THE WAR: OUT BY NOVEMBER 1970?

FOR months it has been clear that Richard Nixon's prime goal is to get American forces out of Viet Nam. The only questions have been when and how he would withdraw the more than 535,000 Americans and what Communist concessions he might get in return. When former Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford put forth his own timetable last month, the President reacted snappishly, declaring that the Administration hoped to move even faster. Many assumed that Nixon spoke out of pique or misjudgment. From every indication last week, however, Nixon not only chose his words deliberately--but meant every one of them.

In a for-your-ears-only discussion with five liberal Republican Senators at the White House, Nixon talked of a nearly complete American withdrawal by November 1970. While the Senators later differed as to whether the President had merely expressed a devout hope or set out a firm plan, they agreed on one point: Nixon is worried that a continuation of the war could destroy Republican candidates in the 1970 midterm congressional elections. Said one participant: "The political objective, the national interest and the desire of the American people all happily coincide."

Pulling the Plug. Clifford's idea, Nixon told the Senators, was really not withdrawal at all, when the fine print was examined. Though more than 200,000 ground combat troops would be taken out by the end of 1970 under the Clifford plan, about 300,000 men in ground, air and naval support units would remain indefinitely thereafter. Without infantry protection, they would be prey to the enemy, totally dependent on South Vietnamese units. This approach is unacceptable to Nixon on both military and political grounds. The implication was that, except perhaps for token remnants, the Nixon plan amounted to total withdrawal. As word of the White House meeting began to get around Capitol Hill, one congressional aide concluded: "Nixon is going to pull the plug. It's just a matter of time."

For all the secrecy that was supposed to surround his thoughts, Nixon must have known that one of the Senators would talk. How much was the President revealing his actual intent, and how much was he attempting to disarm his critics? It could have been a mixture of both. While the negotiations go on, Nixon obviously has nothing to gain by trumpeting his quids before the other side can respond with a quo or two. At home, though, Nixon can gain time and patience with hints that the end is in sight.

More certain--and perhaps more mystifying--was the situation on the battlefield. Except for the clash at Ben Het, which ended last week (see THE WORLD), there was almost complete silence from the enemy, and American intelligence reported that three North Vietnamese regiments, or about 7,500 men, had been pulled back across the Demilitarized Zone into the North. At a news conference, Secretary of State William Rogers said that "we have had the lowest level of combat activity in Viet Nam for a long time, possibly the whole war." Since the severity of enemy activity has been one of Washington's stated criteria for reducing U.S. forces, Rogers' remarks might be the prelude to an announcement of a second American troop cutback.

American briefing officers in Saigon found themselves in the unusual position of having to walk up to the lectern, pointer in hand, and announce: "Nothing to report today." Last week's

American fatalities were estimated at 150, lowest for any week of 1969 and about 75 below the weekly average for the year.

Along with the letup in fighting came a report by air reconnaissance that far fewer North Vietnamese infiltrators are now starting down the Ho Chi Minh trail into the South. At the same time, Hanoi announced that it would release three American prisoners and allow P.O.W.s remaining in the North to receive packages from home. Both gestures, it was said, were in honor of the anniversary of American independence.

Skepticism and Danger. Was Hanoi saying something in deeds that it could not or would not say in words? Or was it pulling back to regroup for a new offensive? U.S. headquarters in Saigon took the less optimistic view. "Militarily speaking," said one officer, "this is just another low, a lull while the enemy refits and prepares for his next high." In keeping with that skepticism, the U.S. continued to field hundreds of patrols and ambushes of its own. Averell Harriman, Lyndon Johnson's chief negotiator in Paris, contends that the U.S. and South Viet Nam failed to respond to a similar Communist relaxation of effort last fall. Though the North pulled three divisions from the South after Johnson halted the bombing, Harriman asserts, the U.S. refused to cut down on its battlefield attacks. "Now that there is another lull in the fighting," Harriman told TIME Correspondent Herman Nickel last week, "I hope that Ambassador Lodge will be given instructions to find out in private talks whether the present lull is in fact a signal and offer to reduce the level of the violence. This could be done by agreement or by example, and should eventually lead to a ceasefire. I think we had an opportunity last year, and I think we have such an opportunity now."

Military Wisdom. Indeed, the timing would be about right if the North was trying to say something by means of the current lull. It usually takes Hanoi about four weeks to communicate decisions to its dispersed forces in the South. If the eight points that Nixon enunciated in his May 14 speech caused the North Vietnamese Politburo to reconsider its war policy--this was Nixon's intention, of course--a cutback in military activity could not have been brought about until the middle of June. As it happens, this is about the time that the current lull was first noticed.

It was not clear how long the reduced level of fighting would have to continue before the Administration ordered a curb on U.S. forays. It would seem logical that, as long as the enemy is in slack posture, Washington should be willing to experiment with a hold-down on offensive tactics. Conventional military wisdom, of course, argues for maximum pressure as long as the state of war exists. But if such wisdom applied in Viet Nam, the war would have been won long ago.

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