The Missile Impasse

WHILE Jordan's civil war set off a new and dangerous explosion in the Middle East last week, the primary fuse was still burning away ominously. As the 90-day cease-fire worked out between Israel and Egypt in August passed its halfway mark, chances of any resulting settlement were becoming increasingly slim. Israeli Premier Golda Meir, after conferring in Washington with President Nixon, again ruled out negotiations with the other side until Egypt agreed to "roll back" the Soviet missiles that were installed in the standstill zone along the Suez in violation of truce terms. Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad angrily declared that the U.S. peace initiative was "dead."

Mrs. Meir, flanked by Israeli security guards and appearing unusually solemn, arrived in the U.S. on two vital missions. First, she wanted to negotiate a long-term package of military and economic aid. Her military shopping list included sophisticated electronic equipment and Phantom jets that would partially offset Israel's loss of advantage at the Suez front caused by the forward deployment of the Soviet missiles. The economic proposals mainly involved long-term credits to a nation that spends almost 30% of its gross national product on defense, more than three times what the U.S. allocates.

Private Talk. Her second--and far more pressing--task was to size up the Nixon Administration's moral commitment to Israel. Washington's heavy pressure on Israel to accept the cease-fire and its slowness in admitting that the agreement was almost immediately violated by the Egyptians have deeply shaken Israeli confidence in their most important ally. Said an official: "Golda wanted to establish a personal rapport with Nixon, to be sure they could have a meeting of the minds."

On the question of aid, she found the prospects fairly reassuring. Even before she left, word leaked out that the U.S. would sell Israel at least 17 new Phantoms. Though no final agreement on the entire program was reached in Washington, U.S. officials estimated that Israel can count on about half a billion dollars in aid over the next two years, with about half of that amount earmarked for arms.

For the last quarter-hour of their 90-minute meeting, Nixon and Mrs. Meir dismissed their aides and talked alone. The Israeli Prime Minister was known to have two thoughts on her mind. She wanted Nixon to have a clear idea of Israel's minimal conditions for a final settlement, which include continued control over the Golan Heights and those sections of Jerusalem seized during the Six-Day War. In addition, she was determined to let the President know that Israel intended to boycott any negotiations with the Arabs until the missile violations are halted.

American Goofs. On that point, Mrs. Meir got an argument. The U.S. contends that the violations have not altered Israel's overall military superiority in the Middle East, and that Israel should take advantage of Egypt's willingness to talk. The Israelis, who point out that they have lost the freedom of the air over much of the Suez front, adamantly refuse to negotiate under present conditions. Following Mrs. Meir's round of Washington talks, the State Department had no choice but to announce, somewhat weakly, that "we will continue to make diplomatic efforts to obtain rectification." Privately, Israeli officials acknowledge that it is no longer feasible to expect withdrawal of the missiles, but they insist that an explicit Soviet agreement to halt the current buildup must precede any bargaining.

Why did Egypt and the Soviets welsh on their agreement? The Soviets' move seemed perplexing in view of their generally cooperative attitude in negotiations like SALT. U.S. officials speculated about several possible theories. One view was that the Soviets simply cynically exploited the absence of Israeli jets over Egypt to complete the installation of an effective air defense system, knowing that the U.S. would probably not retaliate directly. Another explanation was that Russia had grown uneasy over the U.S. foothold as "middle man" in the Arab-Israeli dispute and deliberately violated the cease-fire to force Washington to resume its old role as the partisan and sponsor of the Israelis, thus driving a new wedge between the U.S. and the Arabs.

Whatever the Soviets' motivation, they profited from two goofs in Washington's handling of the cease-fire arrangements. In his desire for a quick end to the hostilities, Secretary of State William P. Rogers failed to obtain written agreement from Moscow on exact terms of the agreement, leaving many possible infractions open to dispute. Also, the U.S. promised that it would try to "rectify" any violations, including military buildups, that occurred during the 90 days. Such a pledge made the U.S. a virtual guarantor of the status quo--a bigger job than it could possibly handle.

Despite all the scars on the U.S. initiative, Rogers is still convinced that peace remains in the interest of both sides, and that the issues preventing them from discussing a settlement are secondary. With last week's opening of the U.N. General Assembly in Manhattan, Israeli and Arab representatives are in the same city and are at least in the proper physical proximity to begin talks at any time. The other promising sign is that along the Suez, the ceasefire itself--despite the arguments and violations that revolve around it--has yet to be broken by gunfire.

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