Dictating the Agenda

"That's 85% indigestion," one Congressman japed as the mess boys carried trays of drinks and hors d'oeuvres through the White House State Dining Room. But none of the Republicans and Southern Democrats present could find fault with the host's mood. Richard Nixon could barely contain his exuberance. "It's great," the President said. "I'm glad there are so many members [of the House] who think the welfare of the country comes first."

It was a rare festivity. Presidents have been known to celebrate the passage of a cherished piece of legislation; Nixon celebrated a bill's demise. He invited the 191 Representatives who had voted to sustain his veto of the Labor-HEW appropriation. He had challenged the Democratic-controlled Congress to a showdown over a fundamental issue--control of domestic policies--and he had won.

The $19.7 billion package had been passed overwhelmingly by both House and Senate. Because the bill had grown by $1.1 billion over Administration requests, Nixon proclaimed it inflationary and promised to veto it. Last week in a presidential first, he explained his case for ten minutes on network television and then, with a flourish of his audibly scratchy fountain pen, signed the veto order in prime time. "The issue," said Nixon, "is not whether some of us are for education and health and others are against it. The question is, how much can the Federal Government afford to spend on these programs this year?"

Lobbyist Army. More than any other dispute to arise in the Nixon Administration, the controversy over the appropriation seemed to define ideological and political lines of force. Yet the lines kept distorting into caricature: the free-spending, socially conscious heirs to the New Deal v. the business-minded, anti-inflation Nixonians. An army of 700 amateur education lobbyists converged on Capitol Hill, limning the social misery that would ensue unless the veto were overridden. Meantime the White House staff put intense pressure on House Republicans. Two days after the veto, House Democratic leaders fell 52 votes short of the two-thirds majority necessary to override the veto. With 226 members supporting the bill and 191 behind the Administration, the measure went back to the drawing boards of the House Appropriations Committee.

Neither Congress nor the White House emerged from the battle with very much glory. Congress had dallied for months with the HEW appropriation, far too long into the fiscal year to allow for effective amendment of programs in the bill. Congressmen pandered to the myriad interests of the education lobby by appropriating larger chunks for virtually everything. Most significantly, funds for "impacted areas" clouded and compromised the ideological lines. The President rightly condemned the inequities of the program (see box), but was willing to give Congress half the additional money it had voted.

Nixon's argument against the bill was artfully simplistic. Since the $1.1 billion increase voted by Congress represents only one-half of 1% of the fiscal 1970 budget, it is difficult to believe that the appropriation would have been significantly inflationary. Nixon claimed that he is allotting more money for education than any President in the past. Yet the Administration's request for appropriations for HEW's Office of Education has fallen by $470 million.

There seemed to be a particular political skill in Nixon's choosing this bill for his first veto, for it offered him a dramatic chance to hang the issue of inflation on the Democrats in preparation for the 1970 congressional elections. In fact, both sides seemed entirely too busy calculating political advantage to arrive at a sensible agreement. The settlement that must now be made may include congressional permission for the President to use his own judgment in spending the other funds.

Actually, Nixon was not fighting so hard over specific dollar amounts; the larger importance of the confrontation was symbolic. The President sought to prove that no spending program is more sacred than the general principle that inflation must be fought with Government austerity. Second, Nixon saw an opportunity to assert authority in a personal way. In his first year's dealings with Congress, the President suffered the Haynsworth defeat and the close call on the ABM. Now he has gone to the people and he has made a crucial veto stick. Congress may be more chary in the future about challenging him. For a time, at least, Nixon has won the right to dictate a federal agenda according to his own priorities.

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