PUEBLO: THE DOUBTS PERSIST

THE return of Pueblo's crew five months ago backed the Pentagon into a cruel corner. Navy regulations and service sentiment seemed heavily in favor of punishing Commander Lloyd M. Bucher, and perhaps others, for allowing the vessel and her secret documents to fall into hostile hands without a serious attempt at resistance or destruction. To most of the public, though, Pueblo's skipper and crew were heroes who had suffered and survived eleven months of North Korean brutality. They were not for hanging. Last week Navy Secretary John Chafee steered between the reefs of opinion and proceeded to bring the agonizing affair to an official close.

Chafee rejected recommendations by the naval court of inquiry that Bucher and Lieut. Stephen R. Harris, the officer in charge of Pueblo's supersecret "research" spaces, be tried by court-martial. Secretary Chafee also refused to authorize the issuance of letters of admonition and reprimand for other officers. "They have suffered enough and further punishment would not be justified," he said.

No Scapegoats. In fact, Chafee's decision represented a deft solution to the Pentagon's thorny predicament. Chafee stated that he was making "no judgment regarding the guilt or innocence" of any of those connected with the spy ship's capture. He added that since the mission was based on the premise that North Korea would not violate the principle of freedom of the high seas, and since the assumption was made at all levels of command, that all had to share the consequences. In fact, the board of inquiry had proposed that the two officers senior to Bucher also be reprimanded.

Thus Chafee neither excused Bucher or Harris nor excluded the upper Navy echelons from their responsibility for the disaster. Arguing that prosecution and punishment would serve no useful purpose for the Navy, Chafee elected to ignore all the recommendations. To a nation more leary than ever before of its military leaders, Chafee's decision must have seemed as satisfactory a settlement of the Pueblo quandary as was possible. Scapegoats had been avoided, but so had exoneration.

For its part, the Navy high command had already recognized the fact that there could be no single whipping boy. Admiral John Hyland, Pacific Fleet commander, had himself disagreed with the court of inquiry's stand, and Admiral Thomas Moorer, Chief of Naval Operations, sided with Hyland (though the final decision rested with Chafee). In effect, the Navy's top command was accepting the fact that the blame for Pueblo had to be shared. The Navy still had to cope with the problem of maintaining its long tradition of tenacity in battle. Said one senior officer: "We won't have any trouble provided that everyone gets the message. If they do, they will know they are still expected not to give up the ship."

What remains to be seen is whether Bucher and Harris, both career officers, will have any future in the service. Officials insist that they can think of no reason why they should not. Yet few old hands in Washington or the Navy think the two have very good long-term prospects. For the time being, Bucher and Harris received relatively unglamorous assignments--but it was said that they had requested them. Bucher will attend a management course in Monterey, Calif., leading to a master's degree; Harris will assume duties at Naval Security headquarters in Washington. The Navy hopes that in their new billets, Bucher and Harris will drop from sight.

Unanswered Questions. Perhaps the two men will, but the questions raised by the Pueblo incident will remain. One of the most difficult is what should be done about the Military Code of Conduct. In the wake of the forced confessions of the Pueblo crew, many now think that the code is worthless when applied under cold war conditions. However, S.L.A. Marshall, the military historian and retired general who was one of the chief architects of the code, says that a false conclusion is being drawn. Writing in a recent New Leader, he argues that the code actually requires prisoners of war to give name, rank, serial number and date of birth. The next sentence in the same article of the code reads: "I will evade answering further questions to the utmost of my ability."

Marshall contends that the only limitation placed on the prisoner is that he evade giving valuable information to his captors. Many military men probably would argue that it is risky trying to fence with the enemy; that it is better to remain silent. In any event, while the Pueblo investigation could have brought this entire question of the code into public discussion, it never did. The question remains unanswered, and the problems remain unsolved concerning espionage missions in general and the difficulties of mounting chancy military operations in which wartime conditions may suddenly arise while the country is technically at peace. The Pueblo case may be closed, but the doubts persist.

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