Once More, De Gaulle v. Britain

WHILE President Nixon was still preparing for his good-will working tour of Western Europe, the long-simmering feud between Great Britain and Charles de Gaulle's France burst into the open once again. As before, the casus belli was Britain's bid for membership in the Common Market, which De Gaulle has repeatedly vetoed. Washington was dismayed, since the dispute would hardly enhance the atmosphere of mutual understanding and cooperation that Nixon ardently hoped to cultivate.

The current Anglo-French crisis first boiled over two weeks ago, when France brusquely refused to participate in a London meeting of the Western European Union called to discuss approaches to a settlement of the Middle East crisis. The WEU, an international organization consisting of Britain and the six Common Market countries, was established in 1955, and laid out the ground rules for West German rearmament, notably a ban on development of nuclear weapons by Bonn. Since then, it has met intermittently to talk over defense questions and other problems of shared interest.

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Because of De Gaulle's steadfast refusal to consider full Common Market membership for the U.K., Britain has clung desperately to the WEU as its only regular forum for multilateral conversations with the Six. When France refused to attend this month's WEU meeting, Paris claimed that what Britain wanted to discuss was the Common Market, a subject technically off-limits to the WEU. Foreign Minister Michel Debre once more raised De Gaulle's favorite specter of Anglo-Saxon conspiracy. Debre declared haughtily: "France considers that the British, who are always inclined to align themselves behind American positions, are not yet ready to join the European community, whose vocation is independence."

Only last week did it become clear what was really angering the French. Stories appeared in the generally pro-Gaullist Le Figaro and France-Soir hinting that the French had offered Britain a new chance to demonstrate a firm commitment to Europe, only to have their overture rejected. Furiously, Whitehall put its side of the story on record. At a luncheon in Paris on Feb. 4 with Britain's Ambassador to France, Christopher Soames, an avid pro-European who is Winston Churchill's son-in-law, De Gaulle--according to the British account--proposed that the two countries should have a summit meeting to talk over replacing the Common Market with a larger economic association run by a four-power inner directorate of Britain, France, West Germany and Italy. This grouping would also form the nucleus of an all-European defense system to replace U.S.-dominated NATO. After consulting his government, Soames replied that Britain found the suggestions "significant" and "far-reaching" --but refused to accept De Gaulle's view of NATO, and insisted on pursuing its aim of entering the Common Market as it is now constituted.

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Once Britain made known its version, France was quick to deny it. All De Gaulle had done, according to the Quai d'Orsay, was to repeat his conviction of many years that British entry into the Common Market would inevitably alter the European community. Debre took to the radio once more. "What did the general say to the British ambassador?" he asked. "He said that reflection and lengthy study were necessary on the subject of the economic organization of a Europe in which Great Britain would participate." A government statement insisted: "The idea of a directorate of four imposing its will on the small countries of Europe is so manifestly contrary to all that the French government has always expressed on the necessary independence of each people that it does not even merit a denial."

What, in fact, had De Gaulle been up to? One cogent theory had it that--with Nixon's visit impending--he wanted to underscore his argument that the British are reluctant to sacrifice American ties in order to join Europe. By so doing, he hoped to dissuade Germany and Italy from taking Britain's part too vigorously in conversations with the U.S. President. But the ploy may have backfired. By publicizing their version, the British now appear to be both good Europeans, solicitous of the interests of the other five Common Market nations, and good Atlanticists, refusing to countenance the dissolution of NATO.

Speaking to a Labor Party meeting at week's end, Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart voiced an eloquent lament. "It is tragic," he said, "that Britain and France, two great nations who have done so much and who can do so much for Europe and for the world, should be at variance. We ought to be working together to build up the splendid structure of Europe as part of the human alliance for freedom. But where there are serious differences, it is necessary to state plainly what they are." If nothing else, the latest brouhaha between Britain and France was a timely reminder to the U.S. of the difficulties of European cooperation.

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