Nixon's Timetable

The President has always been ambiguous about his exact schedule for ending U.S. participation in the Viet Nam War. But last week Richard Nixon laid out his timetable more clearly than ever before to a concerned and respected Republican Senator who was one of the persistent critics of Lyndon Johnson's war policies. Nixon's guest came away from the meeting convinced that the President intends to get out of Viet Nam "come hell or high water."

Nixon told the Senator that he wants to "virtually eliminate" American involvement in Viet Nam by 1972. To meet this goal, he will pull out "nearly all" of the ground combat troops before the end of 1970; he believes that American casualties will have become "insignificant" by then. At the end of 1971, he intends to have withdrawn most of the combat support units as well. Thus, by election year 1972, the U.S. would have substantially fewer than 40,000 soldiers, serving only as advisers, in Viet Nam.

Nixon expects the enemy to "cooperate" in this exit. The President has been told by his intelligence sources that the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong are currently in trouble, that they have had their fill of heavy fighting. As Nixon sees it, his withdrawal plan will allow the Vietnamese Communists to "save face" by claiming that they drove the Americans home. He has also been advised that neither the Chinese nor the Soviets are pushing Hanoi to increase the present low level of fighting.

Well Supplied. The enemy will be watched carefully for anything resembling a winter offensive. If it fails to materialize by February, the rate of troop withdrawal--now running at about 15,000 monthly--will be increased. The Saigon government has told the President that it can survive the removal of 100,000 U.S. troops in 1969, and up to 180,000 in 1970. The Nixon timetable has been drawn up accordingly.

One factor not included in this formula is the possibility that the South Vietnamese army might be unable to hold its own once U.S. troops leave. Nixon seems convinced that Saigon can manage, but the Senator came away with the impression that, in any case, Nixon is determined to be out by 1972, leaving the South Vietnamese well supplied with U.S. arms and aid but otherwise on their own to succeed or fail--or strike a bargain with their enemies.

At the press conference last week, the President said that he would soon address the country on Viet Nam. The speech will probably come just before Christmas. Among other things, Nixon will announce another major troop withdrawal--probably about 40,000 men, bringing the total withdrawal this year to 100,000.

Moscow Visit. There are perhaps two reasons why Nixon is speaking more openly about his plans for Viet Nam. The enemy is quiescent as the situation in South Viet Nam continues to stabilize and improve. And the Paris peace talks are getting nowhere. As he said at his press conference, the chances for a negotiated settlement in Paris are "not good." He further implied that he had no immediate plans to replace his two chief delegates at the talks, Henry Cabot Lodge and Lawrence E. Walsh. Instead, the President named Career Diplomat Philip C. Habib, who served under Lodge and Averell Harriman, as acting chief of the delegation.

TIME Moscow Bureau Chief Jerrold Schecter submitted a list of questions concerning settlement of the war to Nguyen Huu Tho, President of the National Liberation Front, who recently visited Moscow. Tho has operated for the past few years from a succession of hidden bunkers and jungle camps, and is the chief political voice of the Viet Cong guerrillas. His replies, returned to Moscow in writing last week, showed no departure from the hard line, and thus confirm Nixon's pessimism about a negotiated settlement.

Tho repeated the N.L.F.'s rather vague plan for a temporary coalition government composed of "each social class" in South Viet Nam and each distinct political tendency. During the interim before elections, Tho told Schecter, no party should be "in a position to exert pressure on the population and oblige it to adopt a given political regime." For what it is worth, Tho promised to free political prisoners, presumably meaning pacifists jailed by the present Saigon regime, and to "forbid" terrorism or acts of revenge against those who had joined either side. Just how Tho--or anyone else--would guarantee that the elections would be genuinely free and that there would be no reprisals was left unexplained.

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