Message from Ulbricht

Ever since West German Chancellor Willy Brandt launched his celebrated Ostpolitik eight months ago, he has met vitriolic resistance from the East Germans. No agreement for better relations between the two halves of Germany could be reached, they stubbornly declared, until Bonn grants full diplomatic recognition to East Germany. But last week, in a sudden turnabout, East German Party Boss Walter Ulbricht dropped his old preconditions. In a speech published in Neues Deutschland, the official newspaper of the East German Communist Party, Ulbricht in effect accepted two of the points proposed by Brandt at last month's summit meeting in Kassel with East German Premier Willi Stoph. Though Brandt's suggestions had been brusquely rejected at the time, Ulbricht now said that he favored U.N. membership for both countries and the exchange of ambassadors at the ministerial level even before an agreement is reached on recognition.

There was some speculation that Ulbricht may have intended to extend a helping hand to his old antagonist, though such a move would be very much out of character. Only two days before, about 43% of West Germany's eligible voters had gone to the polls in three state elections. Though only state offices were at stake, the nationwide debate over Ostpolitik had turned the election into a plebiscite on Brandt's policies of seeking closer relations with the Communist bloc, especially East Germany and Russia, hence promoting greater economic ties.

Visit to Moscow. The outcome was a standoff between the Christian Democrats, who oppose the Ostpolitik, and Brandt's Social Democrats. A big loss was suffered by the rightist National Democrats. But an even more severe setback was experienced by the Free Democrat Party, a loosely knit combination of conservatives and far-left liberals whose 30 Bundestag delegates give Brandt's coalition a thin twelve-seat majority in the 496-seat West German parliament. In two of the three states, the Free Democrats failed to gain the 5% of the vote required to be seated. The plight of the Free Democrats threatened to undermine Brandt's slender hold on power. Some Christian Democrats were even threatening to try to bring down the government. Under the circumstances, Ulbricht may have reckoned that some sign of progress on the diplomatic front would strengthen Brandt's position.

Ulbricht may well have received advice or pressure from the Soviets, who are in the process of negotiating a renunciation-of-force agreement with West Germany. When Ulbricht was recently in Moscow, he is believed to have been shown the draft of the treaty, which the Russians hope will bring increased West German trade and technical assistance. The Soviets do not want Ulbricht to jeopardize their own relations with Bonn through his confirmed refusal to come to an understanding with the West Germans. Having assessed the Soviet determination to do business with Bonn, Ulbricht may have concluded that he must either moderate his hard-line attitude toward Brandt or face the possibility of being left out of the Socialist-bloc trend to establish better relations with West Germany.

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