The Russians Are Eight Feet Tall --But So Are We

Dr. John S. Foster Jr.. Director of Defense Research and Engineering, addressed a group of Washington reporters last week on what he sees as a burgeoning threat to the U.S. posed by Soviet strategic weapons deployment and a high level of weapons research. He spoke as the Senate entered another round of debate over military spending and deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system. Last week the U.S. also formally presented the Russians with a plan for mutual limitations on both ABM and offensive missile systems (TIME, July 20). Thus Foster described as "extremely important" the maintenance of the Pentagon's credibility with the Congress and the American people. He posed the matter to newsmen partially as "a challenge to you folks" and said, "I'd welcome any suggestions." TIME Senior Correspondent John L. Steele, who was present, has a few suggestions.

Dear Dr. Foster:

The German poet Goethe once said: "I can promise to be frank; I cannot promise to be impartial." That's not a bad guideline for officials who seek, as you do, to maintain credibility in areas of extreme controversy, and credibility itself, I think, implies a certain completeness -- or a symmetry -- in dealing with the data upon which arguments are based. Perhaps I can illustrate this best by using some of the things you said, and didn't say, in your remarks.

You produced a scale model of the Soviet S59 missile to illustrate your point that "the worrisome thing is that it's very large" and carries a payload "something like ten times" that of the considerably smaller U.S. Minuteman. What you said was undeniably true. Their missile can carry a 25-megaton warhead; or, if eventually tipped with in dependently targeted re-entry vehicles, it could carry three warheads of five megatons each. Our Minuteman carries a one-megaton warhead, or, as with the new Minuteman III, three warheads of lesser power.

But there was a good deal more to this apparent U.S. shortfall. The Soviet missiles are designed for totally different purposes than ours. Defense Secretary Laird has said repeatedly that the logical reason for Soviet development of their huge weapon is to strike first at the U.S., and to strike at our Minuteman silos below the ground. Hardened silos require a huge weight of explosives for their destruction.

By contrast, our Minuteman is designed for no such first-strike function. It exists for retaliatory strikes on "soft" tar gets such as Soviet cities. Given this purpose, the Minuteman is hardly small; with its accuracy, it is capable of destroying on a one-for-one basis -- one missile, one city.

We could match the Soviets for gross size, if we decided to do so. But we developed solid propellants for our missiles in part to enable us to shrink missile size and weight, making our missiles less susceptible to tracking and interception. Moscow uses, in its SS-9, a storable liquid fuel that leads to huge size and huge explosive yields. It is this fear some first-strike capability, in fact, on which you base your rationale for U.S. deployment of the Safeguard anti-ballistic missile system; it is meant to protect our deterrent second-strike capability. I am among those who favor an ABM defense around our missile sites as a shield against the SS-9. But I also believe that your comparison of the Soviet S59 and the U.S. Minuteman is misleading; they are different weapons systems designed for different purposes, and this should be made clear in the interests of credibility.

Secondly, and along the same lines, you said that the Soviet SS-9s "are going in at the rate of at least 50 a year," and you added that the smaller SS-11s "are going in at the rate of about 100 a year." Those were the same figures you used in February before the House Appropriations Committee. You no doubt chose the words "at the rate of" with precision, but you gave the impression last week that there would be at least 50 more SS-9s and 100 more SS-11s deployed by the Soviets this year. Yet your colleagues in the Government say, on the best satellite intelligence information available to them, that from November 1969 through June 1970 there were no additional SS-9s deployed and only a few SS-11s installed. Just three weeks ago new intelligence became available indicating that work had been resumed at three SS-areas. Since it is Soviet practice to install six SS-9s at each area, it was believed that silos were being dug and sites prepared for 18 additional SS-9s. That is certainly something to worry about. But on the basis of this information, is it entirely accurate to say SS-9s are "going in at the rate of about 50 a year"? You undoubtedly did not mean to convey an impression that 50 more SS-9s would be deployed this year. Preciseness in language here, too, might help alleviate any credibility problem that the Pentagon may have.

Finally, in making a commendable case for a greater U.S. military research and development effort, you express the fear that the Soviet effort in this field could overtake the present U.S. lead by the mid-'70s. You say we might find our selves producing "inferior weapons" and "might not ever catch up." You might well have pointed out that in precisely this period the U.S. will be well along the way to completion of its Poseidon sub marine program, involving missiles with independently targeted warheads for a total of at least 4,960 warheads. And by the mid-'70s we will be well along the way toward completion of our 500-missile, 1,500-warhead Minuteman III pro gram that I mentioned above.

That is the fruit of "old" research, you no doubt would reply. But shortly thereafter, two very promising "new" research weapons systems probably can be fielded. By 1978, for instance, it is anticipated that the first squadron of B-1s, an advanced intercontinental bomber, could be flown. At about the same time, we could have an entirely new sub marine missile system, the ULMS (undersea long-range missile system), operating in millions of square miles of ocean area, vastly complicating an enemy's anti-submarine problem and able to reach the Soviet Union from such protected areas as, say, the Mississippi River. True, all this can happen only if Congress keeps providing the necessary funds. But here, too, balance would appear to contribute to continued credibility.

I am sure there is no disagreement concerning the dan gers to both the Soviets and to ourselves in the continuing strategic arms race; nor is there disagreement about hopes for an enforceable SALT agreement to curb the race. Good arguments can be made for more funds without "scaring hell out of the customers." My point. Dr. Foster, is that credibility is increased and not decreased by presenting a symmetrical picture of the strengths and weaknesses of both sides. The Soviets are indeed eight feet tall. But so are we.

Respectfully yours, JOHN L. SUELE

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