The President's Analyst

"Prediction is a useful thing for us social scientists," says James Barber, a political science professor at Yale. "It forces us away from the comforts of retrospection." Last week, in a paper delivered at the American Political Science Association meeting in Manhattan, Barber, 39, made a prediction of his own: under certain sets of circumstances "The danger is that Richard Nixon will commit himself irrevocably to some disastrous course of action."

Nixon's problem, Barber says, is a failure to communicate; it stems from "a very strong drive for personal power--especially independent power--which pushes him away from reliance on any one else." In council, Nixon listens attentively and then "retires to his chambers, where he may spend hours in complete solitude" before he "emerges and pronounces the verdict." It is, says Barber, "the lonely seclusion adopted consciously as a way of deciding that stands out in Nixon's personal-relations style." This style has already produced a number of "presidential stumbles," among them the rejection of John Knowles for the post of Assistant Secretary for Health and Scientific Affairs, and Franklin Long for the directorship of the National Science Foundation; as well as decisions about desegregation guidelines and the hunger program.

The flaw in style is compounded, in Barber's view, by a major character deficiency -- Nixon's tendency to lapse into unguarded behavior after periods of great stress. Nixon himself as much as acknowledged the phenomenon in his Six Crises, and later went on to explode bitterly at the press following his 1962 California gubernatorial defeat. Barber even provides a scenario for a future situation brought on by Nixon's "crisis syndrome": the Administration is defeated on a key issue, Nixon losing face or power in the bargain; at a press conference, he is badgered about it and, lashing out, takes an exaggerated policy stand. It is, says Barber, the stuff of "tragic drama: the danger is that he might refuse to revise his course of action in the light of consequent events."

Barber's suggested formula for averting tragedy: Nixon should consult with proponents and opponents on a given issue both before and "after he has reached a 'decision.' " And he should be none too hasty in making definitive public statements on it.

Outrage and Acclaim. Political Scientist Barber claims no credentials in behavioral science. His analysis of Nixon, he admits, is not based on personal acquaintance, but only on careful study of the President's upbringing, rhetorical style, ideological evolution and relations with advisers and opponents. To most laymen, such long-distance analysis will seem outrageous, and behavior experts are bound to take issue with Barber's admittedly unscientific methods and conclusions. But the convention delegates acclaimed his technique. President Watcher James MacGregor Burns thought that Barber's paper provided an "excellent link" between studies of presidential personalities and of the presidency as an institution. Government Professor Aaron Wildavsky, of the University of California, said it was "the best work in the field."

In studying Nixon and four other Presidents, Barber evolved a labeling system that types each man according to his character (positive or negative) and his way of life (active or passive). By these standards, he characterized President Taft as "passive-positive," Truman as "active-positive" and Eisenhower as "passive-negative." Lest anyone accuse him of showing partisanship, Barber listed, along with Nixon, under the heading of "active-negative" a man whose "style failed him" and who knew "the disorientation of an expert middleman elevated above the ordinary political marketplace"--Lyndon Baines Johnson.

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so reader's discretion is required.