Banning the Germs

Chemical and biological agents have always been among the most repugnant weapons in the nation's arsenal. The Pentagon, however, has insisted that development of these arcane armaments was necessary to match the Soviet capability of waging CB warfare. Last week President Nixon rebuffed the generals' argument. He announced that the U.S. would never use germ warfare--either offensively or defensively--and ordered the existing stocks of deadly toxins destroyed. As for remaining lethal chemical weapons, the President reiterated the longstanding American policy that they would only be used in retaliation for a similar attack.

It was a wise and practical decision. Prodded by growing congressional concern and press criticism of CB activities, Nixon launched a review of the program last March. The investigation showed that the Army had developed stocks of deadly diseases such as psittacosis (parrot fever) which could be sprayed over large areas to infect food and water. People in the psittacosis target site would develop acute pulmonary infection, chills, fever; some would become delirious, and ten percent might die. Other diseases, which the Army was prepared to massproduce, were equally lethal, including anthrax, Q-fever and tularemia (rabbit fever).

During the course of the study, representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff could not provide a realistic enough contingency in which they would want to use biological weapons, but they argued nonetheless against the destruction of the germ stocks and the ban on offensive germ-warfare research. The Joint Chiefs contended, unsuccessfully, that the U.S. should preserve its option to "retaliate in kind" to germ attacks from the enemy--specifically, Russia.

Retaliation with biological weapons would be risky at best. It would be difficult to ensure that diseases spread among enemy troops would not infect friendly nations. In fact, there could be no guarantee that a retaliatory American germ attack would not cause a pandemic that eventually would infect the U.S. Added to these dangers are the continuing problems of safely developing, storing and transporting the germs.

The U.S. retains a nuclear arsenal big enough to deter potential enemies despite the elimination of the biological stocks. The President also made it absolutely clear that the restrictions on chemical weapons did not include CS gas--a stronger version of tear gas--or defoliants that are being used in Viet Nam. But the proscribing of germ warfare and the restated strictures on chemical warfare provide concrete evidence of America's strong desire to slow down the arms race. Together with the joint signing of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty by the U.S. and the Soviets (see THE WORLD), Nixon's announcement should add impetus to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks now going on in Helsinki.

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