THE ABM: A NUCLEAR WATERSHED
EVER since the development of missiles that could span continents, the possibility of nuclear-armed rockets arcing over the horizon from a hostile nation has been a nightmare for U.S. planners. How could such monstrous weapons be dealt with? How could the nation avert a death toll of hundreds of millions of its people? For 14 years, military men and scientists have labored mightily to devise some protection against such an eventuality. The principal result of their efforts is the Sentinel anti-ballistic-missile system, a complex of nuclear-tipped rockets and radars aimed at crippling inbound enemy warheads before they can hit their targets in the U.S.
Ideally, decisions concerning complicated weaponry--and the Sentinel system is one of the most complicated ever devised--should be the quiet business of Government: its civilian leaders, military men and scientists. That has not been so with the ABM, as the defensive system is now known. The question of whether the U.S. should install an ABM network--and how extensive that network should be--has suddenly become a national issue that has immense strategic, political and social ramifications for the American people and perhaps the rest of the world. The debate over that issue, warned New York Republican Senator Jacob Javits last week, "could become as bitter and destructive as the dispute over Viet Nam policy."
Unabated Battle
Any President facing this kind of situation would have a major problem. For Richard Nixon, who must contend with opposition majorities on Capitol Hill and try to govern by conciliation, the situation is particularly hazardous. As the Sentinel dispute heated up, he said that he would announce his ABM policy this week. By any reckoning, it is the biggest decision of his Administration to date--and it could bring down righteous wrath on Nixon's head no matter how he decides.
The general expectation was that the President would choose to continue the ABM program in some form, despite the bitter criticism that that course would draw. To do otherwise would amount to a vote of no confidence in the military and undercut Defense Secretary Melvin Laird, who has come out in favor of the ABM. In the highly unlikely event that Nixon chose to abandon this system, he would come under heavy fire from those Americans who voted for him at least in part because he promised to guarantee clear U.S. military superiority over the Soviet Union. To steer a cautious middle course between continuing the project as laid out by the Johnson Administration and ending it outright, could simply result in satisfying no one. Whatever the President's decision, in short, the battle over the ABM is almost certain to continue unabated.
ABM's advocates contend that the system would be a stabilizing influence among the nuclear powers, a necessary addition to the U.S. arsenal, a strong lever in prospective arms-control negotiations--and the savior of tens of millions of lives in the event of nuclear war. The project's foes, on the other hand, see the ABM in itself as a threat to peace--a new source of fuel for the already flaming arms race and a potentially voracious consumer of resources urgently needed for a lengthening catalogue of domestic ills. Beyond that, the critics contend, there are reasons to doubt that an ABM, in its present state of technology, would actually work if put to the ultimate trial.
There is even dispute over ABM's likely adversary. Sentinel has long been billed as a "thin" defense, suitable only against a Chinese attack. Yet some of its strongest supporters--and critics--view it as the beginning of a "thick" shield to counter Russian strength. One point seems certain: if Washington and Moscow decide to invest heavily in ABMs, the world will see a new watershed in nuclear weaponry.
Senatorial Strife
If the stakes are immense, the controversy is vociferous and widespread. The scientific community has been hotly arguing the issue for months. A series of student-faculty protests against the ABM have taken place on university campuses. In areas where ABM facilities might be situated, there have been angry citizens' meetings and demonstrations that the Pentagon's representatives have been unable to mollify. The protesters resent such use of desirable sites, fear that the missiles might be unsafe and, furthermore, insist that their presence would make the host community a special target for the enemy in the event of war.
On Capitol Hill, the Senate particularly has been riven by the issue. Members have been choosing sides without regard to party affiliation. Last week the Foreign Relations Committee, which normally has no jurisdiction over weapons procurement, issued a formal call for delay in Sentinel's deployment. One of the committee's main arguments is that the ABM program contravenes the intent of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty just at a time when Moscow at last seems genuinely interested in exploring ways to curb the arms race. The ABM dispute may also provide the first major confrontation between Richard Nixon and his possible 1972 opponent, Senate Majority Whip Edward Kennedy, who has become a leader of the anti-Sentinel faction and is sponsoring preparation of an exhaustive anti-ABM report.
Dramatic and significant as the controversy is, most of the issues involved are neither new nor applicable only to the ABM among major military pro grams. The weapon itself has been under discussion for many years without ex citing the degree of fervor it has prompted recently. Why now?
Hollered Objections
One precipitating factor has been that in recent months the Army actually started selecting missile and radar sites and began physical work on the system. Some of the areas considered were choice suburban locations near big cities, and many of ABM's neighbors-to-be hollered their objections so loudly that their representatives in Congress had to take notice. For legislators who were already skeptical of Sentinel, time to do anything about it seemed to be running out. Since the first appropriations for construction and pro curement were approved last year, this year's defense budget might be the last opportunity to halt or slow the undertaking.
The presidential election might have served to bring the issue into focus earlier, but it failed to do so. It was the Johnson Administration that had started Sentinel, and Vice President Hubert Humphrey chose not to campaign against it then (he is now a vocal opponent). For his part, Nixon was warning against a possible "security gap" vis-`a-vis the Soviet Union and thus encouraging the ABM's backers. A new Administration and a new Congress offered an opportunity for a new look at the question.
A deeper reason for the out break of contention is that the military is at a nadir of public confidence. Although the Pentagon has no monopoly on blame for Viet Nam -- civilians made the major decisions -- popular frustration vents itself to a large extent on the military command. The Pueblo incident, the Arnheiter affair and technological bobbles like the F-111 have further diminished public trust in the competence of military leadership. Dr. Daniel Fink, a former Pentagon engineer, who has frequently debated on the pro side of ABM, worries about "the belief that these decisions are made by fat, cigar-chewing generals laughing among themselves about billions of dol lars and megadeaths."
Capitol Hill senses this phenomenon. Sentiment against the Viet Nam war has run loose in Congress. There is a growing conviction that the brass is fundamentally unqualified to assess huge, intricate technical projects. Old fears of the "militaryindustrial complex" have been revived; more than 3,000 companies stand to profit from the ABM. Only a few years ago, skepticism toward military requests was almost suspect as being disloyal to "our boys." Indeed, it was Congress that, until recently, was pressing the Executive branch to move faster in producing the ABM, even to the extent of voting funds that the Defense Department refused to spend.
All that has changed. As the Paris negotiations have raised hopes, however often dashed, for peace in Viet Nam, Americans have become obsessed with the prospect of diverting to domestic programs much of the $30 billion a year that the war has been costing. The U.S. faces vast and pressing needs in the cities, the schools, the hospitals and the nation's very air and water. Many of its legislators and citizens thus see the ABM as a thief that would snatch away billions of dollars sorely needed for domestic use. The likely cost for the specific ABM program already begun is between $5 billion and $10 billion spread over several years--which is not really too immense a burden. But many are convinced that the ABM, once undertaken, is bound to grow in size and cost by geometric progression. Democratic Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri, a former Air Force Secretary who is generally sympathetic to the military, declared last week that the ultimate price of the system would be $400 billion.
The ABM is hardly new to controversy. No post-World War II weapon has had so long or difficult a gestation. In the inexorable minuet of military science, each advance in either offense or defense provokes efforts to restore the balance. Fourteen years ago, the So viets had no offensive-missile force to speak of, though they had the ability to build one. U.S. development started in 1955 and soon led to the first, primitive ABM project, the Nike-Zeus. Testing showed that Zeus could indeed stop an incoming missile under ideal conditions; dummy aggressors launched from California were intercepted by defenders based on Kwajalein.
Zeus, however, was merely "a bullet that could stop a bullet," whereas the anticipated threat was a shotgun blast of many projectiles aimed at the U.S. With limited range, relatively low speed and me chanically operated radars that could handle only one target at a time, Zeus offered only "terminal defense" -- protection of limited ar eas. Consequently, Dwight Eisen hower barred production of the Zeus, but directed the Pentagon to pursue efforts to develop a bet ter system.
50 Million Lives?
During the Kennedy years and the first Johnson Administration, the White House and Defense Secretary Robert McNamara resisted pressure from the military and Congress to set up some version of ABM. Meanwhile, the research effort led to Nike-X, an expanded and refined system that employs two types of missiles and electronically operated radars that can handle numerous targets simultaneously (see box next page). Theoretically, at least, the Nike-X proj ect -- which is still receiving $175 million a year in development funds -- thus overcame some of the main technical problems posed by Zeus.
Even so, McNamara, along with many prominent scientists both in and out of the Government, remained highly skeptical of the ABM's efficacy against a large-scale Soviet attack. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, and particularly the Army -- which has jurisdiction over land-based ABMs -- continued to press for its installation on the grounds that some protection was better than none. Army General Earle Wheeler, J.C.S. chairman, has argued that a full-fledged ABM might save between 50 million and 80 million American lives in an all-out war.
In 1967, McNamara finally presented two alternative schemes, one involving an investment of $12.2 billion and an other costing $21.7 billion. The less ex pensive approach might reduce the death toll to 40 million (from an estimated high of 120 million). The second sys tem might lower fatalities to 30 million. Yet these calculations were essentially academic numbers games based on constantly changing realities. They presumed a static Russian defensive capability as it existed in 1967. McNamara himself pointed out the big drawback: "We can be certain that the Soviets will react to offset the advantage we would hope to gain."
This line of reasoning, rebutted by some experts, assumes that the offensive side in missile warfare always has the advantage, that it can cheaply and easily offset any improvement in defenses. This theory also presupposes antagonists of roughly equal strength and technological development. The equations all changed when, in the mid-'60s, the Chinese developed their own rudimentary nuclear program. Now there were two threats to consider, and pro-ABM pressure rose accordingly.
In a few years the Peking regime, which is vitriolic and unpredictable in its self-imposed isolation, will theoretically be able to hit the U.S. with nuclear missiles. Although the U.S. could destroy China as a modern society even more easily than it could the Soviet Union, a touch of yellow-menace fever has set in. "The Chinese are different," argues one general. "They have no regard for human life. Imagine if the Red Guards had got their hands on a couple of ICBMs!" At the same time, the Russians resisted Lyndon Johnson's initial attempts to open negotiations aimed at checking the nuclear-arms race. Moscow made no secret of the fact that it was going ahead with its own ABM. As early as 1962, Nikita Khrushchev bragged that his anti-missile weapon could "hit a fly in the sky."
By late 1967, with an election year imminent and the strong possibility that the Republicans would resuscitate the familiar issue of a missile gap, Johnson and McNamara capitulated to a certain extent. Relying on some of the components developed for Nike-X, the Administration approved the thin Sentinel system that had as its main mission the defense of the U.S. in the 1970s against attack from China. As side benefits, Sentinel could also be used to protect Minuteman sites and would guard against a stray incoming missile that might be fired--probably accidentally--by any nation possessing such weapons in the future.
The basic rationale for Sentinel is the expectation that a potential Chinese attack would be light in number (20 to 30 ICBMs) and use far less sophisticated weaponry than a Russian strike. Hence, it could be repelled. Proponents of a full ABM network, however, have viewed Sentinel from the beginning as merely the first step toward a full-scale anti-Soviet network. It was a development that McNamara fully expected when he warned: "The danger in deploying this relatively light and reliable Chinese-oriented system is going to be that pres sures will develop to expand it into a heavy Soviet-oriented ABM." McNamara was right. Last month, after Defense Secretary Laird halted actual in stallation of the Sentinel pending the Administration's review of the program, President Nixon said at a press conference: "I do not buy the assumption that the thin Sentinel was simply for the purpose of protecting ourselves from attack from Communist China." He added that a thick ABM system "adds to our overall defense capability."
How It Works
Regardless of whose missiles Sentinel guards against and in what depth it is employed, the system's technical concept is unchanged. Aimed over the Arctic (the shortest route), an attacking projectile from Russia or China would take less than 45 minutes to reach, say, New York or Chicago. For planning purposes, strategists calculate the flight time at 30 minutes. PAR, Sentinel's long-range eye, with a vision of some 1,500 miles, could be expected to detect the attackers 10 to 15 minutes after launch, leaving a warning time of 15 minutes. Unlike the old Zeus concept and its lim ited coverage, a single Sentinel site can sweep a broad area. Each radar-missile complex covers a bulbous "footprint" on the map, and only 15 overlapping tracks are necessary to provide a thin blanket for the U.S., although a full defense would require expanded facilities.
It would, of course, take a human decision that an attack is indeed under way -- and authorization from the President -- to trigger Sentinel. (An elaborate communications net follows the President everywhere to permit instant access to him.) Spartan is the first weapon to go. Carrying a warhead of approximately two megatons (equivalent in power to 2,000,000 tons of TNT) and propelled by a solid-fuel, three-stage engine, Spartan seeks its target where a thermonuclear explosion can do the least harm: beyond the earth's immediate atmosphere (more than 75 miles up) and up to about 400 miles away from Spartan's underground launch cylinder. Coming in for the kill at such a height substantially eliminates the danger of concentrated fallout, since radioactivity would be diffused. Also, the aim is not to blow up the incoming warhead, which would be nearly impossible. Rather, the airless environment would facilitate the transmission of X rays from Spartan's explosion. Within an area of a few miles, the X rays would penetrate the incoming warhead's heat shield, wreck its circuitry and defuse its trigger mechanism.
Some areas, including PAR sites that must be kept intact to maintain defenses, would also be protected by Sprints. These sharp-nosed, two-stage missiles, with a payload of a few kilotons (equal to thousands of tons of TNT instead of Spartan's millions), are aimed at warheads that have eluded Spartan. By this time the attacking vehicle has passed into the atmosphere and is traveling at about 18,000 miles per hour. To kill it before it explodes near the earth, Sprint must travel at fantastic speed. Its exact acceleration ability is secret, but the Army talks of Sprint's climbing 50,000 ft. "in two heartbeats." Sprint would make its interception between 25 and 40 miles from its launch site, relying primarily on the blast and heat effects of its own detonation to incapacitate the aggressor weapon's innards. As with the Spartan, its purpose is not to blow up the opposing RV (reentry vehicle)--which would dump much lethal fallout on the territory below--but to detonate close enough to defuse the warhead. Sprint's own bang, however, would cause a degree of radioactivity.
The entire scenario, of course, is theoretical. Dr. Jerome Wiesner of M.I.T., who was John Kennedy's science adviser, notes that Sentinel is "untestable" under anything approaching simulated combat conditions. The warheads have been detonated in underground explosions, to be sure, and the missiles that carry them have been launched, but the 1963 nuclear Test-Ban Treaty prohibits nuclear explosions in space. Even without this veto, it would be fantastically difficult to stage a realistic war game featuring ABM.
The Buts Mount
"We lack vital data about the attacking missiles and about ABM performance," says Wiesner, who calls Sentinel "that Edsel of ABM's." "So we just pick some numbers that seem rational and we use them to make whatever point serves our purpose." Ted Kennedy quotes the Budget Bureau's Richard Stubbing, who evaluated $40 billion worth of aircraft and missile projects initiated since 1955 and concluded that "less than 40% of the effort produced systems with acceptable electronic performance." The implication, of course, is that if technology cannot perfect relatively simple devices, it seems highly improbable that the infinitely complex ABM will work any better.
Some critics, notably Cornell Physicist Hans Bethe, a Nobel prizewinner, and Dr. J. P. Ruina, former director of the Pentagon's Advanced Research Projects Agency, are more lenient. In testimony last week before the Senate Disarmament Subcommittee, they did not attack Sentinel's basic hardware. Bethe, in fact, called the components "well designed" and said he went along with the idea that Sprints should be used to protect Minuteman sites. Both Ruina and Bethe, however, were particularly critical of Spartan's role.
Like McNamara and others, Bethe has long doubted that any defense system can effectively discriminate between real warheads and a variety of decoys and "penetration aids" that the offense is likely to use. Spartan, operating in space, faces a handicap in this area because it is only after the real birds have re-entered the atmosphere that they can be readily distinguished on radar from decoys.
Russia and the U.S. are both capable of throwing up a variety of diversionary objects. Metallic balloons, dummy warheads, masses of tiny metal strips called chaff, can all be employed to confuse the defenders and force them to waste precious ABMs. The presumption has been all along that the Chinese, who do not yet have an ICBM force in being, could not produce so sophisticated a first-generation missile. Still, Peking will certainly develop its missiles with a broad general knowledge of U.S. defense concepts. "Their deployment," Bethe said recently, "will probably be determined by our ABM system. How long our ABM could keep ahead of them is open to question. It may be a few years--or months." Other specialists point out that if the Chinese really wanted to risk obliteration, ABM would not be an insuperable barrier. They could smuggle in the parts of nuclear bombs and use saboteurs rather than missiles. Either the Chinese or the Russians could attempt germ warfare if they feared nuclear defeat. Short-range attacks from submarines sneaking close to the coasts is also a possibility--and one that ABM might not be able to cope with.
Army planners took the probability of Chinese technological improvement into consideration. Sentinel's original configuration put Spartan and MSR sites close to population centers with the idea of thickening the defenses later by adding Sprints, which must be near the points they defend. To move the installations away from densely populated areas would reduce the popular and political opposition to Sentinel, but would also deprive the major cities of the second line of defense that Sprint represents.
One of the most alarming arguments raised by ABM opponents is the prospect that Spartans and Sprints could accidentally explode while still in the ground, devastating a huge surrounding area. This point is not raised only by nervous housewives or fanatic nucleo-phobes. Dr. David Inglis, senior physicist at the Argonne National Laboratory, concluded in a Saturday Review article that the danger deserves serious consideration. Bethe, on the other hand, says that he is untroubled by the safety aspects of Sentinel. In fact, there has been no unintentional nuclear explosion in the U.S. since the birth of the atomic age. Even when nuclear bombers crashed, their weapons failed to detonate. Says one Pentagon official: "The only way to cause a nuclear explosion in an ABM silo would be to have a specialist climb in, rewire the warhead, getting around all those safety devices, and then bring in additional power. There are so many safety devices on it that we only hope it will go off once it is launched."
Another set of arguments goes beyond technology into strategy and diplomacy. Throughout the postwar period, the U.S. has based its main defense on "assured destruction"--the ability to inflict catastrophic damage on any opponent (until now, the Soviet Union) even if the adversary delivered the first nuclear blow. This second-strike capability has induced the U.S. to maintain an immense nuclear arsenal, far larger and more diverse than that of the Russians.
Why, then, is it necessary to set up a shield against the Chinese with their meager resources? And if it is essential, why consider bargaining it away in talks with the Russians? These are points that have never been satisfactorily answered, even by those who first promoted the Sentinel's anti-Chinese system. McNamara led with his chin when he acknowledged in 1967 that only "marginal grounds" supported the decision to authorize an ABM. That speech has been an arsenal of criticism for ABM opponents ever since.
An Extra Option
The fact is that Lyndon Johnson's decision, dutifully but reluctantly implemented by McNamara, was based at least as much on domestic political considerations as on international factors. Sentinel, wags said at the time, was really a defense against American Republicans, not Chinese Communists. Johnson might well have halted the Sentinel project last summer if he could have arranged, as the Soviets wished, to begin arms-control talks. He had on his desk an unsigned message confirming his willingness to negotiate on the night that Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin brought him word of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. That was the end of that.
Many responsible scientists and strategists make a cogent case for Sentinel's deployment. Leon Johnson, a retired Air Force general and National Security Council aide, argues that an ABM gives the U.S. an extra option in any crisis. Its existence in a future confrontation, say with a bellicose nation that has a few primitive missiles, would allow the U.S. a third alternative other than acquiescing to blackmail or being forced to devastate the antagonist. The U.S. could employ conventional forces in a local situation, knowing that a small nuclear attack could be blunted.
Dr. Donald Brennan, a founder and former president of the Hudson Institute, a private research center, argues that even a flawed defense "makes an attack much more complicated and would tend to argue against anyone making one." He disagrees with the contention that it is cheaper and easier for the offense to stay ahead of the defense. Defensive technology has reached the point, Brennan maintains, where it requires equal effort for the offense to keep pace. To this, Simon Ramo, vice chairman of the billion-dollar-a-year TRW electronics company, replies that with "one-tenth of the budget of ABM, thick or thin, I could wreck the system."
Brennan and a number of other ABM advocates part company with the "thin" school. They urge a fuller deployment aimed squarely against a Russian attack. If both the U.S. and the Soviet Union could agree to emphasize their defensive posture, says Brennan, "we might find it very easy to agree on an effective ceiling on offensive forces."
Even some of the most energetic enemies of Sentinel deployment say that they would subscribe to a comprehensive ABM program, notwithstanding the cost, if only they could be persuaded that it would provide an impermeable shield. Says Physics Professor Alvin Saperstein of Wayne State University: "It is not a question of trusting the Russians or the Chinese. You can't trust them. But I don't trust our own military not to lead us to disaster either. If I felt the ABM were effective, I'd live with the damn thing in my back yard. But it isn't." Thus many who want Sentinel stopped favor continued exploration for technological breakthroughs that might assure a more reliable defense.
A crucial question for the Administration is what effect a deployed ABM system would have on U.S.-Soviet nuclear competition or possible cooperation. In the past, the "action-reaction phenomenon" has been the controlling factor. Each side, responding to traditional military prudence, has sought to counter real or prospective advances by the other. The result has been an enormous overkill capacity beyond "mutual assured destruction" (MAD).
Mistaken Estimates
Miscalculations of the rival's intentions are common. In 1960, there was fear of a "missile gap." In 1965, the U.S. concluded that the Russians had given up quantitative arms competition, only to see them spurt forward later. And before leaving office, McNamara acknowledged that, overall, the U.S. had spent too much on weaponry during his tenure because of mistaken estimates of Russian intentions. However, the Russians have accelerated their buildup, tripling their supply of land-based missiles in little more than two years. The U.S. remains ahead in overall nuclear-delivery capability, but Russia continues to close the gap.
As for ABM, the Russians have a lead in deployment if not in technology. They have installed a thicket of one-or two-megaton Galosh missiles--perhaps 75--around Moscow after giving up on an earlier defense ring in the Leningrad area, presumably because of obsolescence. Although no one can be sure of its intent, the Kremlin has reportedly planned a $25 billion program that would buy more than 5,000 Galoshes. U.S. intelligence has assumed that Galosh is an inferior missile supported by relatively old-fashioned mechanical radars and hence of no major concern to the West at present. Recently, though, Defense Secretary Laird has indicated that the Russians are working on new components. German military sources talk of a Russian ABM in the 50-to 60-megaton range.
Despite their heavy military budgets in recent years, Russian leaders, like their American counterparts, have good reason to hope for an arms slowdown. Soviet defense expenditures cannot be precisely audited because they are largely hidden. Nonetheless, it is generally believed that Moscow's recent defense spending has been roughly equivalent to Washington's military budget (after the $30-billion-a-year cost of Viet Nam is subtracted from the U.S. figure). Yet the Russian gross national product is only about half of the American G.N.P.
This, together with the fact that the Russians have managed to catch up somewhat in the arms race, may explain Moscow's present willingness to bargain for some form of arms limitation. Another element is that, in the absence of any agreement, both sides might soon consider it necessary to press ahead with new generations of expensive weapons, both offensive and defensive.
How does ABM enter into that equation? Again, there is wide disagreement. Says Kentucky Senator John Sherman Cooper: "This is a moment when negotiations are possible, a moment that should not be lost." George Rathjens, a former disarmament agency official now at M.I.T., argues that the simultaneous deployment of ABMs and MIRVs would destabilize the present equation by increasing the temptation to make a first, or preemptive, strike. The Administration has argued that the ABM could be a bargaining counter with the Soviets. "We must have both offensive and defensive missiles up for discussion, debate and negotiation," Laird said last month. "We must go into the talks with a strong position."
Megatons and Snowplows
On the other hand, the prospect of constructing an ABM shield might be just as valid a debating point as actual emplacement of ABM. Since the system under consideration would not, in any event, be fully operable until 1971 or 1972, it would be possible to keep the program alive without investing much additional money until the prospects for successful arms talks are fully assessed. In that fashion, the U.S. could tell the world, as Hubert Humphrey said last week, that "we are putting down our pistol--but there it is."
For Richard Nixon, it has been no easy matter to reach a decision. The international ramifications are complex enough. The domestic considerations are also tricky. Opposition to ABM has provided a rallying point for liberal Democrats while seriously dividing the Republican ranks. The split in the Senate is close enough to give the opposition a good chance to embarrass the Administration by withholding further funds. An Associated Press poll indicated that 47 Senators now oppose construction of the system.
The ABM has acquired a symbolic importance far out of proportion to its stated cost at present--though not perhaps out of relation to the ultimate bill if it grows, as some fear it will. After listening to a debate in Lexington, Mass., on ABM's merits, Boston City Councilman Tom Atkins told a panel of experts: "You talk of megatons. We are interested in snow removal. You talk of penetration aids. What we want is housing. You talk of nuclear sufficiency. I say there is massive insufficiency as far as our domestic sanity is concerned." The statement brought applause from both opponents and advocates of Sentinel. That is a trick that Richard Nixon may find very hard to turn.
* Whose original concept, many forget, was forced on the generals and admirals by Robert McNamara and his civilian experts.
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