EUROPE'S DREAMS OF UNITY REVIVE

For more than a decade, Charles de Gaulle imperiously blocked Europe's search for unity. Under his repeated rebuffs, most notably of Britain's attempt to enter the Common Market in 1963, the ideal of unification withered almost to the point of oblivion. Last week a fresh voice spoke from Paris. It was that of Premier Jacques Chaban-Del-mas. Reflecting the new policy of President Georges Pompidou, Chaban-Del-mas declared: "We are ready to go as fast and as far in the quest of European unification as our partners." To prove France's change of heart, the Premier held out the promise of a European summit. "France is ready to participate in a meeting of the chiefs of state or chiefs of government of the six nations of the community," he said.

Chaban's words spurred the revival of hope that was already rising across Europe. In one chancellery after another, old dossiers and old dreams were gingerly dusted off. Britain recalled its ambassadors to the six Common Market countries for an intensive two-day skull session in London to plot the strategy for a new British move to gain admission to the European Economic Community.

Stop the Clock. Hailing the French attitude, Italian Foreign Minister Pietro Nenni called for quick approval of any British application. In The Hague, Dutch Foreign Minister Joseph Luns, whose country for the next six months will hold the rotating chairmanship of the EEC's Council of Ministers, said that he would immediately seek from the Six a declaration of intent "to enlarge the Community." "Things are on the move now," Luns reported to the Dutch Cabinet.

An atmosphere of scarcely concealed glee reigned at the Common Market's spacious new headquarters on Brussels' Avenue de la Joyeuse Entree. "Unity cannot be stopped any more," said Common Market President Jean Rey. He ordered his aides to draw up a schedule of the other items that must be settled before Britain's admission could be taken up anew. "Don't take a vacation during the Christmas season," Rey warned newsmen. Before year's end, he expects marathon sessions to wind up the Common Market's interim period of tariff adjustments, to sort out the thorny agriculture support-price issue, and to grant increased supranational powers to the EEC's executive and parliament. Said Rey: "If the solutions are not ready at midnight on Dec. 31, we will stop the clock and 1970 will commence a few hours later." In his opinion, 1970 belongs to Britain.

Denmark, Ireland and Norway seek admission in addition to Britain. Meanwhile, Austria, Sweden and Switzerland all want various forms of associate membership. Should all go according to the most optimistic schedules, the Common Market could someday expand into a ten-nation economic entity whose industrial might. would far surpass that of the Soviet Union.

European integrationists like Jean Monnet have always argued that if economic unity conies, political unity cannot be far behind. That, too, may be overoptimistic, but the vista is dazzling. If the Europe of tomorrow could muster the political will, it could become a coequal of the other two superpowers, the U.S. and Russia, an event that would fundamentally alter the world's power structure. At the urging of Presidential Adviser Henry Kissinger, the Nixon Administration has decided that it would welcome such a development, even though a stronger Europe in all likelihood would be much more assertive and independent.

Muscular Mark. For the past several years, one of Europe's favorite guessing games has been whether the politicians who spoke so ardently in favor of unity really meant it. Behind De Gaulle's towering non, it was safe enough to mouth popular yeses. Apres De Gaulle, sentiment, political and otherwise, seems overwhelmingly in favor of new measures toward greater unity. Most Europeans recognize that their countries are too small and weak to remain economically, technically or politically competitive in the age of superpowers. Fear is also forcing the Europeans together. Already West Germany and its muscular Deutsche Mark dominate Europe economically. Anxious to avoid other forms of German domination, Europeans would feel more at ease if Germany were contained in a larger, tightly knit Europe. There is also the fear of U.S. business, with its massive resources and research lead, popularized in Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiver's bestseller The American Challenge.

In addition, each country has its particular reasons for seeking a bigger Europe. "The Italians," explains Rome's Political Commentator Arrigo Levi, "feel like junior partners to the Germans and French. They want Britain as a counterweight to a possible Paris-Bonn axis." So do the three small Benelux countries. West Germany wants a crack at Britain's potentially lucrative domestic market. The Five, which have historically supported British admission, still support it. According to Chaban's statement, France seems at last willing to go along with the consensus.

British Bombs. Even so, Britain's application will not encounter all smooth sailing. Economically, Britain is worse off now than it was in 1963, and that fact makes Europeans wary about accepting an ailing partner into their basically sound Common Market. The problems of Britain's wobbling sterling must be worked out to the satisfaction of the Six. One solution is suggested by France's new Finance Minister, Valery Giscard d'Estaing. He proposes creating a Common Market currency, backed by the combined reserves of the member countries. Conceivably, it could replace sterling as a reserve currency, freeing Britain from the world-banker role that it no longer possesses the financial power to carry out.

Though defense is not an issue in the Common Market talks, Europeans will also want to know what Britain intends to do with its nuclear strike force, which includes both bombers and Polaris submarines. In anticipation of an eventual scaledown or withdrawal of U.S. forces, many Europeans are concerned about the creation of their own unified defense systems. West German Chancellor Kurt Kiesinger recently declared: "It is a disgrace that 200 million Americans must protect 300 million Europeans." The Germans see a united Anglo-French atomic deterrent as one way for them to gain participation in the nuclear club, but other Europeans understandably oppose the German design--as will the Russians if unity begins to seem likely.

Gaul list Criterion. In Britain, there is some resistance to Common Market membership among left-wing socialists and die-hard conservatives. Many of the opponents back a somewhat unrealistic scheme called the North Atlantic Free Trade Area, which would link Britain, Canada and the U.S. in a common-market arrangement of their own. Even so, the Labor government of Prime Minister Harold Wilson is committed, as the British put it, to getting into Europe. In the short term, admission would almost surely mean an increase in British living costs because of higher Common Market farm prices. That disadvantage would be far outweighed by the long-term benefit of participation in a broader, growing economic system. Furthermore, Britain would likely be allowed a considerable adjustment period, probably four to six years, before its economy would have to enter into full tariff-free competition with the Six.

Britain's strategy is far different than in 1963, when the British infuriated the Six by insisting on special concessions. Less bound now by Commonwealth ties, Britain does not plan to haggle over items like tariff reductions for Australian kangaroo meat. The British team, led most likely by Minister of State Lord Chalfont, intends to concentrate only on major issues and hopes to complete the negotiations far more quickly than the first time, when they dragged out for two years.

Still, the most important test that the British will face is one of the spirit. Though De Gaulle acted partly out of jealous motives, one of his rationales for blackballing Britain made a great deal of sense to the French and to other Europeans. He felt that Britain lacked a true European spirit. Premier Chaban-Delmas emphasized that the Gaullist criterion still applied. "The English adhesion must not dilute the European idea," he said, adding: "In enlarging the size of a united Europe, we must not compromise its aims."

On that count, Britain has some convincing to do. A late convert to the Common Market, Wilson remains suspect in his true feeling for Europe. Despite his long pro-European record and role as leader of Britain's negotiating team in 1961-63, Conservative Leader Ted Heath last week disappointed many Europeans by making a strong statement on British television against political integration in Europe (though he still strongly supports economic union). So far, it would seem that the British still have not grasped a basic point: to gain admission to Europe, they must ultimately come to think of themselves as Europeans, with the limitations as well as privileges that Common Market membership entails.

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