Hopeful Words on Arms Control

FOREIGN RELATIONS

The task of slowing the nuclear arms race remains the most significant and difficult piece of unfinished business between the two nuclear colossi. Whether a U.S.-Soviet pact toward this end can be achieved will not be known until real bargaining starts, itself a when-and-if proposition.

Last week the Washington-Moscow conversation at least sounded hopeful. In Moscow a ranking government spokesman urged the U.S. to begin promptly a "serious exchange of views" about checking the weapons competition. In Washington the same day, Richard Nixon declared in his inaugural address: "With those who are willing to join, let us cooperate to reduce the burden of arms." That intercontinental exchange may yet narrow down to face-to-face talks across a conference table. For the time being, however, the generalities expressed by the new President and the U.S.S.R.'s Kyril Novikov, head of the Foreign Ministry's International Organizations Department, did not bring negotiations any nearer.

Parity Attacked. Last year it seemed that a beginning was imminent. Since 1964, Lyndon Johnson had been pressing the Soviets for talks aimed at limiting both nations' nuclear stockpiles. While bargaining on related subjects, the Russians continued to build both their offensive and defensive missile systems. But after the U.S. Congress voted funds for a "light" anti-ballistic-missile defense system (ABM), the Russians agreed to talk. Their occupation of Czechoslovakia in August froze any hope of negotiations in the immediate future, and the Democrats were lame ducks by the time the chill wore off.

The new Administration's precise position is unclear. Toward the end of the campaign, Nixon talked of a developing U.S. "security gap" and of his desire to negotiate only from a position of strength. The implication was that the U.S. would have to expand its arsenal before talking about reducing it. Just two weeks ago, Defense Secretary Melvin Laird told the Senate Armed Services Committee that he believes talks should not be held until perhaps next summer, and not until a successful conclusion seems virtually assured. Further, Laird attacked the concept of nuclear parity, which holds that a balance between the U.S. and Russia is acceptable or even desirable to promote stability. Robert McNamara and his successor as Defense Secretary, Clark Clifford, argued that each side already has the power to destroy the other and that any advance by one side would be matched by the other.

Undefined Slogans. Secretary of State William Rogers, although agreeing with Laird that the U.S. should maintain superiority, has declined to endorse the view that talks must be postponed. Nor does Rogers hold out for advance assurance of success. Henry Kissinger, Nixon's Assistant for National Security, has played no part in the public debate since taking office. In recent writings, however, Kissinger has dismissed the terms superiority and parity as virtually meaningless slogans.

In this atmosphere of uncertainty, the Russians chose Nixon's inauguration day to prod the U.S.--and to emphasize to the world that the next move is up to Washington. They also implied that they would not quietly acquiesce to a further U.S. arms buildup.

The definition of "position of strength" is a key element. Although the Russians have been drawing abreast of the Americans in terms of the number of land-based offensive missiles, the U.S. remains far ahead in the quality of these weapons, in both the quantity and capability of submarine-borne missiles, as well as in strategic bombers.

Thus the Nixon Administration could decide that no security gap exists, that the U.S. has superiority and therefore can negotiate now. Some diplomats and disarmament experts in Washington believe that Nixon and Rogers have already concluded that talks should be held--and that a conference may actually begin in two to four months.

Nixon will have certain advantages if he presses for what the bureaucrats have labeled SALT (for Strategic Arms Limitation Talks). No one has ever accused the new President of underestimating the Communists; he would take a tough, skeptical line in any domestic debate about the proceedings. And for the first time in many years, both the U.S. and Russia seem to be in phase regarding their staggeringly costly strategic commitments and conflicting domestic aspirations. This, far more than rhetorical gamesmanship by either side, could be the compelling factor leading to realistic bargaining.

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