Shadowboxing

Psychological warfare, like the shooting kind, runs the risk of retaliation. For weeks, South Viet Nam's President Nguyen Van Thieu hinted at a possible invasion of the north, and even President Nixon refused to rule out the notion entirely. The purpose of this talk was to keep North Vietnamese troops pinned down defending the home front, rather than harassing South Vietnamese troops in Laos.

Last week, during a surprise visit to Hanoi, China's Premier Chou En-lai retaliated by indulging in a little psychological warfare himself. North Viet Nam and China, he said, are "the front line" and "the rear area" of the war. The two countries are as closely linked as "lips and teeth." Should the U.S. "go down the road of expanding its war of aggression," declared a communique signed by Chou and Hanoi's Premier Pham Van Dong, the Chinese people would "take all necessary measures, not flinching even from the greatest national sacrifices," to help the North Vietnamese. Translation, according to most interpretations: China will probably not intervene unless North Viet Nam is invaded or seriously threatened, or the fighting in Laos approaches China's border. Precisely what point on the scale of escalation might bring troops pouring across that frontier was left unclear.

The U.S. also left its intentions deliberately unclear. Talking of a South Vietnamese invasion, Secretary of State William Rogers emphasized that the U.S. has no such plans, under consideration, but "we don't exactly rule it out either."

Hilltop Hopping. The diplomatic shadowboxing was matched by a battlefield standoff, as each side sought a tactical advantage in anticipation of a showdown. South Vietnamese troops briefly occupied Tchepone, 25 miles inside Laos and once described as the "throat" of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Then they pulled back from the deserted town to occupy part of the nearby valley floor and some coyly named fire bases in the surrounding hills ("Sophia," "Liz" and "Lollo" for Actresses Loren, Taylor and Lollobrigida). Hilltop hopping by helicopter, other ARVN forces sought to cut off important enemy supply routes, chiefly Route 914, the last major supply road with a dense cover of foliage. There are main routes farther west, such as Route 23, but they are more exposed to observation and bombing.

The North Vietnamese responded to the attacks over a wide area. Some 80 miles south of Tchepone, Communist forces overran a Royal Laotian garrison at the edge of the Bolovens Plateau, overlooking the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The base, known as Site 22, commanded the SeKong River, a key artery in the trail complex. Near Tchepone itself, North Vietnamese troops managed to call in American artillery on South Vietnamese positions by using the same radio frequencies as the ARVN troops'. At other times they lured American helicopters into antiaircraft fire. Total helicopter losses since the Laos operation began five weeks ago: 66 destroyed and well over 160 more shot down but recovered (see box).

Dispiriting Rationale. After a month of fighting, what had the South Vietnamese accomplished in Laos? For a brief period they managed to cut traffic along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in half. By last week, truck movements were returning to normal, though most of the supplies were going to nearby Communist troops in Laos, instead of to enemy forces in Cambodia and South Viet Nam. The ARVN also counted 1,731 tons of food captured or destroyed, along with weapons for as many as nine battalions, 800 tons of ammunition, 108 tanks and 8,008 enemy killed in action or captured--at a cost of 726 South Vietnamese dead and 2,763 wounded. Even if the figures are accurate, the operation has so far yielded far fewer enemy supplies than did the invasion of Cambodia last year. More impressive in the eyes of U.S. officers is the estimate that one-third of the Communist battalions in the Laotian panhandle have been put out of commission.

But the best ARVN troops also took considerable losses, probably far more than Saigon officially reported. South Vietnamese military sources admit that enlistments for such elite outfits as the paratroopers and the marines, which were hit hard in Laos, are running at one-tenth the preinvasion figures. Even more dispiriting was the rationale offered by a U.S. briefing officer in Saigon--that the incursion into Laos had "bought time" for Cambodia's neophyte army. Last year's invasion of Cambodia was also billed as buying time--for the army of South Viet Nam.

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