Thirty Days More

When Egypt's President Anwar Sadat approached the podium of the National Assembly in Cairo last week, barely a day remained before the ceasefire between his country and Israel was due to expire. He ended the suspense quickly. As long as there was "genuine progress" toward peace, he said Egypt would "abstain from firing." On hearing the news from Cairo, an Arab waiter in an East Jerusalem hotel burst into the bar and happily told his patrons (mostly Israelis): "We've got at least thirty more days."

It took considerable diplomatic spadework to buy even that much time. Arabs worry that the longer Israel occupies the conquered territories, the firmer its hold over them will become. But rather than negotiate a peace themselves that would undoubtedly require concessions from both sides, the Arabs have been hoping that the U.N. and the Big Four powers would force the Israelis to give up the territories. Sadat, who is not yet strong enough to make the sort of concessions that his predecessor, Gamal Abdel Nasser, might have gotten away with, talked tough up to the last minute. Repeatedly, he threatened to renew the war unless Israel produced a timetable for its withdrawal from the territories.

To help get Sadat off that wobbly limb, U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers sent three notes to Cairo within the past two weeks, promising U.S. help in future negotiations if Egypt would extend the ceasefire. U.N. Secretary-General U Thant, stretching the facts, told the Security Council that "some progress" had occurred in a series of talks conducted by U.N. Mediator Gunnar Jarring, giving Thant "grounds for cautious optimism." That also gave Sadat grounds to extend the ceasefire.

Sadat's message to the National

Assembly included one unexpected element. If Israel would pull back partially from the Suez Canal, he promised, Egypt would begin to repair the waterway to accommodate international traffic once more. The Russians would certainly like such a move; with the canal opened again, it would be easier to supply their growing naval force in the Indian Ocean. But Sadat was also making a studied attempt to demonstrate his new administration's sense of responsibility as a member of the world community. In some key respects, Sadat's Suez Canal offer is vague. He did not indicate, for instance, whether Egypt would allow Israeli vessels to use the waterway once it is cleared, dredged and reopened. But it is at least a new proposal. Even though a partial retreat from the canal would pose serious tactical problems for security-minded Israelis, they risk a new round of world censure if they spurn the idea out of hand.

Beware Major X. For their part, the Arabs have reached a point where they must understand that only they and not the Security Council or the Big Four can negotiate any meaningful peace with Israel. Sadat, of course, is in a difficult position at home. "If negotiations get nowhere," observed a Western diplomat in Cairo, "some unknown Major X may be tempted to try his hand at running things." Despite his problems, however, Sadat is not likely to help the negotiations by placing them under the threat of a resumption of shooting. Israeli Premier Golda Meir, who wants an unlimited ceasefire, complained before Sadat's speech that "we can't conduct peace negotiations with a stopwatch in hand." Neither can Egypt. An extension of the truce to March 7 allows too short a time in which to accomplish results.

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so reader's discretion is required.