Lowering the U.S. Profile Throughout Asia

EVER since the Nixon Doctrine was enunciated 18 months ago, it has been a subject of widespread debate --and frequently an object of widespread confusion. The doctrine has been hailed as an antidote to the sort of thinking that led the U.S. into Viet Nam and scorned as window dressing designed to cover up a hasty retreat. To some allies, it seemed to presage a reneging on past promises. The controversy about the doctrine's eventual results is likely to rage for some time, but one thing has become quite clear: before the 1972 elections, President Nixon is genuinely determined to give the U.S. a substantially lower profile in Asia.

The chief tenet of the doctrine, in the words of a White House aide, is that the U.S. will "reduce our presence while maintaining our commitment." Already the American troop level in Asia has been reduced by nearly a quarter of a million men. Last week, en route to Saigon for a personal inspection of the Viet Nam war zone, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird announced that by midsummer U.S. fighting men will no longer seek ground combat in Viet Nam. Because they will still provide air, artillery, logistic and security support for South Viet Nam's army, American G.I.s will still face some combat. But Laird's announcement heralds an end to U.S. ground offensives, the infantryman's "dirty little war" that has claimed the vast majority of the 44,241 American lives lost in Indochina.

Sharp Knives. Nixon first proclaimed the doctrine on Guam during his 1969 Asian tour, and in last year's "State of the World" message to Congress he spelled it out more fully. The U.S. will continue to guarantee protection to its allies against nuclear attack and will "furnish military and economic assistance when requested and as appropriate" against other kinds of aggression, Nixon said. He added, however, "we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility for its [nonnuclear] defense."

Behind Nixon's doctrine is the realization that, largely because of Viet Nam, the day has passed when the U.S. can, or should, serve as the world's policeman. Congress has shown hearty agreement by pruning military budget requests with increasingly sharp knives. A Navy admiral, looking over the list of important Pacific facilities going on the inactive roster, recently declared ruefully: "Hell, when you don't have any money, indispensable things become dispensable."

Since mid-1969, the U.S. has thinned its forces throughout Asia (see map). In South Korea, the departure of 20,000 G.I.s will force Seoul's troops to patrol the entire 151-mile length of their DMZ for the first time since 1950. In Japan, there will be 12,000 fewer U.S. servicemen. The U.S. Navy plans to vacate its huge Yokosuka base in favor of quarters in Sasebo, and some 50 F-4 Phantom jets will be moved to South Korea.

Trends. Still, with 554,200 troops remaining in Asia, the U.S. pullback is hardly a full recessional--and was not intended to be. The fundamental objective of Nixon's plan is to provide a guardrail that will keep the U.S. from being pulled overboard into another Viet Nam-type involvement, yet still protect U.S. allies, and U.S. interests, in Asia. There is doubt that the guardrail would hold in a crisis, but the policy is nonetheless becoming an important reality in Asia. Among the trends accelerating as a result of the Nixon Doctrine:

ASIAN SELF-DEFENSE. Almost every nation is racing to become more self-reliant in conventional military capability, usually with the help of U.S.-supplied equipment. South Korea asked for $3 billion in new aid over a five-year period, settled for half, and will get patrol boats, radar gear and a $26 million M-16 rifle plant. Taiwan has already begun to manufacture its own helicopters under a contract with Bell. U.S. advisers are also training the Nationalist Chinese to repair trucks, tanks, personnel carriers and other equipment damaged in Viet Nam, with the hope that Taiwan will eventually become an area resupply center.

Thailand recently contracted with West Germany's Heckler & Koch to build a plant to produce rifles. Last week Secretary Laird promised increased military aid to Bangkok during the 1970s. He has apparently already delivered on part of it: two new secret bases, one reportedly a communications center near Chiang Mai in northern Thailand and the other a possible assault base on the Cambodian border, are currently under construction with U.S. assistance. Japan is under strong pressure to spend more on self-defense than the minuscule .8% of its annual gross national product (or $1.6 billion) that it currently allocates.

NEW ALIGNMENTS. With the U.S. presence shrinking, many nations are moving to hedge their bets by establishing closer relations with other big powers. In the past year, Thailand has established trade relations with Moscow as well as with Rumania and Bulgaria. The Philippines and Malaysia are also contemplating more active relations with the Kremlin. Some nations are hopeful that a more stable and responsible China will eventually emerge. Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia hope--and expect--that within the next decade both the Western powers and the major Communist powers will guarantee the neutrality of Southeast Asia.

Not every Asian nation is quite that sanguine about the future. "The U.S. is gradually dropping its commitments in Asia, and this will bring you much trouble," warns Taiwan Legislator Hsieh Jen-chao. "You can isolate yourselves if you decide to, but the war will follow you home."

ASIAN REGIONALISM. With U.S. encouragement, Asian governments are cooperating, at least to some extent, on common problems. Thailand and Malaysia send out joint patrols to clean up small but persistent insurgent bands along their common border. Thailand and South Viet Nam have formed alliances with Cambodia, albeit extremely uneasy ones, in Phnom-Penh's fight against North Vietnamese invaders. Australia and New Zealand have ceased, as U.S. Consul-General in Osaka Jerome K. Holloway puts it, "to think of themselves as islands somewhere in the English Channel," and are rapidly extending their defense role in Asia.

Gingerly and rather reluctantly, Japan is beginning to accept new responsibilities. During his last visit to Washington, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato declared that South Korea's security is "essential to Japan's own security," thus extending Tokyo's line of self-defense beyond Japan's shores for the first time since World War II. Not long ago, partly as a sign of its vital interest in shipping lanes, Japan sent its first postwar naval task force steaming around the Far East.

Secret War. To be sure, all of these trends are embryonic, and there are those who doubt that the Nixon Doctrine has caused any real change. In its only test under crisis conditions so far --the power struggle that developed in Cambodia after the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk--Nixon scrapped paper principles and sent in American troops to clean out Cambodia's border sanctuaries. Critics also point out that Laos may be considered an ideal example of how the doctrine will work elsewhere. The country has no U.S. combat troops but an active advisory mission, massive air support and a generous flow of dollars to support an indigenous army. Run largely by the CIA, the war in Laos has proved extremely costly ($150 million this year), and for years was kept secret from the American public.

Other skeptics attack the basic idea as unsound. Testifying before a joint congressional committee last week, Townsend Hoopes, former Under Secretary of the Air Force, warned: "U.S. military assistance, whatever its magnitude, cannot make giants out of pygmies. It cannot determine the military balance of Asia; it cannot serve as a substitute for the U.S. presence." The U.S., he said, should abandon its attempt to contain China and encourage its allies to seek "viable accommodations" with Peking. Earl C. Ravenal, a former Pentagon systems analyst, suggests in Foreign Affairs that the doctrine's major flaw is a failure to redefine America's basic interests in Asia, especially toward China. In fact, he says, by reducing the U.S. presence before making that reassessment, Nixon has actually reduced his options in meeting aggression. He has, says Ravenal, made "the resort to nuclear weapons a more compelling choice."

The President so far has refused to say what he will do if U.S. dollars and U.S. advisers prove insufficient to defend an ally against Communist aggression. Would American ground combat forces have to be dispatched, or sent back? When asked about the specific case of South Viet Nam last week during his interview with television newsmen, Nixon replied that he would not "borrow trouble" by predicting the downfall of the current Saigon regime after America's departure. Sooner or later, however, the President or one of his successors will have to grasp the most nettlesome problem posed by the Nixon Doctrine: Precisely how far can the U.S. reduce its presence in the nations on China's periphery and still maintain a credible commitment to them?

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