The Limits of Commitment: A TIME-Louis Harris Poll

WHAT lessons have the American people learned from the war in Viet Nam? In light of that chastening experience, how do Americans appraise the nation's military commitments around the world? How willing are Americans to have the U.S. intervene in other, future conflicts? Pollster Louis Harris and a task force of interviewers surveyed for TIME a representative sample of Americans. Harris' poll reveals widespread skepticism about the uses of military power--including strong doubt about what the U.S. should do to counter irritating jabs from an increasingly pugnacious North Korea.

If North Korea continues to capture U.S. spy ships or shoot down U.S. aircraft, a sizable minority--21%--feel that the U.S. should risk nuclear war with the Soviet Union. On the other hand, 62% think the danger not worth incurring, while 17% are unsure. There is disagreement over how the U.S. should respond directly to renewed North Korean provocation: 21% would send another warning, 21% would favor a naval blockade, 16% would bomb North Korea's airfields. Only 8% would go to war with North Korea, and more than a third (34%) are not sure what the U.S. ought to do.

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A majority of Americans, 82%, still fears that without any U.S. guarantee of their territorial integrity, many smaller nations face the threat of aggression. But when it comes to supporting threatened nations with force, that majority diminishes: only by 46% to 36% do the American people want to extend such guarantees. A majority (64%) maintains that if weaker nations are to be defended at all by the U.S., it must be in conjunction with America's principal allies. By nearly 2 to 1 (52% to 28%), Americans now believe that "we cannot go it alone in the world any more." Many Americans now favor pulling back into an "orbit of protection," as Harris calls it, which is considerably more restricted than the rhetoric of U.S. foreign policy would suggest.

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Nothing resembling a majority of Americans is prepared to use nuclear weapons to defend any other country. France's Charles de Gaulle has often said as much, and the Harris figures strongly indicate that he is right. More Americans are willing to use nuclear weapons in defense of Canada than of any other country, but at that only 17% would risk it. Mexico is second, at 15%. If Brazil were invaded by outside Communist military force, 52% would favor some form of U.S. help--though only 7% would go so far as to launch hydrogen bombs. Only 42% would aid Italy, a staunch NATO ally. Americans would not go that far if other countries were threatened by a Communist takeover from within, even if the insurrection had outside help; in such a situation, for example, only 28% would have the U.S. come to the aid of Italy. Despite John Kennedy's ringing "Ich bin ein Berliner" declaration of U.S. solidarity with West Berlin, reaffirmed by President Nixon during his European visit two months ago, only 23% of Americans would be willing to risk nuclear war if West Berlin were in danger of Communist invasion. A notably larger number, 31%, would take that risk if Cuba, backed by the Soviet Union, threatened to take over Venezuela. Only in one hypothetical situation on Harris' questionnaire--"If Cuba, backed by the Russians, threatened to take over Mexico"--would Americans be willing to use nuclear weapons, and that by only a minuscule 43%-41% margin.

Even on the question of running that risk over Mexico, there is no clear agreement, for different segments of the population respond differently. Harris found that Easterners would not run the nuclear risk for Mexico, 36% to 49%, while Westerners would, 51% to 36%; the explanation, presumably, is the obvious difference in geographical proximity. The young (under 35) tend to oppose use of nuclear weapons in the context of a Soviet-supported Cuban threat to Mexico by 43% to 40%, while their elders generally favor it by slightly more than the same margin. Those who voted for Humphrey in 1968 are against using nuclear weapons (44% to 42%). Nixon voters tend to favor them (46% to 41%) as a last resort, while Wallace backers are heavily pro-bomb (50% to 34%). Veterans in general are less reluctant than the public as a whole to risk a nuclear showdown (56% to 33%), but only a minority of Viet Nam veterans (43%) agree.

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Given any sort of military intervention, the risk of nuclear war of course can never be totally ruled out. To gain further insight, therefore, the questionnaire posited U.S. military intervention short of nuclear war. Under such circumstances, the picture changes. If West Berlin were threatened by a Communist takeover, 64% would favor nonnuclear U.S. help and only 24% would oppose it. Yet of the 64% backing Berlin, less than half would send NATO troops to the city's defense; the rest would either offer U.S. weapons or simply issue a warning to the aggressor. The prevalent belief is that West Berlin is not worth a war with the Russians--only 36% would go that far.

Israel is a special case outside the principal orbit of protection. There is a small majority (44% to 39%) in favor of going to the aid of the Israelis should Soviet-aided Arabs threaten to overrun them, but only 9% of those sampled believe that the U.S. should go so far as to send in troops. "Clearly," Harris observes, "the American people are not prepared to make to Israel anything like the commitment that we have made to South Viet Nam."

In general, the U.S. orbit of protection is extremely limited, and the closer a threatened country is to the U.S. the more concerned Americans are with helping to defend it against aggression. North America, and South America to a lesser extent, seems to Americans worth defending, as does Western Europe. Otherwise, however, more Americans than not would rather that the U.S. stay out, except for Asian areas with an obvious special interest for the U.S.--South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan and Thailand. Only a minority would give U.S. assistance in a crisis to such third-world nations as India (37%), Ethiopia (35%), Kenya (33%), Indonesia (32%), or Malaysia (32%). By 2 to 1, Americans would not favor aid to Yugoslavia or Rumania, two of Eastern Europe's more restive nations.

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Most Americans (52% to 32%) think a third World War can be avoided, and lopsided majorities favor reducing East-West tensions in general. In particular, they would approve agreements with the Soviet Union to enlarge the U.N.'s peace-keeping role and to control nuclear weapons. While they support such initiatives, however, the only one given a real chance of success is nuclear-arms limitation; 51% think that is likely to come about, while 28% disagree and 21 % are uncertain.

Most Americans believe that the original U.S. commitment to South Viet Nam was justified. But most also conclude that the U.S. has failed to achieve its aim of preventing a Communist takeover in that country. A 56% majority feel it is "very important" that Hanoi and the Viet Cong not take over South Viet Nam, and by a 50%-to-37% margin Americans answer affirmatively when asked, "Is the war in Viet Nam worth it or not?" Despite that conviction, 45% of the U.S. public conclude that the nation is not succeeding in preventing a Communist victory in Viet Nam, against only 38% who think otherwise.

If Americans had known back in 1961 that the war would last so long and be so costly in U.S. lives and funds, they would have opposed U.S. involvement overwhelmingly--63% to 26%. Only 9% would accept a settlement of the war that meant an outright Communist takeover of South Viet Nam either immediately or in three to five years' time. But twice that number, 18%, would agree to ending the war by setting up a coalition government including Communists, even if such a settlement left the Viet Cong in position to dominate South Viet Nam eventually. More broadly, 83% would like to see some solution that would neutralize Southeast Asia so that it is neither pro-American nor proCommunist.

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"The mood of the American people is to take a hard look at the limits of U.S. military power in the world," Harris says. "Only a small 8% want to see a larger role in the world for American military power, on the assumption that 'this is the only way in which Communism can be stopped' and 'this is the only way respect for the U.S. can be maintained.' But more than four times this number, 34%, say they would like to reduce the U.S. military role in the world, reasoning that 'we are overextended now,' 'it is too expensive to become too involved,' 'others ought to solve their own problems,' and 'we have suffered too many casualties already.' A majority of 51% feel our present stance is as far as we ought to go."

In conclusion, Harris says: "To the central question--Should America, in the light of the Viet Nam experience, continue to guarantee the integrity of its smaller allies against aggression?--the answer is a highly qualified yes. That answer is tempered still more by a mood of caution against commitment of American blood, by a desire for a realistic drawing of lines that define just where we stand. Deepest of all is the American desire to work out some way to peace and detente with the Communists, however long or tortuous that road might be."

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