Tenacity and Trouble

Peace, like war, can attain a momentum of its own. This week, for the third time since the Middle East's guns fell silent seven months ago, a formal cease-fire between Egypt and Israel ran out. The two sides are still far from a formal peace, but they are growing used to an absence of war. Thus, when Egyptian President Anwar Sadat went before television cameras at Cairo's Kubbeh Republican Palace at the beginning of the week, he was expected to rule out a formal extension of the ceasefire, but to make it plain that for the time being at least, there would be no renewal of fighting either.

A de facto rather than a formal ceasefire has its perils. But because it sets no deadline for the sides to worry over as they work, it may actually help hasten the snail's pace of Middle East negotiations. As one diplomat at the United Nations explained: "We've been spending two weeks on substance and then two weeks on getting another cease-fire."

No Conditions. In that situation, it is not surprising that little in the way of substance has been decided. Egypt last month put Israel on the defensive by agreeing for the first time to conclude a peace settlement and to extend formal recognition to its longtime adversary--provided the Israelis withdrew from all the territories captured during the Six-Day War of 1967. Israel, in reply, stated its willingness to pull back to secure negotiated boundaries but added that it had no intention of yielding all the territories.

Israel's position stalemated the peace talks being held under the aegis of United Nations Mediator Gunnar Jarring. U.N. Secretary-General U Thant last week tactfully summed up the previous month's discussions by noting that "some further progress" had been made. But Thant added that a deadlock still existed and that Israel's lack of commitment on withdrawal made the situation one of increasing concern. In an effort to get the talks going again, the Big Four (Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the U.S.) held two meetings in Manhattan last week. They were unable to issue a communique at the close of their discussions, however, because the U.S. and the Soviets could not agree on its wording. Washington, supported by Britain and France, pressed for continuation of the formal ceasefire: the Soviets wanted the statement to censure Israel.

Defending Israel's position, Foreign Minister Abba Eban argued that his government has steadfastly indicated its readiness to negotiate without any conditions: it was the Arabs, he said, who were setting preconditions by insisting on territorial changes before peace terms could be negotiated. Critics of that stance maintained that the Israelis, by announcing in advance that they had no intention of returning all of the occupied territories, were setting preconditions themselves.

Israel's policy is based on what Eban describes as "tenacity." In Eban's view, tenacity worked to bring the Arabs to the Jarring talks. Unable to win back their territories by war, Egyptians and Jordanians finally decided to bargain for them through Jarring. Now tenacity is being used to make Cairo more flexible on the borders issue. If Israel holds out long enough. Eban argues, it may convince Sadat that Egypt will have to negotiate earnestly and finally relinquish territories like Sharm el Sheikh, which Israel intends to retain.

To be successful, a policy based on tenacity depends on two things. One is sufficient Israeli military strength to forestall any large-scale resumption of shooting by the Arabs. Israel's military leaders believe that they possess such strength. They are convinced that Egypt's army and air force are not noticeably better than in '67, when they were decisively defeated. The Israelis also believe that the broad band of approximately 3,000 Soviet-built (and in many cases Soviet-manned) SA-2 and SA3 missiles on Egypt's side of the Suez Canal can be neutralized--though they do not say how--and that direct Russian intervention is unlikely.

Strenuous Argument. The second requirement for a policy of tenacity is a lack of pressure from Washington. Israelis were heartened last week by President Nixon's press-conference promise that the U.S. still has no intention of imposing a peace settlement on Israel. Nixon also indicated that his Administration would never withhold arms from Israel because to do so would be to upset the military balance that has helped to prevent all-out war in the incendiary area.

That is not to say, however, that the U.S. is exerting no pressure at all. Although Washington officially denies it, sources in Cairo said the State Department has assumed Sadat that the U.S. is doing its utmost to coax the Israelis into a more flexible position. Israel Galili, a Cabinet Minister Without Portfolio and one of Premier Golda Meir's closest advisers, admitted that the U.S. and Israel are engaged in "a strenuous argument." And the U.S. has let the Israelis know--"not as a threat but as a fact," as an American official put it--that Israel's unyielding attitude in discussions with Gunnar Jarring is making it increasingly difficult for Washington to prevent the Security Council from getting involved. This is the last thing the Israelis want, for the council would probably try to force an unacceptable settlement on them.

In any case, the U.S. would need to apply considerably more pressure than it is now exerting if it expects to persuade the Israelis to change their position on issues affecting what they deem to be their basic security and survival amid unfriendly neighbors. "If they send the Marines," Defense Minister Moshe Dayan smilingly advised, "I would suggest that we give in." At this point, though, nothing less than the Marines seems capable of budging the Israelis.

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so reader's discretion is required.