackout could produce uninformed guessing games of even greater danger to successful summitry.

Key to Indochina. The most immediate problem facing U.S. diplomacy on the twisting road to Peking was the international status of Taiwan, especially its China seat in the United Nations (see following story). But the larger concern was the potential impact of Washington-Peking collaboration on the war in Indochina. Washington tried to disclaim any direct connection between Nixon's journey and ending the war. Yet roughly a year ago, Rogers declared in a Tokyo television interview that "Communist China is the key to the future of Indochina. If they would talk sensibly about a settlement, we think we could work out a peaceful settlement very quickly." Such thoughts obviously still remain tantalizing, and some kind of deal on the war was a possible goal of the summitry in Peking. It was conceded that the war had been discussed by Henry Kissinger and Chou En-lai in their 16 hours of secret conversations. At the least, Kissinger must have outlined U.S. plans for virtual disengagement before Nixon's trip. The possibility of Nixon being welcomed to Peking at a time of fierce combat between Communist and U.S. forces would be improbable. Premier Chou last week told a group of visiting U.S. China scholars that his first concern was U.S. withdrawal of all of its forces from the "dirty war" in Indochina. Besides, in the view of China watchers, Peking assumes that the U.S. has lost the war in Indochina and is definitely pulling out.

Dubious Theories. But that still leaves the theoretical possibility that Peking may be willing to help ease the U.S. exit by persuading Hanoi to moderate its conditions about the timetable for a U.S. withdrawal or about the nature of the regime in Saigon, or accept an international conference to settle the war. Why would Peking want to do this? One conceivable reason would be its desire to get in on peace negotiations rather than allow Hanoi to formalize its victory alone or with predominant support from Moscow; some Asian specialists believe that Peking would prefer a weak rather than a strong Hanoi in the years ahead. Another possible reason for Peking's tacit cooperation could be a quid pro quo whereby the U.S. would in effect gradually relinquish its commitments to Taiwan.

Such theories are still highly dubious. But even if these were Peking's intentions, could the Chinese persuade Hanoi to go along? Peking's influence is considerable--last year for the first time China provided more military aid to Hanoi than the Soviet Union, although Russia still supplies far more economic aid. Nevertheless, Hanoi is showing strong signs of independence, continuing to knock down the notion that it would meekly comply with any arrangements worked out by Peking and Washington. The North Vietnamese regret that they yielded to Chinese and Soviet pressure at the Geneva conference in 1954 and accepted a division of Viet Nam at the 17th parallel; they consider the conflict an internal matter and resent big-power solutions. In a warning to China as well as the U.S.. the official Hanoi newspaper. Nhan Dan, said last week that "the time when big countries relied upon their strength to oppress small countries and force them to obey" is "definitely gone forever." Moreover, Hanoi feels that its forces are on the verge of victory; Nhan Dan claims: "No matter how cunning Nixon may be, he cannot save the U.S. imperialists from total defeat in this unsubmissive and stalwart Vietnamese land."

Hostage to Peking. In some ways, the impending Nixon trip reduces U.S. flexibility on the war and involves risks. If great enough, Nixon's desire for his China visit could make him a hostage to Peking. He might not, for example, be able credibly to threaten U.S. escalation in response to any Communist assault on U.S. troops without endangering his journey. So far the Administration has not replied to the seven-point proposal--including the promise to release American prisoners in exchange for a firm U.S. withdrawal date --put on the table in Paris; the Administration intends not to answer directly for the time being but to continue "to ask questions." Nixon's preoccupation with Peking and his failure to deal promptly with Hanoi's offer could prolong rather than shorten the war. Yet it is also quite likely that only a big-power agreement could guarantee a durable solution of the complex conflicts that exist throughout Southeast Asia. Moreover, Nixon can hope to enjoy wide immunity from attacks by war critics as long as any kind of peace talks with Peking seem possible.

Diplomatic Minuet. Of even greater long-term significance is the impact of Sino-American relations on the Soviet Union. Washington acted to put the Peking trip into global perspective, emphasizing that the U.S. had not lost sight of the importance of its relations with the U.S.S.R. in preventing nuclear war. Yet a diplomatic minuet was required to get the point across. Moscow, apparently determined to express no alarm over the 'Washington-Peking rapprochement, did not seek a U.S. explanation--and Rogers was reluctant to summon the Soviet ambassador. But Anatoly Dobrynin's visit to the State Department on a routine matter gave U.S. officials a convenient opportunity to invite him to stop by Rogers' office. The two talked for 35 minutes. Rogers assured Dobrynin that Nixon meant the U.S.S.R. when he stated in announcing his trip that it was "not directed against any other nation" and that "any nation can be our friend without being any other nation's enemy."

The Soviet Union continued to react to the thaw between the U.S. and China in a muted fashion. Its press printed few articles; they criticized Peking for its "collusion with imperialism," and were less harsh to the U.S. Premier Aleksei Kosygin pointedly reminded Idaho

Senator Frank Church, who was visiting Moscow, that the current U.S.-U.S.S.R. meetings in Helsinki on limiting strategic arms are "the most important talks going on in the world today"--a hint, perhaps, that the Soviets may respond to the Nixon trip by seeking their own accommodations with the West rather than turning more belligerent. There was private speculation in Washington that a SALT agreement might bring Nixon and Soviet leaders together for the signing and produce an American-Soviet summit even before Nixon goes to Peking.

But little help from Moscow is anticipated in any U.S. efforts to seek an immediate big-power solution to the hostilities in Indochina The Soviet Union seemed to be backing Hanoi against Peking in disparaging an international conference.

Fallout in Japan. Another area of intense Peking-summit fallout was Japan. Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, who has long staked his political reputation on his close ties with the U.S., lost face in not being consulted by Washington about the venture. '"We too [can] keep secrets," he complained. Tokyo critics called for Sato's resignation and, defensively, he offered to go to Peking, too, in order to give Japan a say in any arrangement affecting the region. Nationalist sentiment for greater independence from the U.S. was fueled. Eying the new prominence of China, Japanese business firms withdrew from a scheduled trade conference with Taiwan, and five of six shipping companies said that they would discontinue regular runs to the island. All apparently want to be friends of China's if any new business opportunities open up.

Yet any choice between Peking and Taipei would not be an easy one for Japan, and Sato indicated he was not ready to abandon Chiang, especially on Taiwan's membership in the U.N. "How is it possible for us to reject a nation that for long has so faithfully adhered to the United Nations Charter?" Sato asked. "To honor our intentional commitments instead would be the way for us to live up to our reputation as a trustworthy member of the world."

While the U.S. overture could push Japan and China closer together, it might also have the adverse effect of reducing Tokyo's reliance on the U.S. nuclear umbrella and strengthening Japan's urges to have its own nuclear missiles--a development that would horrify Peking.

Problems at Home. The domestic political impact of Nixon's great adventure abroad was still far from clear. Certainly the Democrats were now on the defensive about the war issue; they faced the possibility that Nixon in 1972 will have the brightened aura of a world statesman and peacemaker. Potential Democratic candidates for the presidency could only applaud Nixon's coup. The quixotic candidacy of Republican Congressman Pete McCloskey, centered so completely upon the war, looked even more forlorn.

That thrust the Democrats back to the issues of the economy and other neglected domestic problems plus Nixon's personality. At a meeting of 14 Midwest Governors in Nebraska, Republicans expressed anxiety about Nixon's re-election chances. "It was a major coup," said Michigan's William G. Milliken about the planned trip to Peking. "But the state of the economy in 1972 will have as decided an effect on Mr. Nixon's ability to carry Michigan and the rest of the country." Michigan's unemployment rate is 9%; other Governors reported the continued concern of farmers over low income and inflation. Indeed, new figures showed the cost of living rose .6% last month--the sharpest increase in 15 months. Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur Burns conceded that there had been "very little progress" in checking inflation.

Tricky Politician. Barry Goldwater guardedly endorsed Nixon's trip, but scattered voices on the far right decried Nixon's approach to Chinese Communists. Republican Congressman John Schmitz, who represents Nixon's home district in California, had been invited to cruise the Potomac aboard the presidential yacht Sequoia, but he announced that he was "breaking all relations with the White House" until the President "reverses this decision and apologizes for having made it." Another Californian, former Marine Captain George Brokate, publicly threw into a trash can a plaque of appreciation he had received from Nixon for donating $13,000 to his successful presidential campaign. He denounced Nixon as "just another tricky weather vane opportunist politician."

Nixon can undoubtedly survive the anguish on the right. What matters most, both for Nixon's political fortunes and the best interests of the U.S., is the eventual outcome of the trip. Its success lies largely in the hands of a wily and America-wise Chinese leader, Chou Enlai, and Washington's warnings against expectations of spectacular results were surely justified. But on balance, the bold mission to Peking is more than anything else an occasion of hope and opportunity.

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