NIXON'S DIPLOMACY: THE VIET NAM WAR AND BEYOND

IT was a week of intensive diplomatic activity on a variety of fronts for the Nixon Administration. And in encounter after encounter, the motif was conciliation.

Rather than invoking the legal deadline for imposing sanctions against Peru for seizing an American oil company's properties without satisfactory compensation, the President agreed that the matter could await litigation under Peruvian law. Then Washington began the process of re-establishing relations with Cambodia. At the disarmament conference in Geneva, the U.S. dropped its demands for on-site inspections of nuclear weapons plants, which the Russians have opposed. Secretary of State William Rogers announced that "there is nothing that stands in the way" of discussions with the Soviets on limitation of strategic nuclear arms. Rogers said he expected talks to begin "in the late spring or early summer."

The NATO ministerial conference in Washington, with American encouragement, concentrated on the possibility of a detente with the Warsaw Pact bloc. And Jordan's King Hussein concluded a White House visit, satisfied that the U.S. is following an "evenhanded" policy in the Middle East.

Mutuality. For all the upbeat motions elsewhere, Richard Nixon's central foreign policy concern remained the swift extrication of the U.S. from Viet Nam on honorable terms. As the Paris negotiations limp on with no settlement in sight, Nixon's thinking has focused increasingly on scaling down the American presence in Viet Nam. Even a limited withdrawal could ease domestic political pressure, perhaps reduce casualties and serve as a peace initiative. But how to take the first step safely?

To Nixon and his advisers, the ideal answer is "mutuality." Under this approach, the negotiators in Paris would work out a reciprocal and, if possible, concurrent withdrawal plan satisfactory to North Viet Nam and the U.S. alike. The Administration is banking--perhaps too optimistically--on Hanoi's having a growing desire for peace. As the Air Force had it, the massive U.S. bombardment of North Viet Nam would crack that nation's morale. It achieved the opposite result: by putting everyone in the front lines, the bombing created a spirit of defiance. But, as the theory goes, without the unifying goad of bombs, the hard-pressed peasants now have the leisure to reflect on their privations. As evidence, the monitors of Hanoi's newspapers and broadcasts report frequent condemnation of apathy and general slackness. There is also the tremendous death toll on the battlefield. In an interview with Italian Journalist Oriana Fallaci, North Viet Nam's Defense Minister, Vo Nguyen Giap, was asked if the American claim that he had "lost a half a million men" was correct. "That's quite exact," answered Giap without batting an eye.

Other forces are at work as well. Because Nixon has concluded that the war cannot be won within a time span that the U.S. would tolerate, he cannot let himself be solely dependent on the Paris talks. If the meetings go on too long, he could decide on a unilateral cutback of American forces. This might keep U.S. dissatisfaction with the war below the boiling point.

Few in Washington would consider a one-sided reduction that drains fighting strength. But every modern military force contains some "Pentagon fat" --in this case, desk soldiers and quartermaster types. The return of some 50,000 to 75,000 such servicemen should have little effect on the fighting. Neither would any U.S. troops be withdrawn while the enemy was pushing hard--as he again seemed to be doing at week's end, when 45 cities and posts were hit by mortar and rocket attack. Again, an American reduction might subject Hanoi to world pressure for a similar withdrawal.

Reserve Plan. Nixon faces two risks in a one-sided pullback. His advisers are, in effect, professing to read the enemy's mind, and Americans have not shown themselves notably gifted in making the inscrutable Oriental scrutable. Nixon must also operate with the timing of a master actor. Should the President wait too long before beginning troop withdrawals, the impatience of the nation may seem to have forced his hand. Hanoi may then shed its supposed exhaustion and decide that it can achieve its ends more easily on the battlefield than at the conference table.

The latest in-phraseology labels the Nixon approach as a "dual track" strategy in an "environment of pressure." In addition to the talks on troop withdrawals between the U.S. and North Viet Nam at Paris, it envisages simultaneous talks, open or secret, between the Saigon regime and the National Liberation Front on a political settlement for South Viet Nam. Washington feels that it has already made progress in achieving this second point by persuading South Viet Nam's President Thieu to declare publicly his willingness to talk with the N.L.F., and to hold open the possibility of a full political role for the opposition. Some have wondered what there is in this for the Front, since Thieu seems committed to accepting only a non-Communist opposition. The Administration reply: That is what the Paris talks are all about.

Formula Magic. Washington skeptics can see little difference between Nixon's approach and that of Lyndon Johnson. In reply, Secretary of State Rogers notes that Johnson's "Manila Formula" delayed the withdrawal of allied forces up to six months after the North Vietnamese had gone home. This, said Rogers, implied an initial and unilateral enemy withdrawal, as opposed to Nixon's emphasis on true mutuality. For the present, Rogers hoped "that there would be some chance of mutual withdrawal of troops this year." In the dual-track approach, Rogers sees a "fair and reasonable" means for ending the conflict. But, he warned, "it isn't any magic formula, obviously."

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