Top Dogs and Underdogs

Over lunch in a Washington restaurant, a senior Soviet diplomat turned to a U.S. acquaintance. "You Americans are top dogs who are going down fast," he said. "We are underdogs coming up fast. We have Pompidou and Brandt going to Moscow. Heath is coming to get his astrakhan hat, and he might even get a keg of vodka too. They are turning our way. They are trying to strike bargains because they know we are moving up and you are moving down."

In European capitals as well, Soviet diplomats are seeking out their Western counterparts for private chats to deliver a similar assessment. The Nixon Administration has made some sensible and overdue adjustments of U.S. foreign commitments. But in Moscow's view, the scale-down in South Viet Nam, the troop withdrawals from South Korea, the return of Okinawa to Japan are all indications of growing American isolationism and decline. Accordingly, the Russians are making every effort to convince Western Europeans that Washington is no longer a reliable ally.

Prelude to Retreat. The Nixon Administration last week made several moves designed to counter the impression that the current American retrenchment is a prelude to a full-scale U.S. retreat from its obligations abroad:

>> After a 21-hour meeting of the National Security Council, President Nixon rejected Defense Secretary Melvin Laird's proposal for a 10% reduction in the 300,000-man U.S. force in Europe. The President's reasoning: the drawdown would unhinge Western European confidence in the U.S., debilitate NATO and undercut West Germany's attempts to normalize relations with the East bloc by rendering Western Europe too weak militarily to strike equitable bargains with the Communists.

>> Despite some West German pressure for a quick agreement on West Berlin, the U.S. stuck to its position of securing, at the very least, binding Big Four guarantees of the city's economic viability.

>> At the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks in Helsinki, which last week marked their first anniversary, the U.S. is resisting a Soviet demand that NATO's fighter-bombers be included in a general limitation of nuclear weapons.

>> In Congress, the Administration underlined its continuing commitment to foreign obligations by a $1 billion request for emergency economic and military aid, including $500 million for Israel, $255 million for Cambodia, $150 million for South Korea and $65 million for South Viet Nam.

The Western Europeans will be pleased with the U.S. decision to retain its troop strength on the Continent--at least for the present--since East bloc forces already enjoy a 2-to-l advantage in men, tanks and planes in Europe. As NATO Secretary-General Manlio Brosio warned: "The Soviet Union has set itself two aims and two programs: a minimum program, which is the ratification of the status quo in Europe; a maximum program, which would be the establishment of a pan-European security system that would exclude North American countries from Europe."

Infernal Triangle. Most Western Europeans, of course, are far too sophisticated to accept Soviet prophecies of impending American doom. Nonetheless, they are disturbed by the U.S. preoccupation with domestic problems, and American protectionist tendencies, as evidenced by the House passage of the trade-restriction bill. Many Europeans are convinced that within another three years or so, only a symbolic U.S. military presence will remain in Europe.

One factor that restrains the Soviets from pushing the U.S. even more forcefully is the fear that Washington might move closer to Communist China. Just as the Chinese have a pathological fear of U.S.-Soviet collusion, Moscow harbors a suspicion that Peking and Washington might make common cause.

The mutual fears of the two Communist giants may be one reason both seemed to be seeking last week to improve their strained relations. In Peking, Premier Chou En-lai made a point of personally receiving the new Soviet ambassador. Then the Chinese formally announced that they are filling their ambassadorial post in Moscow, which has been vacant since the first Sino-Soviet-border shootouts in early 1968.

Unfortunate Timing. At the U.N. the Soviets significantly broke one year of icy silence on the subject of Peking's admission. Soviet Ambassador Yakov Malik publicly endorsed the Albanian proposal for seating Communist China and expelling the Chinese Nationalist government on Taiwan. In the subsequent vote, for the first time in 20 successive annual tests, a majority of U.N. members cast their ballots in favor of Peking's admission and the ejection of the Nationalist regime. The count--51 to 49, with 25 abstentions. Since the seating issue is considered an "important question" requiring a two-thirds majority for passage, however, Peking remains outside the U.N. But many of Peking's supporters predict that by 1972 at the latest, mainland China will be admitted.

After the balloting, the State Department, which until recently has zealously opposed Chinese admission, issued a statement acknowledging that a "new situation" exists in the U.N. The Department added that it would "examine all implications" of the vote with Washington's friends and allies. Since many of them favor Peking's admission, the statement was in effect a public affirmation of what has been the case for some time--that the U.S. will no longer oppose Peking's being seated, but will seek to prevent the ouster of Taiwan. The shift was long overdue. Coming this late, however, the U.S. move looks more like a retreat than a sensible readjustment of an archaic position.

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