Instant Armada

Showing the flag is an ancient ploy that has worn a bit thin. Richard Nixon's decision to show American military might last week was an appropriate reaction in the face of severe North Korean provocation. But he may have overdone it somewhat. In response to North Korea's destruction of a U.S. EC-121 spy plane over international waters, the President gave sailing orders to Task Force 71, a 40-ship armada assigned the task of protecting future reconnaissance flights near North Korea.

The force included three attack aircraft carriers and an anti-submarine aircraft carrier, with a total of more than 200 planes, three cruisers, 22 destroyers, at least five submarines, five or six supply ships and, briefly, U.S.S. New Jersey, the world's only operative battleship. A perplexing question is why so formidable a fleet was needed.

Risks Remain. Pentagon officials argued that defense of the lumbering spy planes requires many jet fighters. Ostensibly, the size and power of TF-71 were intended to discourage North Korea from further adventurism. But there was also a domestic political consideration. During the presidential campaign, Nixon had maintained that the U.S. should react to small provocations lest they grow into large incidents. There were plenty of hawks around last week to remind him of that remark.

It would certainly have been imprudent to deploy a force vulnerable to North Korean airpower. But there were risks in any case. Would Premier Kim II Sung look upon the force as a constraint or a challenge? If the North Korean dictator chose the latter view, further conflict could easily develop. In fact, the North Koreans reacted sharply to the force's presence. Kim announced an increase of 11% in his military budget as a result of the new U.S. "threat," thereby raising North Korea's annual defense spending to $561 million.

Costly and Limited. At week's end it seemed that the Administration was drawing back from its show of strength. About 20 of the 29 surface warships of TF-71 were redeployed from the Sea of Japan to the Yellow Sea, possibly in response to Russian displeasure. The withdrawal takes the main force from the eastern side of the Korean peninsula to its western approaches. More important, it moves the ships farther from Soviet shores, making them less provocative to Moscow. In any event, it seems that TF-71 will be only a temporary measure. General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told a special House investigating committee last week that TF-71 is "inordinately expensive" and can only be maintained for "a limited period of time." Wheeler noted further that earlier attempts to protect the reconnaissance flights had proved "very expensive and relatively ineffective" and ,had been stopped.

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