Germany: The Rocky Road to Recognition

DURING his first nine months in office, West German Chancellor Willy Brandt has been preoccupied with the elaborate orchestration of Ostpolitik, his policy of improving Bonn's relations with the Communist regimes to the east. Lately, the tempo has increased. Last week West German diplomats were in Warsaw for the fifth round of talks about Bonn's recognition of the Oder-Neisse Line as Poland's western border. This week Foreign Minister Walter Scheel is due in Moscow to continue--and possibly conclude--negotiations with the Soviet Union over a mutual renunciation-of-force agreement. Paris, London and Washington have all supported Bonn's initiatives--notwithstanding South Carolina Senator Strom Thurmond's charge last week that Brandt was moving toward a "one-sided surrender" to the Russians. In short, Brandt's progress has been sufficiently brisk to raise conjecture about Ostpolitik's logical finale: What would happen if Brandt should grant full recognition to Walter Ulbricht's East German regime?

A year or so ago, that possibility was almost unthinkable. Now it is widely assumed that Brandt will seek to extend some form of recognition to East Germany, probably in 18 to 36 months. The timing is of the utmost importance. It might be a mistake for Brandt to yield to East German demands for recognition without first exacting concessions for better relations between the two Germanys. Ulbricht wants above all to legitimize his regime; once West Germany recognizes him, most Third World countries as well as Sweden, Norway, Denmark and, farther down the road, the U.S., might follow suit. This is what Ulbricht wants, and once he gets it, he might veto increased contacts with West Germany unless they have been guaranteed. Even more important, overhasty recognition would jeopardize the security and economic health of West Berlin, which Ulbricht insists is an independent political entity on East German soil, with no right to any formal ties with West Germany.

Sudden recognition would deal East Germany a severe economic blow, though Ulbricht appears willing to pay the price. Refusing to admit that the East Berlin regime was a separate country, Bonn insisted that the 1957 Treaty of Rome contain a provision giving East Germany a special status that, in effect, made it the seventh member of the Common Market. Thus Ulbricht's regime reaps substantial duty-free benefits. But if Bonn recognizes East Germany as a separate entity, those benefits, which saved East Germany an estimated $137 million in tariffs last year, would likely stop.

As a first step toward recognition, Brandt has suggested that East and West Germany apply for separate United Nations membership (neither is now a member). After that, he hopes to delay further action, at least for a while, by taking refuge in a West German legal technicality which holds that there is a level of relations called Staatsrechtliche Anerkennung (state recognition), stopping just short of diplomatic recognition. Though he has already conceded that East Germany exists as a separate state, Brandt wants to avoid the final stage of recognition until East Germany has agreed to what he calls "human, practical improvements" in relations.

The anticipated improvements are modest, for Brandt does not expect the Wall to come tumbling down. He does expect, however, an increase in the number of telephone lines between the 17 million people of East Germany and the 60 million of West Germany; there are now only 74 lines to accommodate them, and none at all between West and East Berlin. He also wants an easing of East German entry restrictions for West German visitors. Most of all, Brandt hopes to pressure East Germany's rulers into ordering their border guards to stop shooting at virtually anything that moves along the "death strips" dividing the two Germanys.

Before any of this can happen, Brandt figures he must conclude nonaggression agreements with the Soviet Union and Poland and settle outstanding problems with Czechoslovakia. At the same time, at the old Allied headquarters in West Berlin, Britain, France and the U.S. are trying to win Soviet backing for a new agreement that would clearly establish West Berlin's right to economic ties with West Germany and guarantee land, water and air access to the isolated city of 2,141,400. Once West Berlin's present status is reaffirmed, Brandt will feel free to grant recognition to East Germany without fear of delivering the city to Ulbricht.

Will the Communists go along with Brandt's grand design? At the moment, the outlook is hopeful. To just about everyone's surprise, Ulbricht has backed down from his old insistence on immediate, unconditional recognition and accepted Brandt's argument that some limited contacts should be made first. Two weeks ago, Ulbricht's Foreign Minister, Otto Winzer, suggested that if Bonn and Moscow reached a renunciation-of-force agreement, even one that sidestepped East-West German recognition, then talks between the two Germanys "would stand a better chance of success."

At the moment, Brandt's most severe problems appear to be at home. Though the number of West Germans who still hope for--or even want--reunification has dwindled steadily in recent years, they still have considerable influence. The Christian Democrats have traditionally insisted that recognition of the East is tantamount to betrayal of the goal of reunification. Last week they refused to send an observer with Scheel's 25-man Moscow delegation. Their opposition is based on political as well as ideological reasons; they hope to use the issue to wreck Brandt's fragile coalition. Their strategy was aided last month by the publication in Hamburg's Bild-Zeitung of excerpts from what was alleged to be a secret draft version of the renunciation-of-force treaty between Bonn and Moscow. The notes were apparently slipped to the sex-and-scandal paper by somebody who wanted to make public the extent of the concessions Brandt is prepared to make to the East.

Right now Brandt might have serious trouble commanding a simple majority in the Bundestag on the recognition issue. His coalition partners, the Free Democrats, whose 30 seats give him only a narrow twelve-seat majority in the 496-seat lower house, might split on the question. Thus, before Brandt can carry out the aims of his Ostpolitik, he might feel compelled to hold new national elections in West Germany. If the voters continue to give him the overwhelming support indicated by recent opinion polls--as high as 75% in favor of his handling of the chancellorship--Brandt will then have the mandate that his bold plans demand.

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