And Now, a Few Words from The Secretary of State . . .

IN the execution of U.S. foreign policy, the distance between William Rogers' State Department suite and Henry Kissinger's White House corner sometimes seems great enough to require its own hot line. One recent example of their divergent tactics, in fact, ended in a cable the Secretary of State received while he was still on a Far Eastern tour. Uncharacteristically apologetic, the President's National Security Affairs Adviser recalled his remark to the effect that the U.S. ought to "expel" Russian troops from the Middle East. That remark, cabled Kissinger, had been unfortunate.

Last week it was Rogers who had to take a step back, this time over Indochina. Early last week, in an interview, he warned that the Cambodian invasion had brought the Indochina action no closer to a negotiated end. His view clashed with that of the President, who told a television audience that while "only time will tell," he believed that the invasion would speed productive talks.

On Wednesday, Rogers appeared to bring himself at least parallel to the Nixon line. In a press conference, he declared: "I think that probably the prospects for the next couple of months are not too bright. I do think that the prospects in the long run are still good." He also said that the invasion, by speeding Vietnamization of the war, "does increase the probabilities that the enemy, somewhere along the line, will negotiate."

The Administration's apparent schizophrenia over Indochinese strategy followed a similar display over Middle East tactics. It was while Rogers' fresh call for a settlement was still being considered by Egypt's Nasser and his Soviet patrons that Kissinger made his reference to a possible need to "expel" Russian troops. And the President on TV deliberately brought up the Middle East to castigate "aggressive" Arab nations who "want to drive Israel into the sea."

Rogers is known to feel that such bellicose public posturing lessens rather than enhances chances for successful talks; as a lawyer and highly skilled negotiator, he knows that settlements often come quickest when the other party is not made to feel weak by being shoved against the wall. He believes that, because the Egyptians now feel more confident, they might conceivably be more disposed to negotiate. He also believes that the Russians harbor the same suspicions against the U.S. that the U.S. harbors against them--but that the Russians really want some kind of Middle East settlement. Even if the President cannot proceed on that assumption, Rogers feels that there is no need to talk publicly of the steps the U.S. is taking--and that occasionally there has been too much talk at San Clemente. Despite last week's partial recantation, Rogers does not buy the theory that Hanoi will be willing to talk because the tide is turning against it.

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