What It Means For Vietnamization

Laos was ARVN's first major test without American advisers and against seasoned North Vietnamese regulars. But was it a "milestone" for Vietnamization, as President Nixon described it, or a sharp setback?

The results were both encouraging and dismaying. The U.S. command's assessment that 18 of the 22 ARVN battalions "fought well" is slightly suspect, if only because a great many of the 22,000 troops were employed in occupying static positions and counting enemy bodies after U.S. air strikes. But in general, discipline was high, and there was reason to believe that the South Vietnamese were at last beginning to solve their chronic leadership problems on the squad, platoon and company level. "They had to have damn good small-unit leadership," an Army general argues, "or they wouldn't have got out of there."

Jealous Generals. On the negative side is the fact that some of Saigon's elite units were badly bloodied--the Airborne, Rangers, Marines, and what many Americans consider ARVN's top infantry division, the 1st. Moreover, the operation underscored continuing deficiencies in crucial areas like communications. American pilots had problems with Vietnamese ground controllers, who have a tough time pronouncing words like "coordinate"--or speaking English at all while ducking rocket and mortar fire.

The real weaknesses Lam Son revealed were at the top. The Saigon strategists figured that air power would give the small but mobile ARVN invasion force an edge, even when outnumbered 3 to 1; too often it did not. Moreover, though the Laotian panhandle was known to be execrable country for armor, South Vietnamese planners sent in a column of 150 tanks. It stopped dead, only 17 miles in, during the first week.

One reason why the operation stalled was that it took six days for General Hoang Xuan Lam, the ARVN commander, to get around to establishing a forward command post inside Laos, where the troops, the B-52s and the other elements could be coordinated. What is more, Lam's staff was riven by jealousies. Major General Le Nguyen Khang, who bosses South Viet Nam's elite Marines and holds a slight seniority edge over Lam, was so miffed when Lam was named to run the Laos operation that he retired to Saigon and turned his responsibilities over to his deputy, a colonel. During the pullout from Laos, Lam's headquarters ordered the Marines to stay behind and fight a rearguard action; when they got into trouble, Khang simply directed them, on his own authority, to come out too.'

Political Alchemy. In 1968, then Harvard Professor Henry Kissinger wrote that the best the U.S. could expect after withdrawing its troops would be for Saigon to survive for "a decent interval"--two or three years. Since then, South Viet Nam's military machine has grown to brobdingnagian proportions. Saigon's air force should rank seventh in size in the world (50 squadrons, some 1,200 aircraft) when its Vietnamization is completed by 1974 or 1975. Its local and regular ground forces and navy, already 90% to 95% trained and equipped, will reach their full 1,100,000-man strength some time next year. By then Fortress South Viet Nam will be the second most muscular military power in Asia, ranking ahead of Taiwan (600,000), South Korea (620,000) and India (1,000,000), and behind only Communist China (2,700,000).

Korean Solution. Doubts persist about whether a costly and complex American-style army will ultimately be an asset or a liability for Saigon. The South Vietnamese may be hard put to maintain such a force. Moreover, some analysts still argue that the only way to peace in South Viet Nam is a negotiated settlement with Hanoi, which probably could be brought about only through some kind of coalition government in Saigon. A vast army, and the tough, militarist regime that would inevitably go with it, would make such an outcome virtually impossible. The alternative, which might please both Saigon and Washington, would be a "Korean solution": a South Vietnamese government strong enough to fight the North to a standstill, leading not to a formal peace but to a semi-permanent armed truce. In Korea, of course, that was possible because of the presence of U.S. ground forces and the existence of a vigorously anti-Communist population.

Some argue that Vietnamization is already a proven success. In a paper currently making the rounds in Washington, Guy Pauker, the Rand Corp's leading Southeast Asia specialist, maintains that the treasure the U.S. has pumped into South Viet Nam over the past five years has quietly accomplished a "feat of political alchemy" by transforming a weak Saigon government into a strong regime with a clear chance of surviving. Pauker says that this chance can become a certainty if the U.S. will pick up the bills for at least a decade--not only for the regime's army, but also for an economic-aid program aimed at giving the people a stake in the status quo.

More for Less. The U.S. would also have to accept a prospect that many Americans would find unhappy: spending more without getting much operational control of the regime. A non-Communist regime in Saigon would of course represent a sharp defeat for Hanoi and, indirectly, for Peking. Therefore North Viet Nam could be counted on to continue throwing everything it has against the South. In such circumstances, American money alone probably would not be enough to support the Saigon regime. U.S. air power, which propped up the South Vietnamese in Laos, and other support would probably be required for at least a few years.

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