NEW STEPS TOWARD A MIDEAST PEACE

ARABS and Israelis found themselves in a rare moment of accord last week. In Jerusalem, Premier Golda Meir told a Hebrew University audience: "Even our best friends do not have the right to decide for us what our conditions for peace and security should be." In Cairo, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser asserted to the Congress of his Arab Socialist Union: "No one can impose on the Arab nation what it considers to be inconsistent with its historical rights."

This unlikely unanimity of view was produced by the prospect of imminent Big Four talks at the U.N. on peace in the Middle East. Washington, encouraged by a series of bilateral discussions, had proposed that U.S., British, Soviet and French negotiators begin high-level meetings this week on the possibility of an agreement, and Washington's initiative had been welcomed in the other capitals. Both Paris and London, however, insisted that there was no thought of actually imposing a solution. "I do not think such a solution would work," said British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart. "On the other hand, there is clearly the necessity to have some degree of persuasion by the four powers." The precise extent of such "persuasion" was left carefully undefined, and Washington braced itself for the arrival of Jordan's King Hussein, due April 8 on a formal visit designed to put forth the Arab views. Hussein's visit is the latest round in the diplomatic minuet over the Middle East that brought Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban to Washington in mid-March to outline Israel's position, and had Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin shuttling back and forth almost daily last week between his embassy and the State Department.

Talking Points. As the preconference meetings continued, details of the U.S. "talking points" began to appear. Perhaps the most important of the points would be an effort to win full four-power agreement on the implementation of the November 1967 Security Council resolution, which postulated mutual recognition of sovereignty and Israeli withdrawal from areas conquered in the Six-Day War. Israel, according to the latest U.S. suggestion, would retain Syria's Gobn Heights and Arab Jerusalem, although Jordan would have certain rights in its former sector. The U.S. also envisages the following:

-Demilitarized zones, patrolled by U.N. forces, along all Arab-Israeli frontiers.

-Guaranteed Israeli navigation through the Suez and the Strait of Tiran.

-Repatriation of all Six-Day War refugees--and those who were made homeless earlier--and their resettlement in Arab lands, with generous U.S. aid.

-A ban on all military operations in the area, including guerrilla strikes by fedayeen bands, which are now the most volatile Arab armed force.

-An arms embargo, preferably total.

-A guarantee of any settlement by the Big Four, and perhaps the U.N.

Neither Israel nor the Arabs could be expected to accept such proposals completely. Israel, moreover, maintains that any settlement can come about only as the result of face-to-face agreement with Arab negotiators. On this point, the Arabs are reluctant, partly because such formal talks would imply full Arab recognition of Israel.

Less formal discussions, however, have been held. Israeli Deputy Premier Yigal Allon held three secret meetings with Hussein between Sept. 25 and 29 in London. Eban was present at one of these sessions. At one point in this period, Allon also met fruitlessly with Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad. It is likely that Eban and Hussein held more private discussions in London in October and January.

Wailing Wall. Given the vitriolic state of Arab-Israeli relations, it was, in a way, remarkable that these secret meetings took place at all--and perhaps not surprising that they produced no results. The Israeli sessions with Hussein at first seemed promising. Hussein agreed to Israeli construction of defense settlements overlooking the West Bank of the Jordan River, as well as to a demilitarization of the West Bank area, but he rejected the idea of an Israeli cordon sanitaire along the West Bank. In turn, Israel accepted Hussein's demand that Palestinian refugees who fled the West Bank as a result of the 1967 war be allowed to return.

The talks broke down, however, over Jerusalem. Hussein offered Israel some rights in the Jordanian part of the city-including access to the Wailing Wall--and talked of internationalization of the city as a possible alternative. Israel, of course, has formally annexed Arab Jerusalem and does not want to relinquish its hold. In any further Arab-Israeli negotiations, it seemed increasingly obvious that Jerusalem may prove the major sticking point.

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