The Paper War

Of the myriad problems and risks posed by the nuclear age, none weighs so heavily on the strategist, politician and scientist as the need to anticipate the military balance five and ten years hence. Such foresight is a necessity because of the long lead time required to perfect weapons systems. The difficulty of reading the tarot cards of Atomic Age technology and rival nations' intentions is at the heart of the anti-ballistic-missile dispute.

Last week opponents and supporters of ABM engaged in another exchange of paper missiles. The antagonists were acknowledged experts in their fields. Their arguments, pro and con, were well reasoned. Even so, they brought the issue no closer to a political solution in Congress or a popular verdict in the nation. The reason is that neither the critics nor the advocates of the ABM can argue with any certainty just what kind of attack the Russians or the Chinese may be capable of mounting in the next decade.

Few Kind Words. The most impressive battery of expert arguments brought together since the debate began appeared in modest lithograph form. It was a 340-page report by 16 scientists and other experts organized last February by Senator Edward Kennedy, a leader of the ABM critics. Jointly edited by M.I.T. Provost Jerome Wiesner and Harvard Law Professor Abram Chayes, the study included a paper by a Nobel laureate, Physicist Hans Bethe, as well as contributions by Arthur Goldberg, Theodore Sorensen, Bill Moyers and other veterans of service in high places. As expected, since Kennedy commissioned the review, the report contained few kind words for Safeguard, the Nixon Administration's proposed ABM system.

Instead, it was a detailed exposition of the technical, diplomatic and economic objections to the ABM, nearly all of which have been made before (TIME cover, March 14). Among them: the ABM in its present state of technology is of little value, is untested and untestable and is not worth the investment; moreover, it can be easily circumvented by the other side and, instead of bringing security, might well accelerate the arms race. Probably the document's key argument is that there is no compelling need to deploy the ABM --for now at least--whether it would work or not.

Defense Secretary Melvin Laird had staked the Administration's case on the contention that the Russians aim to achieve nuclear supremacy. He maintained that they will have the capability by the mid-'70s to jeopardize the American power to retaliate against a first strike. If that forecast proves accurate, the foundation of U.S. nuclear strategy could disintegrate. There would be no capability to inflict "assured destruction" on the attacker.

Wiesner, who was President John Kennedy's science adviser, flatly denies that thesis. Utilizing the same basic data that went into Laird's projection, he sketched five scenarios of possible Russian attacks some time between 1975 and 1980. Depending on the situation, the U.S. would still retain a very powerful nuclear counterpunch by Wiesner's calculations: between 2,500 and 7,500 deliverable nuclear weapons. The launching of only a few hundred warheads would be necessary to devastate the Soviet Union.

The Kennedy-Wiesner-Chayes report brought an immediate reply from John Foster Jr., the Pentagon's Director of Defense Research and Engineering. Another response came in the form of a 60-page monograph published by a subcommittee of the conservative American Security Council. The A.S.C. subcommittee included not one but two Nobel laureates, Chemist Willard Libby and Physicist Eugene Wigner, an assortment of prominent academics, retired generals and admirals, and Edward Teller, one of the world's most eminent weapons physicists.

Crucial Issue. Foster accused the Kennedy report of inconsistencies, overstatements, understatements and contradictions (it did, in fact, misspell Wiesner's name twice), claiming that it presents "incompetent, dangerous and inadequate alternatives" to Safeguard. One of the points often made by Safeguard's opponents is that the system would require so quick a decision to be activated in time of national danger that the President might be excluded from the process. Bill Moyers raised the fear of a President's "surrendering his decision-making authority to the computers and the junior military officers who stand over them." Foster retorted that by offering some degree of protection to U.S. offensive missiles, Safeguard would give the President more leeway than he might otherwise enjoy before launching a counterstrike against the adversary's homeland. "I don't want to give Safeguard up for some trigger-happy system where you have to salvo all our Minuteman missiles," he said. On the crucial issue of whether the U.S. can preserve its assured destruction capability in the '70s, Foster said of the Wiesner-Chayes argument: "They may be right, but they can't prove it."

The American Security Council is not that generous. Its study concludes that the Russians are already surpassing the U.S. in every important nuclear category, offensive and defensive. The figures are far more alarming than any put out by the Pentagon; yet the council, too, works with the same basic data that have been generally available. By ascribing more importance than most strategists give to Soviet middle-range bombers, missiles and conventionally powered submarines, it concludes that the U.S. is already behind in the missile race by 2,750 to 1,710, and in bombers as well.

Militant House. The tremendous disparity between the two groups of experts that published their findings last week, points up Congress's problem with the ABM controversy. There is no consensus among nuclear and strategic seers--and there probably will be none. In the Senate, where skepticism of most military undertakings is very much in vogue these days, the pre-vote count remains against Safeguard, 49 to 42, with nine Senators wobbling. The Administration therefore is in no rush for a Senate decision. Instead, it is hoping to win the undecideds over to its side. In the more militant House, members are at least 2 to 1 in favor of Safeguard, with the leadership of both parties in firm support of the program.

House Speaker John McCormack, however, does not want his chamber to vote before the Senate. He is assuming that the Senate will go against Safeguard and would rather have the House in the position of vetoing Senate action than the other way around. The possibility of complete deadlock persists, of course. If that occurs, the Administration could attempt to win a few Senate converts by acquiescing to a modification of Safeguard's prospectus. Any such change--on paper at least--would have the aim of making the program seem more experimental and less of a firm undertaking to build a 14-site network. This would be a difficult trick to turn; the next budgetary authorization involves construction of the first two sites. Still, the Administration needs to win only a handful of additional Senate votes. If that entails calling Safeguard, a research and development project rather than a frankly operational commitment, the White House and the Pentagon would be unlikely to resist.

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