Crumbling Deterrent

The most important difference between the time just before the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 and today is the widely held conviction that the Arabs would get licked in any new adventure. In other ways, the similarities between the two periods are proving quite remarkable. Last week United Nations Secretary-General U Thant warned both sides that U.N. observers cannot "continue indefinitely" to be exposed to artillery fire across the Suez Canal. Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser, in a May Day speech that was his most belligerent since the war, declared: "We are planning for attack. Our forces are prepared to move into Sinai." Almost exactly the same rhetoric preceded the Six-Day War.

By now the world is accustomed to Nasser's words outrunning his intentions, and he did add a promise to "think ten times" before plunging Egypt into all-out war with Israel. He might consider thinking even one or two times more. Egypt lacks the equipment to cross the canal in force, and the best that it could hope would be to damage Israeli bases with its 20 Russian-supplied tactical missiles, which have a range of 45 miles. But, as 1967 proved, the option to attack is not Nasser's alone. There would be no quicker way to draw wrath than any attempt to follow up on his declaration that "we reserve the right to strike at Israeli civilians."

Intensified Scare. In the deadly Middle East pattern of blow and counterblow, Nasser's threat was made in response to an Israeli raid into Egypt --which in turn was in retaliation for continued Egyptian shelling along the Suez Canal. As the barrages continued into their fifth week, Israel counted ten more dead.

In the past, Israel has tried to dampen Arab belligerence by punitive raids. Now, any heavy retaliation would only play into Nasser's hands by intensifying a war scare that Israel wants to play down. Accordingly, Israel struck back in a manner obviously intended to impress the Egyptians with a display of its capability, without exacerbating big-power fears of a new war. Tel Aviv announced that its commandos had penetrated deep into Egypt, cutting a power line and damaging a bridge and the Nag Hammadi dam 270 miles south of Cairo.

Far from having the intended effect, the Israeli account of the raid was hotly disputed by Egypt, which claimed that "there were no losses at all." Moreover, it is questionable whether even an entirely successful raid would have deterred Nasser. He has publicly written off Egypt's oil refineries and installations along the Suez, which have been heavily damaged by Israeli artillery, and has ordered the evacuation of Port Said. He also promised last week that the shelling would go on until Israel's fortifications along the canal are destroyed.

Search for a Policy. If Nasser is undeterred, the threat of Israeli might has had more effect on Lebanon, which has tried to prevent fedayeen guerrillas from raiding Israel across its border. Two weeks ago, the Lebanese government resigned amid widespread rioting that followed a clash between security forces and a group of fedayeen. Last week Lebanese politicians were still trying to put together a new government. They were also seeking a policy that would mollify the guerrillas without bringing on Israel's wrath--particularly since Charles de Gaulle's pledge to protect Lebanon from an Israeli invasion has presumably gone the way of the general.

The crisis has endangered Lebanon's delicate political balance between its Christians, who generally oppose involvement in the Arab wars, and its Moslems, who are predominantly pro-fedayeen. Trying to tip the scales to the militants, Syria last week sent a group of guerrillas to attack a Lebanese military post. They were driven off when reinforcements arrived. No matter what the politicians agree on, the 15,000-man Lebanese army will find it difficult to control the 1,000 guerrillas camped on the lower slopes of Mount Hermon. The guerrillas are determined, in the words of the Palestine Liberation Organization, to "operate from every Arab position around the occupied homeland" --by which they mean Israel.

Debate in Washington. Events in the Middle East are thus rapidly outpacing the diplomatic efforts to find a settlement. Representatives of the U.S., Russia, Britain and France met again in New York last week, but their discussions will be made more difficult by the indecision now attending French foreign policy. Bilateral negotiations in Washington between State Department officials and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin are more crucial. In this case, Washington's diplomats are negotiating in the presence of a third party that is, as it were, looking over their shoulders: the U.S. Jewish community, which is deeply concerned that Israel's interests might be subordinated in a search for U.S.-Soviet rapprochement.

The extent of the Jewish community's opposition to the talks was illustrated two weeks ago by a stormy session between Jewish leaders and Secretary of State William Rogers. Rogers assured them that "this Administration has rejected Soviet attempts to get the Israelis to withdraw from the occupied territories before a settlement is achieved." Unsatisfied with that, one Jewish leader angrily warned: "Don't think you can get our support, Mr. Secretary, for any kind of imposed settlement now being cooked up." Flustered and angry, Rogers ended the meeting. Word drifted back to the Jewish community that both he and President Nixon were "vexed" that their word had been challenged.

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