Hanoi's Rainy-Season Surge

LIKE some cosmic drum roll, the rumble of thunder accompanied the wild winds and torrential rains that swept across most of Indochina last week, heralding the advent of the southwesterly monsoon. From the air, thousands of acres of paddyland glistened in the infrequent sunshine like a vast mirror. By the time the storms abate in October they will have dumped up to 150 inches of rain on the region, turning the ground into a muddy sponge and swelling the majestic Mekong River to flood stage as it courses through Laos, Cambodia and South Viet Nam.

With roads washed out, bogging down allied and Communist troops alike, and with low ceilings grounding helicopters and jets much of the time, the monsoon has traditionally brought a welcome respite to Indochina's battlefields. On the U.S. side, a slowdown in activity was already evident at the beginning of the month as the withdrawal proceeded; in the week ending June 5, American fatalities fell to 19, the lowest seven-day toll since October 1965. Yet U.S. officials in Saigon are particularly concerned as the monsoon season begins this year. In selected areas, Communist troops are not only maintaining the pressure but, despite the rains, seem intent on increasing it.

Though the Communists control very little territory in South Viet Nam, during the past year they have dramatically expanded their control over parts of Laos and Cambodia. In fact, the North Vietnamese army (NVA) now controls more real estate on the borders of Viet Nam than ever before. From the Sino-Laotian frontier in the north to the tiny crossroads town of Snuol in the south, Hanoi's troops are masters of an area that measures 840 miles long and 250 miles wide at its broadest point (see map).

Traction for Trucks. This assures the Communists of access to the Mekong and, most important, provides security for the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Although ARVN (Army of the Republic of Viet Nam) troops, with U.S. air support, inflicted considerable damage during the Lam Son 719 thrust into Laos and made parts of the trail unusable, the Communists reacted by simply moving the key supply network westward and widening it in the bargain. Thus, in recent weeks, Communist activity along the trail has been running at twice the normal rate. U.S. aerial reconnaissance has revealed piles of bamboo and mounds of gravel at many points along the route, indicating that the Communists hope to provide traction for supply trucks no matter how muddy the going gets.

To improve security for the trail, the Communists last month pushed the Laotian army completely off the strategic Bolovens Plateau, deep in southern Laos. Possession of the plateau not only gives the NVA control of the heights overlooking the Ho Chi Minh Trail, but also of a landscape so wild that a full division can assemble there without being spotted from the air. Seeking to further improve their supply network, the Communists continue to battle along Route 23.

Hiqh-Level Dismay. At the same time, the Communists have renewed their pressure on Cambodia. Three crack NVA regiments last week tangled with elite Cambodian troops for control of the Vihear Suor marshes on the east bank of the Mekong, which are the key to the eastern defenses of Phnom-Penh. In the Cambodian capital, a mere dozen miles away, residents could hear the fighting. While the Communists appear to have no interest in toppling Phnom-Penh, they want.control of the marshes to increase their flexibility in responding to potential ARVN attacks.

The North Vietnamese have already gained control of Snuol at the far southern terminus of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. In the course of five days of fighting, they mauled an ARVN task force of 4,000 holding the town, forcing it into a disorderly retreat. Saigon insists that it had long planned to leave Snuol once the rains began, yet there is plenty of evidence that ARVN departed with embarrassing haste. It left behind no fewer than 72 vehicles--including tanks, armored personnel carriers and trucks --and eleven artillery pieces. The U.S. Air Force had to bomb the abandoned but still functioning weapons lest they fall into enemy hands.

By official reports the battle cost ARVN about 800 dead, wounded and missing; the Communists claim that the figure is almost twice as high. Saigon reports that with U.S. air support, its troops inflicted 4,500 casualties on the enemy. Yet as a result of the performance in Snuol, there was enough high-level dismay in Saigon that the task force commander, Brigadier General Nguyen Van Hieu, was relieved of his command.

Most threatening, perhaps, is the increasing level of enemy activity in the northern part, of South Viet Nam, the one part of the country where the rainy season has just ended. Taking advantage of the partial vacuum created by the departure of the U.S. Marines, the North Vietnamese are creeping back into Quang Tri province, just below the DMZ (Demilitarized Zone). Their repair of long unused road and river infiltration routes directly through the DMZ bodes ill for northern I Corps, always a vulnerable area and the scene of the war's bloodiest battles. Already Vietnamese have begun fleeing from the countryside into Danang, fearful that rural security will vanish when the American troops do.

No Panic. Ever since the Nixon Administration announced its Vietnamization and withdrawal program two years ago, the nightmare of U.S. commanders has been that the enemy would wait until American troops are reduced to a level of combat ineffectiveness and then launch a major offensive against the exposed ARVN forces. The unusual activity of the Communists, together with fresh evidence that they are currently recruiting extra manpower in North Viet Nam, hints at such a plan. They might even decide to come straight down through the DMZ. When? Politically, the ideal time could be somewhere between October, when Saigon holds its presidential election, and April, when the campaigning intensifies for the 1972 U.S. balloting.

Litmus Test. Once launched, however, the offensive is not certain of success. The Communist position has its weaknesses. Hanoi's Laotian and Cambodian holdings are very sparsely populated. In South Viet Nam the Communists hold nothing but such desolate regions as portions of the U Minh Forest and the A Shau Valley. The heavily populated and strategically important Mekong Delta and the eleven provinces around Saigon face no substantial military danger. While ARVN troops have performed disappointingly in some recent battles in Cambodia and Laos, the litmus test of the Vietnamization program is how they will defend themselves inside South Viet Nam.

There the record is more impressive --so much so that a senior State Department official who recently returned from Viet Nam is convinced that the reduction of U.S. forces to a bare minimum would not involve prohibitive risks. He even maintains that Saigon is ready to accept, without panicking, an announcement of a specific withdrawal date for American forces.

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