The War: Toward the Deadline and Beyond

Last fall, when antiwar protest was reaching a crescendo, President Nixon refused to buckle. Instead, he rallied his Silent Majority, promoted his Vietnamization policy, and watched the opposition deflate. This spring he is attempting the same. Though the ferocity of the outcry over Cambodia rattled the Administration, the White House is still determined to ride it out. As American troops come out of Cambodia, Nixon hopes, the issue will become increasingly academic.

Crucial to Nixon's approach is his ability to prove that the Cambodian incursion has been a tangible success. There was evidence that the operation was indeed proving useful in purely military terms. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird pressed his commanders in Viet Nam about the possibility of accelerating U.S. troop withdrawals. At the same time, Administration loyalists in the Senate conducted an effective stalling action against a cutoff of funds for any future U.S. operations in Cambodia after June 30. Often speaking to a nearly empty chamber, Republican Senators prevented any substantive vote. An innocuous change in the wording of the measure's preamble was approved, 82 to 11, but it amounted only to what Republican Whip Robert Griffin called a "cosmetic" to make the legislation "look a little better" to the Administration. The modification did not change the White House's opposition to any congressional restriction.

Zigs and Zags. With the Administration's self-imposed deadline for leaving Cambodia only weeks away, attention is shifting from the controversy over the original U.S. incursion to the murky question of whether South Vietnamese forces will remain in Cambodia and what support the U.S. will give them if they stay or return. Though senior officials insist that Washington's private approach to the problem of Saigon's role has been logical and consistent, the public record suggests either confusion or purposeful dissembling. Some of the zigs and zags:

> On May 8, at his press conference, President Nixon reaffirmed that U.S. troops would quit Cambodia by July 1 and added that he "would expect that the South Vietnamese would come out approximately at the same time that we do because when we come out our logistical support and air support will also come out with them." Three days later, President Nguyen Van Thieu said that his troops faced no deadline and that they would feel free to return later whenever asked to do so by the Cambodian government.

> On May 13, Secretary of State William Rogers said that he would not "rule out air activity over Cambodia" past the June 30 deadline. He also said that the U.S. was encouraging both South Viet Nam and Thailand to cooperate with Cambodia in meeting Communist threats there.

> On May 14, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird said that the South Vietnamese forces probably would make some limited attacks into Cambodia after the current operations come to an end and that he would urge that U.S. bombers continue to strike Communist areas in Cambodia after June 30 if necessary.

> On May 16, at a briefing in Key Biscayne, a White House official said that the Administration still expected South Viet Nam to withdraw all of its combat forces from Cambodia by about July 1.

> On May 20, the State Department press officer, Robert J. McCloskey, conceded that South Vietnamese troops might remain in Cambodia after the U.S. troops withdrew. And on the same day, Lieut. General Do Cao Tri, one of the senior commanders of Saigon's forces in Cambodia, said that South Vietnamese troops might stay indefinitely, until the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces were driven out of Cambodia.

> On May 22, Laird emphasized that there would be no American military advisers in Cambodia after June 30, but other officials in the Administration said that if South Vietnamese troops remained in Cambodia and needed tactical air support, it could not be denied them. Such support demands close coordination between ground and air units, and would almost certainly require U.S. advisers on the ground to direct the U.S. air attacks.

Whose Scenario? It was easy to conclude from all this that Washington initially wanted Saigon's troops out and then changed strategy, or that the Administration intended all along to promote and sustain a Vietnamese expedition in Cambodia after June 30 but chose to obfuscate that policy, or that Thieu rather than Nixon was writing the scenario. None of this is so, Administration officials now argue--though some admit that the public statements are contradictory and confusing.

In the wake of large-scale protest against the Cambodian intervention and the Kent State killings, Nixon on May 8 was going out of his way to stress the limited nature of the incursion. In the give-and-take of his press conference, Nixon overstated the certainty of South Vietnamese withdrawal and of the termination of U.S. support. The remark took some of his subordinates by surprise. The equivocations since then have been designed to retreat somewhat from that firm statement.

The explanation given privately in Washington last week stressed that the Administration, from the beginning of the Cambodian intervention, expected the South Vietnamese to be more adventurous than the U.S. At the same time, there was concern that Saigon's forces might be diverted on so large a scale as to damage the war effort in the main arena, South Viet Nam. So the U.S. really wanted the South Vietnamese to come out soon after the Americans if the military situation permitted --but it did not want the Communists to be too sure of that. One important motive behind Washington's wobbles is a desire to keep Hanoi guessing. If the Communists could be sure that all the allied forces would leave for good by a specific date, they could more easily move back into the border sanctuaries and step up their operations against South Viet Nam.

Eye on the Ball. Actually, the U.S. still does expect the South Vietnamese to pull back within a few weeks of the G.I.s' departure. But Saigon's forces will be ready to clear out the sanctuaries again if it should be considered necessary. Both Saigon and Washington also want to prevent a Communist overthrow of the Lon Nol regime; the Nixon Administration would be pleased if the Cambodians, South Vietnamese and possibly the Thais do whatever ground fighting has to be done on that score. Apparently the highflying U.S. bombing raids will continue to hit any Communist buildups in the sanctuaries. The ban against U.S. advisers operating in Cambodia seems firm, and thus close U.S. combat air support seems unlikely --though if a large South Vietnamese unit were threatened with defeat, the U.S. could hardly fail to come to its relief with fighter-bombers, helicopters and cargo flights.

The Administration insists that there is no disagreement with Saigon. Said one official: "There is no sign that Thieu is going to be a real problem. He has his eye on the ball--in South Viet Nam." Nevertheless, war has its own inner dynamics. It is still only a matter of speculation if. or how severely, the other side will ultimately respond in Cambodia--and what counteraction that response may demand.

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