Middle East: Between Hope And Menace

AS Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser lingered in Moscow, extending his stay once, twice, then a third time, statesmen in a score of capitals wondered what was up. Were the Russians, mindful of recent U.S. warnings, finally trying to strong-arm their client into seriously considering the latest peace plan put forward by U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers? Or were the Russians and Egyptians taking all that time to check out a new shopping list of late-model Soviet weapons? When Nasser finally ended his 19-day visit last week and flew back to Cairo, a vague communique alluding to a political settlement was softer in tone than previous such statements but did little to clear up the mystery.

Strange References. To some Western officials, the dearth of diatribe was in itself a hopeful sign. They noted that Moscow and Cairo did not come right out and reject the Rogers proposals, which include a 90-day ceasefire, Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories and Arab acceptance of Israel's right to exist within recognized borders. There were rumors, in fact, that the Soviets had stressed the importance of a political solution, and had actually prevailed on Nasser to accept the essence of the Rogers proposals--a ceasefire and negotiations. The Israelis, however, saw no evidence that Nasser had experienced such a change of heart. In an interview last week with the Paris magazine L'Express, Premier Golda Meir said: "They say Nasser cannot accept public negotiations. Well, five times, ten times, 20 times, and not later than two weeks ago, we suggested secret conversations to him.

We never got the slightest response."

Vastly more pessimistic were some words addressed by Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan to newly trained pilots about to enter the air force. In an Air Force Day speech, scarcely 90 seconds long. Dayan raised the possibility of serious fighting ahead.

"Now in the fourth year of the Six-Day War," said Dayan, "the Egyptians and their foreign advisers are attempting to force a decision. I doubt whether their desire will bring us peace. I fear that the next round will take place not around a peace table, in talks and compromises of good will, but will take place in forts, in the skies, in air, missile and artillery battles, in raids and in repelling invasion attempts."

Continued Dayan, in a passage that contained some strange references: "I am well aware of the supreme effort demanded of you, and the extreme danger you are required to face in order to defeat the enemy. Battles in the skies over Kutamiya and Salhiya are no holiday gifts. But better that the battle for our future be fought there than at the fences of Nahal Oz and with the blood of the children of Kiryat Shemona."

What About Kutamiya? Dayan did not have to explain whom he meant by Egypt's "foreign advisers." Every Israeli by now is able to translate such a phrase into Russian. Similarly, Dayan's countrymen know of Nahal Oz, a fortified settlement on the Gaza Strip border; and Kiryat Shemona, a city on the Lebanon border where eight residents have been killed in recent months by Russian-made rockets fired by Arab guerrillas.

But what about Kutamiya and Salhiya, where Dayan all but announced an impending battle? Kutamiya, it turns out, is a new Egyptian airbase west of the port of Suez, halfway between that city and Cairo. Salhiya is another airfield northwest of Ismailia and about 20 miles west of the canal. Both are forward positions, sited on the northern and southern rims of the area where the most SA-2 missiles are concentrated (see map). Both are now housing MIG21s piloted by Russians. The Israelis saw the stationing of MIGs at such advanced bases as an ominous move for three reasons:

1) The planes are in a position to fly cover for the SA-2 and SA3 missiles in the general Suez Canal area. Since the bases are at the very edge of the 20-mile zone where the Israelis have announced that their planes will continue operations, there is a distinct possibility that Soviet pilots will eventually tangle with Israelis.

2) The Israelis are even more worried that the MIGs might serve to cover Egyptian cross-canal operations--not necessarily an all-out invasion but perhaps a series of commando sorties. Such fears were magnified when the U.S. disclosed last week that Egypt was receiving its first amphibious armored personnel carriers from the Soviet Union; in recent months the Soviets have conducted Marine-style landing maneuvers with Egyptian troops.

3) The MIGs might be used to bomb Israel's Bar-Lev Line on the east bank of the Suez Canal. Up to now, Egyptian pilots have been carrying out such hit-and-run raids, but ineffectively. One Israeli source suggested last week that while Nasser was in Moscow he may have proposed that the Russians take over some of these bombing missions, and that the Russians readily agreed. After all, the source continued, Soviet pilots are anxious to acquire some combat experience.

U.S. intelligence admits that Russian pilots have been spotted at one of the new bases, but Washington seems less concerned than do the Israelis about their presence. The U.S. view is that the Russians' mission is still defensive and that Dayan's tough words were meant to be a deterrent to the Soviets.

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