The Next Marine Battle

At 9 a.m. on March 8, 1965, a 1,400-man force of the 9th Marines splashed ashore at Danang to become the first American ground-combat unit in South Viet Nam. The Communists were threatening to cut the country in two and the South Vietnamese army was collapsing. But that morning, the grunts in green met only rain, surf and a welcoming force of pretty girls. It was a placid preface to one of the bloodiest chapters in Marine Corps history.

Now the Marines are leaving Viet Nam. Earlier this month, the Corps' Third Amphibious force turned over command of I Corps, the northernmost sector of South Viet Nam, to the Army. Last week the 26th Marines, which earned fame and a Presidential Unit Citation at Iwo Jima, was withdrawn and returned to Camp Pendleton, Calif. There the regiment will be deactivated.

Critical Year. The transfer of command and the departure of the 26th symbolize the end of the Marines' role in Viet Nam. Marine strength there, once up to 86,700, will be reduced to 42,000 when the current phase of troop withdrawals is completed on April 15, and will eventually drop to 10,000. The withdrawal also signals a new battle for the Marines, whose future role is now being re-evaluated in the light of U.S. military needs and the Corps' showing in Viet Nam. Says Corps Commandant Leonard Chapman Jr.: "1970 has become the critical year of transition."

The Viet Nam performance has drawn mixed notices from both friends and critics of the Marines. Trained for amphibious assault and brief, intensive offensive action, the Marines instead were used for defensive purposes in the northern plains and .hills. The decision still rankles many Leathernecks, who argue that they are an offensive team and should not have been sent in to conduct "a goal line stand." Army General William Westmoreland's decision to send the Marines into Khe Sanh also grates on the Corps. Ordered to defend the nearly encircled position "at all costs," the Marines held, losing 200 men before the eleven-week siege was lifted. They fared no better at Con Thien where they lost another 200 in a month.

Courage v. Cunning. Marine casualties in Viet Nam both dead and wounded stand at 97,500 compared with 87,000 in World War II and 28,000 in the Korean War. Because their ratio of combat to support personnel is high, and because they engaged North Vietnamese regulars on the enemy's border, their losses were proportionally higher than those of the Army. Lacking large helicopter forces to carry out the vertical envelopment tactics that they developed in Korea, the Marines often seemed immobile and oldfashioned, as if forced to substitute raw courage and tenacity for flexibility and cunning.

The Marines did perform well in important respects. The very fact that they were the first into Viet Nam was a tribute to their readiness. They leave I Corps' Popular Forces the best trained in the country. Further, they were in the business of rural pacification long before the term became fashionable in Washington. They mixed Vietnamese Popular Forces and Leathernecks in Combined Action Platoons (CAPs) that not only helped to train local troops and improve security but also provided a model for the Army's Mobile Advisory Teams (MATs).

Still, the Marines depart with a sense of frustration and malaise, of leaving the job unfinished, of expending too much blood for too little gain. As an elite organization, the Corps has always been the target of Army jealousy and rivalry. "After every war they try to get rid of the Marines," says one colonel. Viet Nam is no exception. The sister services and a budget-conscious Defense Department are already taking aim at the Corps.

The case against the Marines is based on this question: Does the U.S., now reducing its international profile and cutting its armed forces by 551,000, need a highly specialized force of shock troops? Some Army and Air Force men, concerned by what they consider Marine encroachment on their own areas, say no. The Navy is jealously eying the Marine Corps budget. A separate service, the Marine Corps accounts for only $2.2 billion of the Department of the Navy's $21.7 billion budget for fiscal 1971, and many Navy men would rather see the money spent on anti-submarine warfare to counter a growing Soviet naval buildup. Army and Air Force men argue that the Marines do nothing that their services could not do, given the proper equipment. On the other hand, Marine planners insist that the Corps is necessary to get the U.S. into hostile territory on short notice, using helicopters if not landing craft. Army men scoff at the idea. But few Army units maintain a Marine-like state of readiness, and none is stationed on ships around the world, ready to move anywhere, and fast. Nor can they be as easily deployed as the Marines. The 1834 Marine Corps law, which updates the 1798 act creating the Corps, declares that in addition to more routine military duties, the Marines "shall perform such other duties as the President may direct" and gives the Chief Executive wide discretion in their use.

Nixon Doctrine. The nation's developing foreign policy is another factor. Though it does not necessarily bind future administrations, the "Nixon Doctrine" declares that the U.S. will support its allies with air power, money and equipment. But it also says that, except in Europe, the U.S. will be slower and less likely to intervene on the ground in local emergencies than it was in Lebanon or the Dominican Republic. The National Security Council's still-secret outline of future American strategy, NSSM-3, sees the U.S. ultimately as a Pacific power only in the sea and air.

The debate leaves the Marines a unit in search of a mission, but a unit nonetheless. A 1952 law guarantees the Marines three combat divisions and three aircraft wings, and though Marine strength will shrink from its March 1969 level of 317,400 to below 200,000 as part of the general military cutback, the Corps itself will doubtless survive. Having fought heroically in some of the nation's fiercest battles, it has won the admiration of a vast number of Americans as well as powerful friends in Congress. Even if the U.S. in fact ceases to be "the world's policeman," it will still need a tough, seasoned force of firemen, if not cops, to protect American interests--and lives--abroad.

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