New Crunch for the U.S. in Indochina

As President Nixon sought again to clarify and advance U.S. policy in Viet Nam, the situation was made even murkier by events in neighboring Cambodia. There the menacing movements of 40,000 Communist troops threatened the poorly equipped army of the new Premier, General Lon Nol, and there was even a danger that the capital, Phnom-Penh, might fall (see THE WORLD). The new Communist challenge posed another, potentially fateful series of questions for the U.S.

The President must decide how much military aid, if any, and what kind, the U.S. should provide in response to Lon Nol's personal appeal for help. If Phnom-Penh were to fall, so would the non-Communist government of Cambodia. The North Vietnamese troops would then have even safer sanctuaries and supply routes from which to harass South Viet Nam. But any widening of U.S. involvement would raise political protests at home. The President's televised report to the nation only underscored the dilemma. He bluntly warned Hanoi's leaders that they would be taking "grave risks" if they "jeopardize the security of our remaining forces in Viet Nam by increased military action in Viet Nam, in Cambodia or in Laos." At the same time, a White House aide conceded that "the last thing in the world we want is involvement by U.S. ground troops" in Cambodia.

Calming Effect. While the Administration agonized over a response to Lon Nol, it allowed the South Vietnamese to send about 1,500 captured Soviet-designed AK-47 automatic rifles to the Cambodian army. Senator William Fulbright's Foreign Relations Committee sought an explanation from Secretary of State William Rogers--and then, without waiting for his promised testimony this week, ordered two staff members to go to Cambodia to investigate any U.S. involvement. Democratic Senator Edmund Muskie complained that linking troop withdrawals to events in Cambodia and Laos was to "broaden our commitment" dangerously.

Nixon's speech sought to reassure the U.S. at a time when polls show that domestic discontent over the war is rising anew. It was full of highly hopeful statements: "Pacification is succeeding"; "The South Vietnamese can develop the capability for their own defense"; "We finally have in sight the just peace we are seeking." Those words, coupled with the specific promise to pull 150,000 more U.S. troops out of Viet Nam within a year, may well have the intended calming effect at home.

Yet Nixon is also under counterpressure from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the U.S. commander in South Viet Nam, General Creighton Abrams. The President originally planned to announce a reduction of 50,000 over the next four months, then a drawdown of 100,000 within the following four months. The Joint Chiefs, fearful of Communist moves across the Viet Nam borders, pleaded first that no announcement of any kind be made for 100 days, or if that were not possible, for at least another 60 days. Nixon heard the chiefs out at a luncheon meeting in the Pentagon. Then, only a few hours before his telecast, he decided to lump the 50,000 increment and the 100,000 increment together, stretching the deadline from eight months to twelve.

Flexibility. By spreading the combined new withdrawals over a year, Nixon gave himself maximum flexibility to deal with the conflicting pressures. He can delay all withdrawals until the military situation becomes clearer, thus meeting the concerns of his generals. He can keep the Communists off bal ance in the field. He can avoid the repetitive guessing game over each next announcement at home.

Nixon's decision not only keeps the U.S. on a committed course of disengagement but also allows draft calls to be reduced. The President moved to make the draft more equitable last week by announcing that no more occupational and paternity deferments will be granted and urged Congress to give him the necessary authority to end student deferments as well.

Slip of the Tongue. Nixon's announcement did not significantly alter the current pace of disengagement (an average reduction of 12,500 men in Viet Nam a month), but it did reflect a new emphasis upon seeking a negotiated settlement of the war. He did not indicate any great hopes for the Paris peace talks. But, as had Secretary Rogers before him, Nixon seized upon the remarks of Yakov A. Malik, the chief Soviet delegate to the U.S., who suggested that "only a new Geneva Conference could bring a new solution" in Southeast Asia. The U.S. is eager to seek a regional solution with the help of other major powers and the nations of the area. The Viet Cong and Malik himself have since knocked down the idea that they are considering the creation of a new conference like the ones that created the much-violated Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962.

Yet the notion persists in Washington that Malik is too experienced a diplomat to have allowed himself an uncalculated slip of tongue. There is a suspicion that the Communists want to keep this kind of option open. When they feel that their military situation gives them a strong bargaining position--if, for instance, they are able to topple the regime in Phnom-Penh--they just might want to seek a regional agree ment rather than fight on indefinitely in South Viet Nam. Nixon seemed to be committing the U.S. to a willingness to consider any avenue of negotiation. He ruled out only the Hanoi demand that "the government of Viet Nam be overthrown before real negotiations begin." There could be some significance in the word "real" as a possible hint that President Thieu's government could become a concession after serious talks begin. Nixon raised the possibility of some kind of geographical or other reallocation of power in South Viet Nam when he suggested that "a fair political solution should reflect the existing relationship of political forces" within the country. "Make no mistake about it," one key Administration official insists. "Negotiation is our game."

Appeal to Pride. But the possibility of negotiations is not helped by the kind of appeal to pride and patriotism that President Nixon employed. "America has never been defeated in the proud 190-year history of this country--and we shall not be defeated in Viet Nam," he declared. He may feel a need to justify the terrible cost of the war in lives and suffering, but such stark categories as "victory" and "defeat" do not reflect the reality of the indecisive conflict. That kind of assertion could also make more difficult the public acceptance of a compromise settlement.

As always, the desire of the parties to negotiate hinges heavily on their relative military strength in the field. At the moment, the Communists hold no great advantage within South Viet Nam. They are severely strained as they try to step up pressures in that nation while mounting new actions in Laos and Cambodia. Yet their skill and boldness have been repeatedly underestimated in the past, and the new initiative in Cambodia offers both a new threat and, ironically, a new thread of hope that a regional solution might become profitable to all of the adversaries.

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so reader's discretion is required.