Defects in Communications

In an era when nuclear missiles stand poised less than 30 minutes from their targets, the ability of civilian and military leaders to communicate and command is crucial. Last week a House subcommittee charged that inefficiency in these vital areas sometimes renders U.S. forces impotent during sudden emergencies.

Chaired by New York Democrat Otis Pike, the subcommittee has been investigating the capture of U.S.S. Pueblo and the loss of an EC-121 reconnaissance plane, which was shot down by the North Koreans last April with the loss of 31 men. The committee concluded: "The inquiry reveals the existence of a vast and complex military structure capable of acquiring almost infinite amounts of information but with a demonstrated inability, in these two instances, to relay this information in a timely and comprehensible fashion to those charged with the responsibility for making decisions." Equally disturbing was the finding that, in both cases, the Navy exhibited almost total lack of command control.

In the Pueblo incident, the defects in communications were evident even before the vessel sailed. Pueblo's electronic-spying mission was assigned a minimum-risk factor. Neither the Pacific Fleet Command in Hawaii nor the regional command in Japan was aware that Radio Pyongyang had already threatened retaliation for what it called "provocative" acts in the Sea of Japan off North Korea's east coast.

Warning. Thirteen days before Pueblo sailed from Japan on her mission, the National Security Agency, the Government's giant cryptography and communications intelligence center, urged that more "protective measures" be taken for the ship. The recommendation never got past Commander-in-Chief Pacific headquarters. Another copy of the message, addressed to the Chief of Naval Operations, was lost in the Pentagon. Once Pueblo's plight was known, it took Navy officials in Japan more than 40 minutes to reach the Fifth Air Force headquarters in Japan by telephone. The two commands had failed to establish emergency communication procedures in advance.

In any event, it was impossible for Fifth Air Force jets stationed on Okinawa to reach U.S.S. Pueblo without refueling in South Korea, an operation that would have taken too long for them to reach the stricken ship in time to help. No fighter planes were in readiness in South Korea to aid U.S.S. Pueblo, a precaution exercised in an earlier spy-ship mission off North Korea.

In the case of the EC-121, the difficulty was as much one of command as communications. Flying under the operational control of the Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron (VQ-1), the Navy plane was more on its own than it could have realized. According to the Pike report, VQ-1 "lost all effective operational control over the aircraft. Army, Air Force and Navy units monitoring the flight of the EC-121 appeared to assume operational control of the aircraft --and if they did not, no one had operational control." The monitoring units detected the aircraft threatening the EC-121, but VQ-1 learned of the danger only by chance interception of messages. VQ-1 then ordered a search and recovery flight, but by that time the U.S. spy plane had been down for well over an hour.

Military officials readily admit that their communications equipment is not at fault. The blame rests on human errors in the sending and routing of messages--and in acting on available information. One tragic mistake occurred in June 1967 when the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered the spy ship U.S.S. Liberty to leave its station in the Mediterranean off the Sinai Peninsula. The message failed to arrive until after Israeli jets attacked Liberty, mistaking it for an Egyptian vessel. Thirty-four U.S. sailors were killed in the attack. A woman clerk in the Pentagon had routed the Liberty order to the Philippines, in the direction of the only war she could think of at the time.

Talk and Listen and Act. Another, and more serious, problem is the drift of authority toward Washington. With sophisticated communications equipment available, and the threat of nuclear war always present, local commanders tend to look to the capital for guidance in crises. This Washington reflex is not discouraged by Government officials. They are rightfully concerned with keeping tight rein on the military. As President Kennedy once said: "I don't want some sergeant starting World War III." Yet the Pike report demonstrates that a better balance must be found if local commanders are not to be paralyzed in cases of limited threats. The report urges that the Administration seek --"on an emergency basis"--new methods to get the several echelons of command to talk and listen to each other, and to act on what they hear.

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