Cambodia: A Cocky New ARVN

For the better part of a decade, U.S. military men have regularly been called upon to explain the pathetic performance of their hapless protege, the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam. Now Pentagon press officers are no longer apologizing. Instead, they are speaking delightedly of a "new" ARVN, joking about its resemblance to the rugged Koreans or even Israelis, reassuring reporters that, no, Saigon was not about to annex Cambodia. Perhaps not, but Saigon's newly ferocious forces were exulting in their unaccustomed role of conquering heroes.

U.S. officers were pleasantly startled by the soaring spirits of ARVN units in Cambodia. "It was something," reported an American who watched the ARVN 21st Division roll into Can Tho after three weeks across the border. "They were throwing handfuls of Viet Cong money to the people from their trucks and armored personnel carriers as they came through town. They were sky-high." ARVN armored columns were blithely plunging 50 or more miles into Cambodia. Streaking across the Cambodian flatlands like so many pocket Pattons, they liberated towns and hurtled far beyond the range of their U.S. advisers, artillery and helicopter support. In addition to their impressive mileage, they rolled up some astounding (and probably inflated) body counts. ARVN and the U.S. claimed to have killed close to 10,000 Communists by week's end, one-fourth of the original Viet Cong--North Vietnamese force (v. 524 ARVN and 227 U.S. dead).

"The Cambodian high," as the phenomenon was beginning to be called, had a dramatic effect on ARVN morale. "When we went across the border," says President Nguyen Van Thieu, "I had almost every general in the country calling me on the phone, saying 'I want to go to Cambodia.'" Ordinarily, 600 ARVN troops would show up for a 4th Marine Battalion roll call in Saigon; last week, after word arrived that the 4th was headed for Cambodia, all 800 showed up.

The Easy Way. Operating with a full complement of U.S. hardware and a minimum of U.S. advisers and logistical support, ARVN units have employed their new-found mobility to the fullest. Saigon's armored task forces in Cambodia have roamed as far as the port of Kompong Som (formerly Sihanoukville) in the south and Chup, site of Indochina's largest rubber plantation, in the north. Attacking the Chup plantation, whose 64,000 acres had become a haven for elements of the Viet Cong 9th Division, South Vietnamese Skyraiders reduced the latex plant to a smoking ruin. Trouble is, they also killed 15 civilians.

On the ground, concedes ARVN Major General Ngo Dzu, "the maneuvers have been conventional, more like the European wars than the guerrilla war in South Viet Nam. If you contact the enemy you can destroy him. I like that --it's much easier to make war." Only once, however, has an ARVN force made significant contact. Early last month a pincer movement of 18,000 troops trapped about 4,000 Viet Cong in the Parrot's Beak; some 1,200 Communists died in the one-sided, two-day fight.

A South Vietnamese intelligence colonel concedes that, at bottom, "our troops are still not very enthusiastic, but they fight better in Cambodia than Viet Nam." One important reason is that they know there is little danger of booby traps, sniper fire or determined opposition from the retreating Communists. Still, U.S. officers have nothing but praise for units like the ARVN 9th Division, which has been tracking down Communists and picking up new confidence in Cambodia's southern reaches. "Cambodia has been a bonanza for ARVN," says Major General Hal D. McCowan, top U.S. adviser in the Delta region. "Nothing helps like kicking the hell out of the other guy."

Over the past two years, efforts to improve ARVN have produced steady, gradual progress, though no one claims any miracles. Reports TIME'S Saigon Bureau Chief Marsh Clark, "Certainly compared with a ragtag Cambodian army and a Communist enemy that has been for the most part desperately eluding and evading, ARVN has taken on a new and refreshing look. But ARVN has changed only by comparison. By any measure, it has not suddenly changed from a marginally efficient overall force to a superarmy."

Saigon's military establishment is, to be sure, bigger and better organized than ever before. Astonishingly, Saigon did not get around to general mobilization until mid-1968; since then, its forces have grown from 775,000 to 950,000 men. Of the total, 484,000 belong to the Regional Forces and Popular Forces, the keystones of the pacification effort. The 387,000 troops of ARVN's twelve regular divisions, plus 31,000 navy, 35,000 air force and 13,000 marine personnel, account for the rest.

Mandarin Generals. In South Viet Nam itself, many units are still apt to strike live-and-let-live bargains with the Communists in their areas. But ARVN is much better led than it was before Thieu began replacing the old mandarin generals with battle-seasoned officers and the products of improved training academies. One grim sign of a new aggressiveness on the platoon and company level is the soaring casualty rate among lieutenants and captains.

In many areas, however, ARVN's progress is still disappointing, and not even the intense euphoria of the Cambodian excursion can overcome low pay, corruption and lackluster leadership. True, U.S. Defense Secretary Melvin Laird began hinting last week that "the success of Vietnamization" could permit a speedup in U.S. withdrawal plans; instead of pulling out 150,000 troops by next spring, as President Nixon announced in April, the U.S. might bring home as many as 195,000. But the fact is that Vietnamization is six months behind in some respects. A high-command reorganization that was supposed to root out the remaining corrupt, incompetent or lazy generals has been delayed indefinitely. ARVN's lack of helicopters and pilots has slowed development of truly independent ARVN strike forces. And even at 950,000 men, ARVN is 150,000 men below strength, according to the Vietnamization timetable; Thieu is loath to make up the shortage for fear of upsetting the fragile economy and, in turn, his own political position.

For much the same reason, ARVN's pay scale is appallingly low. An American private first class makes $200 a month, and even Saigon bar girls stand to clear $100 a month, but an ARVN brigadier general earns only $41 a month and a private $10.

Supposedly Secure. Unfortunately, the kind of search-and-destroy spectaculars that are winning huzzahs for ARVN in Cambodia have long been discredited in South Viet Nam. Moreover, with ARVN spread thin and getting thinner, the Communists may have more room to begin gnawing at pacification gains in South Viet Nam and building up pro-Communist cadres in Cambodia.

Already there are tentative signs that the Communists are at work on this scenario. A month ago, Viet Cong raiders boldly kidnaped 200 civilians from a resettlement compound in South Viet Nam's Pleiku province. Saigon's pacification-program computers have reported a decline in the percentage of the population living in "secure" and "reasonably secure" hamlets. The slip was slight--from 89.7% to 88.9%--but it was the first in more than two years.

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