Toward Compromise on ABM?

The bill before the Senate was S.2546, "authorizing appropriations for fiscal year 1970 for military procurement, research and development." The total amount involved was more than $20 billion, but only a fraction of that sum was at issue right now: $759.1 million for the first steps in deployment of the Nixon Administration's Safeguard anti-ballistic-missile defense system. After months of inconclusive hearings and angry debate, and publication of a spate of weighty books on ABM by civilian defense scholars,* the Senate settled in for its toughest fight over a military bill in memory.

Each side was claiming victory, but only by the narrowest of margins; neither advocates nor opponents were confident of success. Leading for the ABM's supporters was Mississippi Democrat John Stennis, a respected Senate leader and military-oriented chairman of its Committee on Armed Services. The opposition leadership, more diffuse, fell to two men as widely esteemed within the Senate as Stennis: Republican John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky and Democrat Philip Hart of Michigan. Senator Edward Kennedy, originally among ABM's most vocal critics, was persuaded to mute his opposition in order not to offend colleagues jealous of the publicity he attracts.

$17.09 Campaign. Cooper and Hart argued in favor of continuing ABM research, but opposed any appropriations for actual hardware and weaponry. New Hampshire Democrat Thomas Mclntyre put in an amendment allowing deployment of radar and electronic gear at the first two proposed ABM sites in North Dakota and Montana. However, the Mclntyre plan would ban manufacture or installation of the actual Spartan and Sprint ABM missiles for at least a year.

President Nixon encouraged liberal Republican Senators opposing ABM to "vote your consciences." Despite the close division in the Senate, Nixon and

Defense Secretary Melvin Laird have consistently refused to offer or accept any compromise, insisting that the nation cannot afford to lose time in constructing missiles at the two initial sites. ABM expenditure for research and development would pass the Senate easily; few of those who object to voting deployment money now would oppose further R. & D. work on the complex system. But the Administration wants funds for missile installation included, partly as a bargaining counter in the strategic arms-limitation talks it hopes to begin with the Soviet Union next month.

It was on just that point that the issue turned last week. Capitol Hill was fogged in speculation about which ABM opponents might waver if the Administration started twisting arms. Mclntyre himself would be badly hurt if the Defense Department decided to close down the Portsmouth Naval Base, an important employer in his constituency. But the key man, one of the few Senators un committed as debate began, was Vermont's venerable George Aiken, 76, dean of Senate Republicans and a man singularly invulnerable to pressure. (The total cost of Aiken's 1968 primary campaign was $17.09 for postage; he was unopposed in the November election.) Said one anti-ABM strategist: "If we don't get Aiken, we don't win."

Like 20 Touchdowns. Aiken's closest friend is Democrat Mike Mansfield of Montana, the Senate majority leader, with whom he breakfasts at the Capitol daily. In their morning chats, Mansfield observed that if, as seemed likely, ABM squeaked through the Senate by a hairbreadth, the U.S. would be harmed rather than helped in arms negotiations with the Russians. Said Mansfield: "It would be a positive weakness. It would show a deep divisiveness in the country. It would be a Pyrrhic victory."

When Aiken took the floor last week, he echoed that thought. Carefully avoiding the word "compromise," Aiken said: "This pending legislation must be modified to the extent that a strong approval of this Senate will be obtained." If the U.S. starts discussing arms limitation with the Soviets, he argued, "even though the legislation as written could be approved by as many as 51 or 52 votes in this Senate, which I doubt, we would be in an extremely weak bargaining position." Aiken added: "I believe it is absolutely necessary for President Nixon to have a much larger number of votes in this Senate supporting him when we enter into such a conference."

Republican Leader Everett Dirksen, who admits that he is no military expert, scoffed at the Aiken-Mansfield argument. "If you win by one point," he said, "it's as good as 20 touchdowns." While all but four or five Senators are dug into positions as hard as the ICBM silos the ABM is supposed to protect, anything can happen in the week or more remaining before S.2546 comes to a vote. Still, Aiken, who had conferred privately with the President on the issue, gave a clear signal that the Administration was about ready to settle for a compromise--or "modification"--of its original proposal.

* The latest entry, Why ABM?, emerged last week from the Hudson Institute think tank of Herman Kahn (On Thermonuclear War), The fat pro-ABM volume drew a charge by Senator Edward Kennedy, sponsor of the critical ABM: An Evaluation, that it was biased because the Hudson Institute is partly supported by Pentagon funds. Safeguard: Why the ABM Makes Sense is due in August from Hawthorn Books, which is headed by W. Clement Stone, a large Nixon campaign contributor.

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