Apprehensive Allies

Since the U.S. completed its withdrawal from Cambodia in late June, the fighting in Indochina has fallen off drastically. The U.S. death toll for the week ending July 4, for example, was 61, the lowest in 31 years. The comparative battlefield lull was overshadowed, however, by intense diplomatic activity. As Secretary of State William P. Rogers wound up his 15-day, five-nation Asian tour, he spoke of "further political initiatives that might be taken for peace." These words, combined with other comments by U.S. officials, led the government of President Nguyen Van Thieu to wonder if Washington was thinking of a coalition government for South Viet Nam.

Tension over this critical and highly controversial point had been building up for some weeks. As far back as April 20, Richard Nixon, in announcing the withdrawal of an additional 150,000 U.S. troops by April 1971. for the first time in a major policy speech failed to mention free elections in South Viet Nam as a prerequisite for any negotiated settlement. Two weeks ago, Saigon's concern mounted further when Rogers said on the eve of his Asian swing that if the Communists represented 20% of the people in South Viet Nam, they should have 20% of the representation.

For Saigon, the issue was crucial. In an election Thieu, who firmly controls the country's administration, could expect to win handsomely. In an imposed coalition, however, Thieu would be forced to seat several Communist ministers in the Cabinet.

By the time Rogers reached Saigon, the South Vietnamese were so agitated that the Secretary moved immediately to reassure them. Striding into Thieu's office he came right to the point: "Mr. President, let me make one thing clear. I have never used the words coalition government. We feel that the best way to determine what the people of South Viet Nam want is by the electoral process. We have no intention of imposing a solution." Rogers also brought Thieu a warm personal letter from President Nixon promising $100 million to improve the housing and rations of South Vietnamese servicemen and noting that Thieu's forces have proved "fully capable of shouldering the tasks of the substantial numbers of men we have withdrawn."

Pacific Power. If Thieu was reassured, other Asian leaders were growing increasingly apprehensive over U.S. intentions. Both Rogers and Defense Secretary Melvin Laird have spoken of accelerated U.S. troop withdrawals from

Asia. By Oct. 15, U.S. troop strength in South Viet Nam will be down to 384,000--some 50,000 below Nixon's authorized ceiling. In addition, Laird said last week that the U.S. would reduce its forces in South Korea by 1971. A Pentagon spokesman expected this to involve one U.S. division--about 25,000 out of the 64,000 Americans there.

Though Rogers tried to offset the impression created by these announcements by emphasizing that the U.S. was determined to remain a Pacific power, many Asian governments were uneasy. Philippine, Australian and New Zealand officials expressed concern to Rogers over possible U.S. withdrawals from Asia. South Korea and even Japan did not. try to conceal their fears that "readjustments" in the U.S. military presence might turn into a dangerous thinning out of U.S. forces.

The prospect of an accompanying decline in U.S. military spending particularly displeased the Asians--none, perhaps, more than the Thais. Facing a budgetary deficit of $250 million in 1970, the Bangkok government last week announced that duties and excise rates on more than 200 imported items would be drastically increased, some by as much as 300%. The regime was so worried about the unpopularity of the measure that Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn spent a full hour on TV explaining that Thailand needed more money for arms because of the serious threat on its borders. Thanom indicated that the threat came partly from Thailand's native Communist insurgents, eight of whom were arrested last week. But the gravest danger came, he said, from the spillover of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops to areas of Cambodia near Thailand's frontier. Thus far, however, the Thais have not responded to Cambodia's urgent pleas for troops, not only because of Bangkok's internal economic problems but also because of its uncertainty over how much U.S. aid might be forthcoming to help finance a major effort.

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