VISIT FROM AN ARAB KING

WHAT the Israelis took by force of arms in the Six-Day War, the Arabs have been trying to recover by force of diplomacy ever since. For 22 months, Arab foreign policy has been aimed at getting the Israelis out of the occupied territories before their presence is ratified by time and their own efforts to fortify and settle some of the area. The talks on the Middle East that started three weeks ago between the U.S., Russia, Britain and France have given the Arabs hope that the Big Four may achieve what they have not brought about themselves: an Israeli withdrawal. Last week Jordan's King Hussein came to the U.S. to further that cause, in both public speeches and private talks with President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State William Rogers.

Vague Smoke Screen. He brought one new concession to the Israelis--at least one that has never before been offered quite so explicitly by an Arab leader. In a talk to Washington's National Press Club, Hussein promised Israel guarantees of free passage through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea's Gulf of Aqaba as part of a six-point Arab plan for settlement. Since only Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser could deliver on that particular promise, Hussein was clearly speaking for Egypt as well as Jordan. Nasser and Hussein had, in fact, jointly prepared the statement.

The U.S. welcomed the offer, since any sign of yielding by either side in the Middle East has been hard to come by. But Israel, though it will study the plan at a weekend Cabinet meeting, promptly dismissed the six points as nothing more than a "vague smoke screen," a propaganda maneuver designed to lend an air of reasonableness to the Arabs' position. Other points in the plan stipulated that Israel must return all territory, including the Arab sector of Jerusalem, conquered in the 1967 war. This Israel is not prepared to do without a genuine settlement negotiated directly with the Arabs. "If the Jordanians have a constructive plan," said Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Gideon Rafael, "let them bring it to the table." The Israelis believe that any recommendations by the Big Four are likely to demand more from them than from the Arabs, and thus they have opposed the talks, which continued last week in New York.

Hussein is aptly cast as the Arab spokesman to the West. By being forced to yield Arab Jerusalem and the West Bank, his nation lost proportionately more than other Arab nations in the war; accordingly, he stands to gain more by a settlement. He also needs that settlement most. The popularity he enjoyed two years ago is ebbing to such a degree that he reportedly has threatened abdication. In recent months, a host of unsavory rumors have sprung up about the King's financial dealings and his personal life. True or not, most Jordanians believe them. Undermined by such rumors and his inability to recover the lost lands or cope with Israeli reprisals, Hussein's support among the once fanatically loyal Bedouin tribesmen is diminishing. Many idealistic junior army officers have turned away, and he is having a hard time getting men to serve in his Cabinet. Candidates want either more power than the King is willing to yield them or a share of the reported spoils.

Freedom of Action. Buoyed by war outlays and by the spending of 20,000 fedayeen in the country and 17,000 Iraqui, 7,000 Saudi and 5,000 Syrian troops now stationed there, Jordan's economy is actually in better shape than before the war. Jordan's dollar reserves are a healthy $300 million. But tourist receipts are down to a third of pre-1967 figures, and agricultural production has dropped with the loss of the West Bank. Israeli analysts sum up Jordan's economy as "financially good, but stagnant in terms of development."

Much more serious is the problem of the fedayeen. As Hussein's popularity slips, that of the commandos rises, presenting the King with a tough choice. If he decides to throw in his lot with the commandos, he risks severe retaliation from Israel, and a fourth round of war becomes a distinct possibility. On the other hand, any attempt on his part to crush the fedayeen would almost certainly result in his overthrow. Commando Chief Yasser Arafat has pledged privately not to move against Hussein--but only so long as the fedayeen continue to have freedom of action within Jordan.

That freedom can have dangerous consequences for Jordan. Within 40 minutes last week, the fedayeen poured 16 Czech-made rockets into Israel's Gulf of Aqaba port of Elath, injuring ten persons, damaging a hospital, homes and cars. At dawn, Israeli jets bombed the nearby Jordanian port of Aqaba, reportedly killing eight civilians and wounding nine others. For years, Israel and Jordan had observed an unwritten truce in the Aqaba-Elath area, largely because both ports are so conspicuously vulnerable to retaliation. With a few rockets, the fedayeen severely bent that agreement. Further attacks on Elath would almost certainly provoke full-scale Israeli retaliation on Aqaba, Jordan's only access to the sea.

Pressure on the Four. The fedayeen attack on Elath had several objectives. Not the least of the targets was Hussein himself; it was a demonstration to him and the rest of the Arab world that the fedayeen can call their shots whenever they please. The upsurge of violence was undoubtedly aimed for effect on the Big Four as well. The combination of commando intransigence with the Hussein-Nasser six-point plan for peace could not help increasing pressure on the Big Four to seek an easing of Israeli demands.

In his talks with Nixon and Rogers, Hussein learned that Nixon shares his concern that the danger of a new outbreak of fighting is near--although lower-level State Department officials see it differently. Nixon and Rogers told Hussein that the U.S. firmly supports the withdrawal of Israeli troops from occupied territories, but that it will not become involved in drawing boundary lines on maps. Those matters, the Administration believes, must be negotiated by the Arabs and the Israelis, either directly or under the auspices of the United Nations.

Hussein in turn told Nixon that unless a settlement can be quickly achieved, his regime will be in real danger of losing whatever remains of its control over the fedayeen within its boundaries. Nixon responded by pointing out his belief that the complexities of the issues are so great that a rapid settlement seems unlikely. Despite his urgent requests for more military aid, Hussein won no new promises of major arms assistance. That is not likely to improve the King's already shaky hold on the affections of his army and his subjects.

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