Growing Soviet Commitment

Russian engineers are especially busy in Egypt these days. They are rushing to complete new missile sites, several of which are expected to become operational next month. One is located in Alexandria's east harbor, where it will guard Egypt's main port, now crammed full of Soviet freighters that are off-loading equipment for President Nasser's armed forces. Another is situated between the Pyramids and Cairo West Military Airbase, and will force Israelis to think twice before raiding again in the vicinity of the capital. The third site is being built 560 miles up the Nile near the Aswan High Dam. Because Aswan's airport was suddenly closed last week to civilian traffic, there was reason to believe that the Russians have actually begun installing the first of the new SA3 ground-to-air missiles, designed to shoot down low-flying aircraft.

The SA-3s, which are similar to the U.S. Hawk missile, have never before been stationed outside the Warsaw Pact nations, nor have they ever been fired in combat. The missile and its radar are so complex that the Russians have decided not to rely on Egyptians to man the sites. Instead, they are sending their own crews. They are also sending guard detachments, perhaps as a precaution against the Israelis' picking up a few SA-3s by helicopter for study.

Training Programs. Along with the new missiles, 1,500 to 2,000 Soviet experts and troops have arrived in Egypt in the past six months, bringing the number of Soviet personnel there to between 4,500 and 6,000. The increase in the Soviet commitment raises a number of crucial "what if" questions for Israeli planners.

Nine Soviet advisers have been killed by Israeli bombs and bullets since the Six-Day War, but neither the Soviets nor Israelis publicize the fact. An escalation in fighting, however, could lead to a direct confrontation, which the Israelis are obviously loath to provoke. So far, the new missiles are placed only in defensive positions around civilian and industrial targets.

The Russians are also continuing their training programs for Nasser's army and air force. More than 100 Soviet pilots now serve as instructors. Despite some reports to the contrary, there is no evidence that these pilots are flying combat missions. Russian advisers have also established a number of military training schools, where they teach everything from logistics and supply to operational planning. They follow the Egyptian soldiers from school through war games, and finally into the field. They instruct commando forces and give amphibious training to the units along the Suez Canal. By far the largest number of Russians are stationed with the armored units, in keeping with the Soviet military doctrine that masses of tanks should spearhead any offensive or defensive activity. The fear of killing too many Russians is the main reason the Israelis have failed to bomb the long lines of Soviet-made Egyptian tanks that are parked under open skies between the Suez Canal and Cairo.

Have the Soviet efforts made better fighters out of the Arabs? The Israeli answer is a resounding no, overall. As if to buttress their contention, the Israelis last week launched the largest attacks since the Six-Day War on the Syrian front. Annoyed by mounting numbers of small Syrian probes, Israeli jets and artillery pounded Syrian positions for seven hours, knocking out at least 15 antiaircraft and artillery batteries.

Despite Israeli denials, there was some evidence that the Syrians may have improved a little. Though they lost three jets in a whirling five-minute dogfight, they managed at least to knock down an Israeli Pharitom, the first confirmed loss of one of the U.S.-built fighter-bombers since they went into action. In a triumphant mood, the Syrians promoted the MIG pilot who had downed the Phantom plane. A Syrian farmer who captured the two crewmen after they bailed out was presented with $125 in cash and a new pistol by Syria's strongman, General Hafez Assad.

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